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4Introduction
The history of the Iberian Peninsula is intricate and complex. Like most regions of
Western Europe in the Middle Ages, it suffered invasion, occupation, political change
and an almost constant re–alignment of social alliances. Yet the thirteenth century saw
one of the most massive shifts in the balance of power recorded in western history. In the
space of fifty years, Islamic rule within the peninsula was ended for good, with the last
vestiges of Muslim territory erased from the southern peninsula by the fifteenth century.
Christian ascendancy heralded the arrival of a mixed policy of tolerance, as questions
began to be asked about the nature of living together with other cultures and religions and
whether this new rule – this new Christian rule – needed to tolerate the existence of
others in its midst.
The most dramatic shift in policy occurred in the middle of the thirteenth century,
as the campaigns of the two great northern kingdoms of Leon–Castile and Aragon–
Catalonia moved southwards. The most dramatic outcome – due to the size of the Muslim
population – was the relatively swift conquest of, in the case of Ferdinand III, the main
towns of Andalucia and, in the case of James I, king of Aragon, the region of Valencia by
1245. Yet it is important when examining the campaigns of these great warrior kings not
to be overwhelmed by the idea of the religious ethos for the conquest. Some historians
have chosen to interpret the thirteenth–century conquests as the Christian reaction for the
centuries of subjugation under Muslim rule.
The reasoning behind the conquests was far more complex than that of a mere
idealistic crusade. In the case of thirteenth–century Christian expansion, desire for
5territory, sovereignty, inheritance, taxation and inter-territorial rivalry had just as much of
a part to play as a desire to overcome the Muslim ‘infidel.’ It is the conquest of Valencia
which will form the major focal point of this paper, examining the historical precedent
for conquest, the nature of Muslim rule, the ulterior motives of the Christians, the
position of Muslims and Jews in existing Christian society (as well as under the
conquerors) and the role of James I in both consolidating and changing that culture.
The programme of this thesis is divided into two main parts. In the first part, the
paper will explore the impact of historical events up to the birth of James; how these
events both shaped him as a king and as a warrior; and how domestic concerns may have
provided a greater incentive than religious missionaries spreading Crusading fever
amongst Western kingdoms. It will review the impact of those close to the king; on the
nature of his conquest; on his ideology; and how his attitude towards his conquered
subjects was shaped. External political and geographical pressures impacted both upon
the king’s campaigning and, ultimately, how complete the conquest was.
In the second part, the thesis will focus on the communities themselves and the
changes that occurred as the conquests progressed further and further southwards. It will
contrast the circumstances and fortunes of those conquered with the lives of minority
cultures who were already subjects in the Christian realms. It will examine the idea of
hierarchy within minority culture and the social mores that had an even more direct
impact upon community life than the military campaigning. Most important of all, it will
question the idea of convivencia and the concept of tolerance and ‘living together.’
6Chapter One – James I of Aragon and the Llibre dels Fets.
Spain in the thirteenth century was a most unusual territory.1 Christians shared a
bond with the faith of Islam because of its imposing presence in the Iberian world since
the ninth century. It was a bond formed by a shared cultural experience; “by the daily
presence among them of Muslims and of Jews trained in Arabic culture; by the physical
setting in which they lived… which, for centuries, the conquerors hardly attempted to
change.”2 Al–Andalus, by contrast, had been “the monolithic empire of the Almohad
dynasty and religious orientation, centred on Marrakesh at the Sahara’s edge”3 and was
an empire that was fast disintegrating at the dawn of the thirteenth century conquests.
The Iberian Peninsula was home to three disparate religions, living together in
relative harmony, mixing on an almost daily basis.4 Such a situation, even if apparently
deceptive, rarely thrived elsewhere. For the people of Spain, it was a state of reluctantly
accepted co-existence and cultural exchange which existed for social, economic and
military reasons. Particularly in Valencia, Christian, Muslim and Jew lived side by side,
interacting, socialising and conducting business in a way not seen before or since.
Christian conquerors made pacts with Islamic defenders, allowing them to remain in their
lands.
1 The peninsula was “a patchwork of disparate countries, cultures and languages crowded into a geography
of contrasts.” Burns, R. I. ‘Castle of Intellect, Castle of Force: The Worlds of Alfonso the Learned and
James the Conqueror’ in R. I. Burns (ed.) The Worlds of Alfonso the Learned and James the Conqueror –
Intellect and Force in the Middle Ages (Princeton 1985) p 3
2 Hillgarth, J. N. The Spanish Kingdoms 1250–1516 Volume I: ‘1250–1410 Precarious Balance’ (Oxford
1976) p 161
3 Burns (1985) p 3
4 This phenomenon, often referred to as convivencia, is discussed further in chapter 3.
7In this examination of cultural change in the thirteenth century, the three key
players were James I of Aragon (a king greatly influenced by his background and those
who cared for him5 and a representative of Christian sentiment and idealism), along with
the Jews and Muslims themselves, both as individual communities and also as a body
politic. Whilst the Jews merely settled down to life under yet another change of regime,
the conquered Muslims continued to rebel, even when all seemed lost, once the final
conquests of the 1240s had been completed. James’ son, Peter, was to finally enjoy, in
the closing years of the thirteenth century, the limited peace which his own father’s
endeavours had helped to secure.6
Muslims, both in the conquered lands to the south and in James’ homelands of
Aragon and Catalonia, were considered a ‘royal treasure,’ a phrase arising from
Boswell’s study of their status in the fourteenth century.7 In the regions already under
Christian control, Muslims were ‘like frequent raisins in a pudding.’8 In the conquered
territories, they were experts on irrigation, land holdings and the existing Muslim
communities’ legal customs, as well as being key players in trade and commerce. The
Christians became the new paymasters, simply usurping the former Muslim overlords
without any significant changes to the systems and controls that were in place at the time,
particularly in Valencia and along the Ebro river basin.
Christian rulers treated Muslims as valuable commodities from the thirteenth
century until their final expulsion but they still had almost complete disdain for the
5 See page 16 following.
6 For a more detailed discussion of Muslim relations with the conquering king, see Chapters 3 and 4.
7 See Boswell, J. The Royal Treasure: Muslim Communities under the Crown of Aragon in the Fourteenth
Century (Yale 1977)
8 Burns (1985) p 3
8communities themselves, with concerted efforts to convert Muslims to Christianity by
means of language schools. These were run by the mendicant religious orders and
received strong royal backing from James himself. The ultimate irony of Spanish life at
that time was that such attitudes should contrast so greatly with the lax application in
Aragon and Valencia of papal decrees.9 There was a great deal of harmony between
Muslims and Christians, despite official discouragement, with a great deal of contact
through trade, too.
The Jews commanded even more protection from their royal masters, perhaps
because they were of greater value. Jews were servi camerae (‘serfs of the [royal]
chamber’), “for at all times they are ours” according to the Furs of Valencia in 1240.10
What reinforced the Jews’ position was their role as dragomans (royal translator) during
the conquest of Valencia.11 They were the Christians’ interpreters, possessing the
requisite language skills to act as intermediaries between the conquerors and their new
Muslim charges. Despite the paucity of records for Aragon–Catalonia, it is still easy to
see the influence of French and European laws in the king’s total control over his Jewish
subjects. A lord needed to have gained possession of his Jew through donation for the
king to lose such dominion. An important caveat was that Jews were still classified as
9 These dealt, in the main, with correct forms of dress and behaviour for the minorities.
10 Roth, N. ‘The Civic Status of the Jew in Medieval Spain’ in P. E. Chevedden, D. J. Kagay & P. G.
Padilla (ed.) Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages – Essays in Honour of Robert I. Burns
S.J. – Volume II ‘Proceedings from Spain and the Western Mediterranean’ (New York 1996) p 141
11 With their command of classical Arabic, Jews worked as secretaries and translators for the king. The
king’s mobile entourage – when he was on campaign – included chancery officials from the Arabic
department headed up by a Jew. Several specialists in Roman, canon, Islamic and Jewish law accompanied
the king, to help prepare him for most eventualities. (Burns, R. I. Diplomatarium of the Crusader Kingdom
of Valencia, The Registered Charters of its Conqueror Jaume I, 1257–1276, Volume I: Introduction
‘Society and Documentation in Crusader Valencia’ (Princeton 1985) p 29) For a more detailed discussion
of a Jew’s role in James’ court, see Chapter 4.
9free men. “The kings do not have the power to prevent them from going wherever the
spirit moves them.”12
In James’ court in Aragon, Jews were key administrators and financiers.13 Very
often, the Jews were able to rescue James from difficult financial situations, and were
ready to back his campaigning in the Balearics and Valencia even when his own barons
were not. The reasons for this are not difficult to fathom. The Jew, for all his wealth and
apparent influence, had a low social status. There were superficial appointments and
notable exceptions14 but, whereas the Aragonese baron was an established part of the
Christian hierarchy, and could afford to be slightly rebellious when it came to
campaigning, the Jew had in reality little choice but to take the opportunity of providing
financial aid in the hope that it would continue to maintain his position within the societal
structure. The benefits usually far outweighed the drawbacks of continued exploitation.15
The third player in the thirteenth–century Iberian drama was James I, king of
Aragon and count of Catalonia. Compared to his contemporaries, through his tolerance
and diplomacy, he was ‘enlightened’ in his dealings with Muslims and provided the Jews
with a ‘golden age’.16 James was a ruler whose conquests provide the main focus for
analysis. Thirteenth–century Iberia, as the background for his upbringing, was a major
influence in both his personal thinking and his policy. War was a strong motif – four
12 Roth (1996) p 144
13 James’ finances often depended on loans from other parties, since he had no royal reserve of his own.
(Smith, D. & Buffery, H. The Book of Deeds of James I of Aragon – A Translation of the Medieval Catalan
‘Llibre dels Fets’ Crusade Texts in Translation 10 (Ashgate 2003) p 171; Hillgarth (1976) p 241)
14 This was particularly true of the role of alfaquim.
15 This did not prevent violent and erratic attitudes being displayed towards the Jews. See Chapter 3.
16 Burns (1985) p 7
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great battles between 1204 and 1214 helped shape James’ ideology17 – so it is perhaps no
surprise that this paper spends its time considering the impact of James’ military
campaigns upon cultural life in his territories.
The region of Aragon was situated to the north–east of the Iberian Peninsula.18
James did not try and defy the geography of his surroundings in his campaigns, nor was
he particularly over–ambitious. He limited his horizons to those territories with which he
bordered directly or (in the case of the Balearic Islands) those with which his kingdom
had mercantile interests. Mountains, rivers and fragmented land meant that to have had
ambitions above these would have been foolish. More than that, James changed the
whole attitude towards conquest by concentrating the thrust of his incursions southwards,
rather than in expanding the already reasonable foothold his kingdom had in France,
particularly around Montpellier.19 He gave his people instead a Mediterranean empire,
laying the foundations for Catalan naval power in the Western Mediterranean.20
In addition to his Spanish gains, he would inherit claims over southern Italy from
the Hohenstaufens, Tunisia as a client state from the Almohads, “plus a gaggle of
Almohad princes as guests and pawns against the rising Marinid imperium in
Morocco.”21 The king’s strategies were shaped by more than just politics; Bisson calls
17 Burns (1985) p 4–5; The conquest of Valencia was something that James had dreamed of since
childhood. (Burns, R. I. The Crusader Kingdom of Valencia: Reconstruction on a Thirteenth–Century
Frontier, Volume I (Harvard 1967) p 2)
18 See Appendix A
19 It could be argued that these holdings were not destined to last. For a more detailed discussion of James’
politico–territorial entanglements with France, see Chapter 2.
20 Burns (1985) p 7
21 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 3
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James the founder of the federative realms.22 After a turbulent accession to the throne, the
young king was faced with a land in disarray, with a pressing need to put his domestic
affairs in order before embarking upon conquests further afield.23
Campaigns against the Muslims to the south had helped to shape the established
domestic allegiances of the previous century.24 James inherited lands that were cohesive
and expansive yet lightly governed and the people over whom he ruled had either fought
in such conflicts or had close connections with those who had. The changes that had
occurred under his two predecessors25 determined more fundamentally the order (and
disorder) of James’ reign. In Alfonso II’s reign, the newly expanded realms of Aragon
and Catalonia started to become administered as political units, expansion rendering old
structures of power (such as militant alliance of count or king with fighting barons)
worthless, particularly in the face of receding danger in the second half of the twelfth
century.26
This reform was particularly far reaching in Catalonia. Those entrusted with the
enforcement of the peace (vicars and bailiffs) were firmly subordinated to the count and
the king. Such men held both fiscal and military powers of supervision by the thirteenth
22 Bisson, T. N. ‘Prelude to Power: Kingship and Constitution in the Realms of Aragon, 1175–1250’ in R.
I. Burns (ed.) The Worlds of Alfonso the Learned and James the Conqueror – Intellect and Force in the
Middle Ages (Princeton 1985) p 23; “His talents as a ruler were considerable – as an administrator, as a
legislator, as a planner, as a strategist, as a warrior, as a leader of men.” Burns (1967) p 5
23 The early part of his reign was a minority. A more detailed discussion of James’ troubled upbringing and
the shaping of his ideals can be found on page 16 following.
24 Memories of glory extended as far back as the exploits of the Cid. (Burns (1967) p 2)
25 These were James’ grandfather, Alfonso II (1162–1196) and his father, Peter II (1196–1213)
26 Bisson (1985) p 24
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century.27 A new fiscal archive was created, for the collation of crown accounts by
Alfonso, who was ever present at every level of government and society, re-asserting his
control over wayward barons and nobles. The towns of Aragon-Catalonia “amounted to
semiautonomous city-state regions, each governing itself and its dependent villages by an
elected complex of legislative council, executive jurats and judicial justiciar.”28
It would be misleading to suggest that the new regime solved all of the realm’s
problems. It indeed rectified the faults of an ailing system of allegiance but in many ways
failed to address the needs of an expanding kingdom. The new network of power and
responsibilities tied the king more closely into his realm but no measures were put in
place to regulate him or his ambitions.29 New administrative reforms tackled outlying
regions and local administration without fettering the rule of the king, something which
remained personal but totally arbitrary and subject to whim. The courtiers charged with
supervising the enforcers of new rules and regulations were omni-competent and no-one
oversaw their own efforts.
The positive outcome from such legislation was that reform in the outlying
regions would eventually push inwards to the state centre and lead to institutionalisation.
Ministerial functions were undertaken by knights,30 businessmen and Jews but provided
an opportunity for secular clerks and scribes to provide their indispensable professional
literacy to the reforming government of Catalonia. It was not a reform that proved
27 Bisson (1985) p 26; Vanlandingham, M. Transforming the State; King, Court and Political Culture in the
Realms of Aragon (1213–1387) in The Medieval Mediterranean – Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400–
1500 Volume 43 (Boston 2002) p 98
28 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 4
29 “Royal finance remained dynastic and itinerant, without treasury or budget.” Bisson (1985) p 26
30 Ministerial functions were in the areas of diplomacy, justice and finance. Those knights who became
involved tended to be of the wealthy kind.
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popular with the military elite, who were effectively displaced by the changes.31 Despite
dwindling prosperity, their desire for new acquisitions had not dimmed, even though
Alfonso II did not provide any inspiration as an effective campaign leader. The king’s
further attempts at conquering Valencia were hindered by what Bisson refers to as ‘an
inclination for perambulating around his domains on leisurely tours.’ Fresh incursions
against Majorca and Valencia in 1178/9 were unsuccessful.32
It was amidst this atmosphere that a turning point in royal–baronial relations was
reached in 1187. An attempt to ratify the statutes of the peace of Fondarella succeeded
only in driving a wedge between the barons who supported the king and those who firmly
opposed and felt threatened by the Peace. The statutes forbade the very violence with
which they were charged with regulating. This occasioned the first constitutional crisis of
Catalonia’s history, something which would cast its shadow over James’ reign and
severely limit the rise of legislation and taxation for nearly a quarter of a century.33
As Alfonso’s reign ended and Peter II came to the throne, increasing fiscal
concerns were beginning to dominate Aragonese politics – there were a rapidly dwindling
number of lands ripe for conquest and into which they could expand. The crown was also
increasingly involved in heated competition for territory with Castile from the turn of the
thirteenth century. As reserves dwindled and revenue became more of a priority, Peter
relied increasingly on taxation, backing dubious precedents in order to justify the
31 “The universality of the territorial peace, its acceptance at every level, afforded the ruler with an
irresistible construct for use in undermining the foundations of privilege with which various sectors of
society – particularly the baronage – had surrounded themselves.” Vanlandingham (2002) p 98
32 Bisson (1985) p 27; The treaty of Cazola in 1178/9 did, however, set a formula for partition which was to
become familiar under James.
33 Ibid., p 28; The crisis was the root of all the unrest which blighted James’ early years on the throne.
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increasingly bizarre and burdensome taxes which he favoured.34 These were also applied
erratically, with the king rescinding tax demands almost as quickly as he issued them in
an effort not to alienate the vast majority of his nobility. Whilst the spirit of his
endeavours in providing revenue for his rapidly expanding territory proved popular with
his people, the taxes themselves did not, particularly amongst his critics in the church,
whose lands he taxed without their knowledge and generally at will. 35
Upland Aragon was linked to coastal Catalonia as a common realm by virtue of a
shared ruler; in other respects they were separated by language, economy, institutions and
mentality.36 The region endured a different, and much slower, process of transformation
than Catalonia, being targeted more specifically for tough taxation by Peter in the first
three years of his reign. A poorer land, change was regarded as less relevant and reform
was not pursued with the same intensity, a more autonomous nobility less insistent on
their jurisdictional rights. The region also had strong existing fuero legislation surviving
from the twelfth century.37
Aragon did not avoid financial problems. James remarked in his own memoirs
that his father had alienated some seven hundred honours for short term financial gain38
and the sixteenth century historian Zurita notes that there was resistance to Peter’s costly
submission to the Pope in 1204. An attempt to impose the monedajte in 1205 was met
34 Vanlandingham (2002) p 98
35 Unlike their European brothers, the rulers of Aragon had limits when it came to ordinary revenues and
they lacked the right to levy aids on fiefs. Peter often attempted to gloss over the unpopularity of his tax
proposals by declaring them necessary for the war on Muslims. (Bisson (1985) p 29–31)
36 Burns (1985) p 3; Vanlandingham (2002) p 10
37 Bisson (1985) p 31: The effects of Peter’s tax policies would severely constrict the finances available to
James at the start of his reign. See below at page 18.
38 Bisson, T. N. The Medieval Crown of Aragon (Oxford 1986) p 58; Llibre dels Fets p 27 at chapter 11
(discussed in more detail below at page 18 following)
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with concerted protest and this may well mark the point beyond which policy in each
region diverged. There is certainly no real evidence that Aragon ever submitted
substantial money–tax to the king’s coffers, whilst Catalonia certainly did make its fair
share of a contribution, most of the known taxes and borrowings post dating 1205.39
Problems back home in Aragon and Catalonia would continue to dog James throughout
his reign. The conquests helped to solve some of his domestic problems, yet at the same
time set him the challenge of dealing with new problems, external threats and enemies,
less discriminating about the impact of their resentment upon a beleaguered king.
This served as the political and historical background to James’ accession but a
study of the man and his beliefs is just as important. A major document, arguably one of
the most important medieval documents of all, is the autobiographical Llibre dels Fets.
The king’s memoirs are a mixture of forthright bravery and subtle diplomacy, the perfect
model of a Christian king both in public and private life. Whenever death comes, James
told King Sancho of Navarre with his usual practicality, “we kings take no more from
this world than a single shroud, except that it is of better cloth than those of other
people.”40
Temporal and spiritual leadership were intertwined in an ideal Christian and
secular lord and king. Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, archbishop of Toledo, used Alfonso
VIII as his benchmark for integrity in his Dialogus. The same template portrayed a
comparable level of integrity in James. Without faith, man would not subject himself to
man. Christians were defined in relation to their faith, in a direct contrast to Muslims and
39 Bisson (1985) p 32
40 Burns (1985) p 10
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Jews who were defined by their lack of it.41 In their introduction, Damian Smith and
Helena Buffery call the Llibre dels Fets “an historical record without parallel. For the
author of the book was the king.”42 It is interesting to note that the format takes its
inspiration from the chansons de geste; a troubadour’s skill was used to describe the
glories of recent Catalan achievements when levies and taxes needed to be raised for a
new programme of campaigning or when long months of siege warfare had sapped the
morale of the king’s troops.43 The descriptions of the Majorcan and Valencian conquests
are possibly prose versions of several chansons composed at the time.
The narrative employs the first person plural, the colloquial ‘royal we’ used to
emphasise the king’s role in the great conquests of the thirteenth century – the defeat of
Arab forces in the Balearic Islands from 1229 to 1235 (Majorca and Minorca, along with
Ibiza) and Valencia, the capital being taken in 1239 and Játiva, the last city, finally taken
in 1244.44 James’ work is particularly useful for this period. It is less useful for the
immediate aftermath,45 such as the king’s account of his clash with al-Azraq in the late
1240s, which is less than complete. He often leaves out details that do not suit him, and
expends a great deal of effort in attempting to portray the Muslim leader in a bad light.46
41 Pick, L. K. Conflict and Coexistence: Archbishop Rodrigo and the Muslims and Jews of Medieval Spain
(Michigan 2004) p 16
42 Llibre dels Fets p 5
43 Hillgarth (1976) p 235
44 See Appendix B
45 James takes great care not to detail his failures in the crown lands of southern France.
46 It is worth remembering that his principal aim was to show how the Muslims crumbled in the face of
Christian supremacy. Al–Azraq was one of the few Muslims leaders who did not willingly seek surrender
terms with the king. For a more detailed discussion of James’ conflict with al-Azraq, see Chapter 2.
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The Llibre dels Fets aims to present James as God’s champion against Muslims.47
Its authorship makes it a highly biased account, like most chronicles whose agenda is an
insight into providential interpretations and mentalities. Such accounts from this period
do not aim to provide us with economic explanations. Their authors see the events
described as part of a divine plan leading towards victory. What James’ book does
provide could be said to be infinitely more valuable – more so, even, than economic
theories – namely “the ideas and the mentality without which one could not begin to
explain a century of astonishing achievements.”48
James I was born on February 2, 1208 in Montpellier, which still formed part of
the kingdom of Aragon. James acceded to the throne in 1213, after his father had just
been killed during the embarrassing defeat at Muret.49 The future king grew up against a
backdrop of war (the battle of Las Navas, 1212; the aforementioned battle of Muret,
1213; the end of the fourth Crusade in 1204 and the battle of Bouvines, 1214) that had
shaped and changed the political map of Western Europe. Fated by his circumstances, he
became a warrior by trade, both in his campaigning and his diplomatic method.50
One can trace elements of his religious fervour from the identity of his early
custodians. His mother, Maria, had designated first the Templars (in her testament of
47 Hillgarth (1976) p 249; Events are seen almost entirely from the point of view of James himself,
illustrated by the many instances of justifications for the actions of the king – only required if it had been
the king himself writing the narrative. (Llibre dels Fets p 6); However, because it is from James’ point of
view, the narrative is extremely weak in describing events which he did not witness personally and often
‘wildly inaccurate.’ (Ibid., p 8)
48 Hillgarth (1976) p 237: The work is ‘something of a guidebook for how to rule,’ showing what other
kings could achieve with the help of God. (Llibre dels Fets p 6)
49 Chaytor argues that the defeat at Muret ended the pretensions of Aragon in southern France. (Chaytor, H.
J. A History of Aragon and Catalonia (London 1933) p 80) James’ pride, however, led him to at least
attempt to resurrect his kingdom’s interests.
50 Burns (1985) p 5
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1209) and then the Pope (in her testament of 1213, written shortly before she died) as the
guardians of her young son. The newly elected master of the Templars, Guillem de
Montrodón, was to have a big influence on the young king, particularly in regard to the
machinations of Count Don Sancho of Provence and Don Ferdinand, two of James’
relations;51 “both of these hoped to be king.”52 A turbulent early childhood, providing
forceful influences, and a violent backdrop of ongoing family conflict, constantly
impinging upon his early life, was good preparation for the trying years ahead, when
conducting his campaigns in the Balearics and south–eastern Spain.
James spent most of his formative years as king in the Templar fortress of
Monzón, from August 1214 until June 1217,53 the confined environment immersing him
in the ideology which would drive his campaigns forward. James’ career essentially
began as a count, his power base resting in Catalan lands. The title meant regional rule, to
whatever level of independence the count could manage. The local political situation
ultimately meant that James remained a more imposing figure as a count necessarily than
as king.54 He was to be King of the Majorcas, King of Valencia and claimed title as King
of Aragon but he was forever Count of Barcelona in respect of Catalonia.55 This
demonstrates the importance of local power and perhaps explains the reasoning behind
the retention of local structures upon the completion of the Valencian conquest. James
appreciated that, from his own experience, an environment which thrived on established
51 Bisson (1986) p 58
52 Llibre dels Fets p 26 at chapter 11
53 Ibid., p 27 n57
54 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 26
55 Ibid., p 27
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hierarchy might fall away if an attempt were made to strip away local authority in favour
of over-arching rule.
The opening to the Llibre dels Fets leaves one in no doubt as to James’ beliefs
and how this is an exemplar of the Christian sentiment that was prominent at the time;
“And so that all men may recognize and know, when we have passed from
this mortal life, the deeds that we have done with the help of the powerful
Lord, in Whom is true Trinity, we leave this book as a record for those who
might wish to hear of the mercies that Our Lord has shown us, and to give
an example to all the other men of this world so that they should do as we
have done and place their faith in this Lord Who is so powerful.”56
This is a bold and clear statement by the king, ringing with strong Crusader sentiment and
a mindset which is repeatedly conveyed throughout the narrative. When he gathers his
men together before the conquest of Majorca, the king delivers a speech with a similar
theme – namely that God is supporting their every action.57
As a result of dissension during James’ early years, the nobility had gained
unwelcome renown for their actions. The king cleverly presents the campaign as a way
of cleansing all of the barons’ previous evils;
“We can give no remedy for this evil except in two ways: first, through the
will of God guiding us in our business; and second, because you and we
56 Llibre dels Fets p 16 at chapter 1
57 James “could probably understand simple Latin when it was read to him, but his culture was essentially
that of the troubadours, a cult of chivalry and love.” Hillgarth (1976) p 249
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may undertake such enterprises as will be pleasing to God, and that the
enterprise may be so important and good that the bad reputation that you
have may be erased, since the light of good works overcomes the dark.”58
James promises the cleansing of their respective evils during the campaigning as part of
God’s grand design. The king was God’s instrument and therefore obedience to him
would please the Divine Creator. A member of the nobility, G Berenguer de Salano, who
was a witness to events, suggested that the king’s speech was not universally understood,
an observation which might lead one to believe that he could not be heard or that the
assembled nobles were merely ignorant, unable to understand the Latin which the king
employed in his address.59
In addition to increasing factionalism in Aragon, financial constraints of his
accession forced James to ignore the trouble brewing in Southern France. As a young
king in a minority, he was unable to make much of an impression on the well established
consuls at Montpellier or at Marseilles and Provence, independent and under the auspices
of cousin Raymond Berenger V.60 This situation added to the pressure being exerted
upon him by the unrest brewing amongst the barons of Catalonia and Aragon, who were
unsettled by the financial crisis gripping his kingdom. This had been caused, to a large
extent, by James’ father, who had pledged all the kingdom’s revenues and given away
most of the fiefs belonging to the knights of the realm.61
58 Llibre dels Fets p 71 at chapter 48
59 Ibid., n 13
60 Lewis, A. R. ‘James the Conqueror: Montpellier and Southern France’ in R. I. Burns (ed.) The Worlds
of Alfonso the Learned and James the Conqueror – Intellect and Force in the Middle Ages (Princeton 1985)
p 132; He later reluctantly accepted the Capetian takeover of Toulouse and Trencavel in the Midi because
of his absence on campaign in the Balearics and Valencia.
61 Bisson (1986) p 58
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In his Llibre dels Fets, James remarks that;
“all the rents that our father held in Aragon and Catalonia had been pledged
to Jews and to Saracens. Even the honors, some seven hundred knights’ fees
at that time, had been given or sold by our father, King Don Peter, with only
one hundred and thirty remaining. Thus, when we entered Monzon, we had
not even enough food for one day, so wasted and pledged was the land!”62
Arguably this typical twelfth century precedent set the tone for James’ reign. Given the
financial disaster which blighted his accession, the decisions that James was forced into
making in the ensuing years meant that the financial stability of his kingdom was
assured.
The Aragonese nobility craved further wealth and control of territories and James
mentions the factionalism that sprang up during his early years.63 Their divisive
behaviour flourished in the power vacuum created by the minority, when the new king
had no immediate personal authority, but the very nature of the violent factionalism in
the court saved Aragon from being plunged into civil war. Pierre de Douai, acting on
James’ behalf, forced all the assembled barons from Aragon and Catalonia to swear
lasting allegiance to the king at a cort in Lerida but there was no real incentive for them
to comply.64 These “refractory nobles… sometimes fought among themselves with
unconcerned disregard of royal authority, or formed leagues in direct opposition to the
62 Llibre dels Fets p 27 at chapter 11
63 Ibid., at chapter 12; “The Aragonese nobles were traditionally insubordinate and impatient of authority,
characteristics which now became more than ever pronounced.” (Chaytor (1933) p 81)
64 James used these cortes to enact new legislation which superseded local codes. Decrees concerning
counterfeit coinage; instituting the inquisition; fixing prices; restricting extravagance; and regulating
weights and measures, among others, were solemnly sworn by such assemblies.
(Vanlandingham (2002) p 98)
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crown.”65 Catalonia was spared from all new taxes until the king came of age. This could
be seen as an assuaging measure for the barons who had just sworn fealty. The only
proviso was that those living in pledged lands might have to be moderately taxed for the
redemption of those lands.66
Innocent III’s orders in a series of decrees on 23 January 1216 enabled a more
organised approach to redressing the fiscal balance, with Guillem de Montrodón left in
charge of most of the work. James’ youth and inexperience enabled the Pope to step in
and take charge of the situation, installing his own preferred choices in the administrative
positions. With the Templars in charge of the financial administration and with
increasing support from the Pope, the realm’s finances began to level out once more,
although still crippled with unbearable debt.67 By the time that James had asserted his
authority, his understanding of the social balance led him to choose Jews as the more
pragmatic solution.
“While, in 1220, under Jaime I, the responsibility for finance was delegated to
two Templars, one for Aragon, the other for Catalonia, in the thirteenth century in
general many of the main financial officials were Jewish.”68 James also turned to taxation
to further ease the financial instability. These helped to restore some measure of solvency
to the king’s estate in the period 1220–25 but the system relied very much on the restraint
of both the king and his nobles. As James came of age and the barons’ influence began to
65 Chaytor (1933) p 82
66 Bisson (1986) p 59
67 Ibid., p 60; It was this Templar influence, however, that led James to make a potentially fateful decision
in abandoning the alliance he had with the Raimonds of Toulouse.
68 Hillgarth, J. N. ‘The Royal Accounts of the Crown of Aragon’ in H. J. Hames (ed.) Jews, Muslims and
Christians in and around the Crown of Aragon – Essays in Honour of Professor Elena Lourie in The
Medieval Mediterranean – Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400–1500 Volume 52 (Boston 2004) p 18
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increase, there was a return to the old alternative system based on credit. Pledges held by
the Jews were soon recovered and the associated anxiety was quelled.69
Five years old at his accession, with a kingdom in financial ruin, the new king
had been in no position to remedy his people’s ills. It was in Aragon that “James learned
how to fight and how to negotiate… and men learned to respect him there.”70 By keeping
the church and the towns on his side through careful negotiation and shrewd concessions,
James established a precarious balance between friend and foe. The church and towns
often came to James’ assistance during the more troublesome years of his early reign.71
The path of the conflict between king and nobility was ultimately dictated by the young
king’s tactical and emotional immaturity.
James won eventual, and hard-fought, respect from his baronage yet, when it
came to writing his memoirs, he callously trivialised a key incident in the power
struggles taking place during his minority. He accuses Guillem de Cervello and Don
Nuno Sanches of quarrelling over a male goshawk, hardly the most serious of
arguments.72 The incident possibly evoked a bitter memory, as the king had been drawn
into a rivalry not of his making, with the two protagonists using him to get what they
wanted.73 Alternatively, James may have deliberately played down the seriousness of the
situation in order to avert a reader’s attention from a quarrel that could have had serious
69 Bisson (1985) p 33–34: The taxes had been rejected under his father’s rule and avoided at the 1214 cort.
70 Bisson (1986) p 61
71 Chaytor (1933) p 82
72 Llibre dels Fets p 34 at chapter 20
73 Bisson (1986) p 62
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implications for James’ kingship and which represented yet another attempt by two noble
factions to gain control of the king and his favour.74
One other interpretation could be that James used an allegory to allow his readers
to visualise the hunting down by James of the factionalism within his own state. Hunting
had a strong literary expression within the social hierarchy of any medieval nobility, not
just the Spanish one. The apparent trivialisation was perhaps yet another expression by
James of the ease with which he was dealing with early problems in his reign. Arrogantly
expressed, this anecdote provides us with an example of James asserting his royal
authority, dispelling doubts about any potential problems that continued to linger within
his kingdom. For all the king’s bluff and bluster, this juncture (possibly late 1222) could
be argued to represent a realignment of the factions within Aragon.75
Lessons were learnt on both sides. James’ mishandling of the rebel Pedro Ahones
in 1225, along with an early and unsuccessful siege of Peniscola, led to a league of
magnates rising up against him, and he only just prevailed in 1227. This was fortunately
not an organised revolt and was more indicative of desperation on the part of the
magnates, whose influence was fading.76 James’ negotiating capabilities received another
test in 1228 when Aurembiax, daughter of Count Armengol VIII, claimed her inheritance
in Urgel. This was a key northern territory, separating Aragon from James’ beloved
Catalonia and Barcelona. Therefore, the king desired that control of the region should not
be lost. Guerao, her cousin, was attempting to seize the lands for himself, on the basis
74 “James… deliberately… trivializes one of the most important conflicts of the minority.” (Llibre dels Fets
p 34 n 92)
75 Ibid.
76 Bisson (1986) p 61–2
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that a woman should not inherit. He had overrun the country in 1220 whilst James was
struggling with his minority and it was only in 1228 that he could finally divert his full
attention to dealing with the problem.77
Having bought Guerao out, on the pretext that Aurembiax could redeem the
territory from him, he arranged a mock show trial (she was clearly one of the king’s
many mistresses) where she promised to hold the country in fief for James, whilst ceding
control of Lerida to him. Guerao was driven out and Pedro of Portugal was installed as a
husband for Aurembiax. By means of rotation, James got what he wanted by taking the
whole province from Pedro on Aurembiax’s death in 1231, giving him the Balearic
Islands and then lands in Valencia upon its conquest.78 Whilst his clever policy was
undoubtedly linked to the necessity of keeping one eye firmly on the complicated system
of bequests made to his extended family, this is clear evidence of the way that James’
slick negotiating skills were honed on the battlegrounds of home long before he crossed
the border into Valencia.
It is hard to decide who was manipulating whom. The same pattern of
factionalism that marked James’ early reign existed here, except that now it was king and
noble vying directly with each other for power and control.79 The effect of a relatively
easy conquest of Majorca was that “the king… won independence of action as well as
prestige.”80 The Aragonese nobles wanted James to conquer Valencia. For the obvious
77 Chaytor (1933) p 82
78 Ibid., p 83
79 James’ clever politicking had negative effects for him. An increasing reliance on peace assemblies meant
that, although the king effectively balanced his influence with that of his refractory nobles, he became
increasingly reliant on support from the assemblies. (Vanlandingham (2002) p 99–100)
80 Bisson (1986) p 65
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additional rewards, they felt that the more expensive campaign to the south was
ultimately more profitable (at least for them) than a campaign in the Balearic Islands.
James was disinclined to either humour their obvious political designs on the southern
region or change his plan of attack.81 Valencia was, after all, a land in exaggerated
political decline, from which the young king already received tribute.82
James needed to raise money, both to stabilise his own royal finances and
subsequently to fund his ambitious campaigning, as well as make his mark on the
kingdom, and the conquests in the Balearics served both purposes.83 It was an opportune
moment to overthrow a weak Muslim ruler and to garner for himself newfound respect
from the sceptical nobility, in particular the Aragonese barons.84 In renewing a
programme of re-conquest, “James responded to the hopes of his peoples, the Templars,
and the pope alike.”85 Yet it is an irony of James’ policy that he should then invade
Valencia out of a fear of losing Montpellier, arguably the most important port of the
Midi. The counter crusade of 1269 alienated the support the king had there86 and
Montpellier turned against him anyway, the one thing he had tried to avoid.
81 James was furious with the Aragonese nobility for forcing him to marry Leonore, daughter of Alfonso
VIII of Castile, whom he despised, in 1221. In rejecting their calls for a Valencian invasion and annulling
his marriage, 1229 was a satisfying year for James. (Shneidman, J. Lee The Rise of the Aragonese–Catalan
Empire 1200–1350, Volume Two (New York/London 1970) p 309)
82 Bisson (1986) p 64
83 Lewis (1985) p 133; Financial management consisted of an attempt to gather revenue as quickly as
possible to cover both current expense and debts that the king could no longer afford to ignore. It was not a
system based on budget but, by now, one based on credit. (Vanlandingham (2002) p 120)
84 Throughout his autobiography, James presents himself as an activist warrior, but this was mainly
“because the Islamic influences on his autobiography favored that fantasy.” These events demonstrate that
the reality was often a lot more complex. (Burns (1985) p 21)
85 Bisson (1986) p 64
86 He “found himself increasingly isolated, and publicly humiliated.” Lewis (1985) p 147
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The decision to attack Majorca was primarily a measure designed to satisfy the
Catalan merchants, who frequently complained of piracy by the Moors there87 and was
also an ambition that had been firmly at the front of his father’s mind.88 The Muslim
regime on the island was also in a poor state of repair, living on ‘borrowed time.’89 The
king deliberately rejected overtures from the refugee Abu Zayd, recently deposed, who
sought Christian sympathy90 and assistance in Valencia to defeat Zayyan, a rival Muslim
who had supplanted him.91 The wali promised very generous terms, including handing
over all his landed possessions to James’ control as part of the alliance. But the king was
far too preoccupied and focused on the impending Majorcan campaign, for which he had
spent much time and money preparing.92
James relates proceedings as follows;
“When we had eaten, they [the Catalan nobles] came before us and they
said to us: “Lord, we have asked Pere Martell something that we think will
please you, about an island that is called Majorca.” ” The nobles then go on
to describe the island’s dominion over nearby Menorca and Ibiza. “ “You
87 O’Callaghan, J. F. Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain (Pennsylvania 2003) p 90
88 Chaytor (1933) p 83
89 Bisson (1986) p 63
90 Abu Zayd also approached the papal legate, Jean d’Abbeville, in an attempt to maintain his independence
by converting to Christianity and subjugating his kingdom to the Holy See. (O’Callaghan (2003) p 90)
91 In the midst of the confusion which followed the Battle of Las Navas in 1212, the Muslim territory to the
south had fragmented into competitive micro-states. Zayyan appealed to, and received support from,
Tunisia and the Hafsids, with Abu Zayd and Ibn Hud making appeals to Castile, whilst respectively looking
upon the Almohads and the Baghdad caliphate for their legitimacy. When Zayyan made an aggressive
move on Valencia, the defeated Abu Zayd sought assistance from James, as the Aragonese king’s
ambitions in this direction were well–known. (Burns, R. I. & Chevedden, P. E. (with a contribution by de
Epalza, M.) Negotiating Cultures – Bilingual Surrender Treaties in Muslim–Crusader Spain under James
the Conqueror in The Medieval Mediterranean – Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400–1453 Volume 22
(Boston 1999) p 4) James would later take the wali up on his offer when he finally commenced his
Valencian campaign.
92 Chaytor (1933) p 84; Conquest proved expensive. “The warfare in which they constantly engaged…
rapidly drained the royal treasure chests.” (Vanlandingham (2002) p 124)
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should conquer that island for two reasons: the first, because you and we
will increase our worth; the second, because it will seem a marvellous thing
to all who hear about this conquest, for you will have taken a land and
kingdom in the sea, there where God wished to fashion it.” And we listened
to their words and we were greatly pleased by them.”93
The date of the meeting where this request took place is November 1228 and the king
was at Tarragona. Clearly the 20 year old king valued his reputation, with a need for
prestige, and was still not immune to vanity. “The king’s memoirs reveal both his
womanizing and his Marian piety, his brutal and tender moments, and his childlike
vanity.”94 The nobles cleverly exploited his ambition and lack of modesty by making
such a request. Of course, there was a great deal to be gained by them as well.
Campaigning in the Balearic Islands (and Majorca in particular) would ultimately
provide a good testing ground for James’ battle tactics and diplomacy and act as a
precursor to his incursions on the main peninsula. The 1229 campaigns were well–
planned, taking advantage of weakened rule but mindful of the immediate importance to
trade. The cost of attacking the Balearics was ultimately lower than a major assault on
Valencia. James was well informed about Muslims both in the Balearics, by his Catalan
merchants, and in Valencia by “one of his nobles, who had spent two years in exile…
[there] and who knew both the attractions of that kingdom and where it was vulnerable to
attack.”95
93 Llibre dels Fets p 70 at chapter 47; James had confidence that God would guide them (p 80 at chapter 56)
94 Burns (1985) p 10
95 Hillgarth (1976) p 156–7
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The campaign in Majorca was brutal. Several thousand Muslims escaped to the
mountains but just as many again were butchered by the Christians.96 Perhaps this
approach was adopted because the Balearic Islands needed much stronger Christian
control, since they were effectively outposts of James’ territory. Conversely, the very
proximity of Valencia to Aragon and the size of its Muslim population meant that the
king had to be very careful that it did not turn into a bloodbath. Precedent for the more
peaceful settlements of his later campaign came as James negotiated truces with the local
Muslim chieftains well in advance of the principal massacre at Majorca city.97
The situation on the island remained in the balance whilst James left for
Tarragona and settled a dispute between Sancho of Navarre98 and Theobald of
Champagne. It was not until 1235 that Ibiza was captured and the Muslim presence in the
Balearics was finally subdued.99 As Harvey points out, enslaved Muslims represented the
largest proportion of the population on the islands.100 James aimed to benefit, through
tribute, from the mercantile colonies of the Mediterranean and northern Africa. The king
looked out on the Maghrib from his position in the recently–conquered lands with ideas
of commercial exploitation, not expulsion or conversion.101
The increasingly impatient nobility finally forced James’ hand and he turned his
attention to a conquest of Valencia in 1233.102 During a lull in the fighting in the
96 30,000 Muslims are said to have escaped to the mountains. (Chaytor (1933) p 84); Most departed for
other islands or North Africa. (O’Callaghan (2003) p 92)
97 This reflects tactics that would be employed without exception during the Valencian campaign.
98 This territory was to the north of Aragon.
99 Chaytor (1933) p 84; James left affairs in Majorca in the hands of trusted Berenguer de Santa Eugenia
whilst he was in Tarragona.
100 Harvey, L. P. Islamic Spain 1250 to 1500 (Chicago 1990) p 116
101 Bisson (1986) p 70
102 Burns (1967) p 3
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Balearics, James moved on the strongpoint of Morella, already taken by a zealous noble,
Blasco de Alagon.103 Fernando Diaz said that “it would be better for the Moors to have it
than Don Blasco, as you can sooner take it from the Moors than from” him.104 In May,
James attempted to rally other nobles to his cause in Teruel but a relatively poor response
limited his initial successes to towns in the northern territories, such as Burriana and
Peniscola. After resolving yet further domestic problems, James attempted to restart his
campaign two years later, but found that any remaining fervour had dissipated.105
Having secured another stronghold at Puig de Cebolla, only twelve miles from
Valencia, he had left a garrison behind until he could assemble a larger army.106 The
baron charged with its custody died,107 and the men left to repel vigorous attempts by the
Muslims to regain control were severely disheartened. The nobility of his uncle,
Ferdinand’s, party advocated an abandonment of the campaign entirely.108 The younger
James might well have been dissuaded but to his stubbornness had been allied
experience, both from domestic disputes and his Balearic campaigns. Just as the political,
religious, demographic and cultural nature of the landscape changed, so James himself
changed and moulded the application of his ideas from campaign to campaign.
103 Llibre dels Fets p 140–145 at chapters 130 to 138 and p 143 note 24; James had granted Don Blasco the
right to all castles and lands he could seize in Valencia in a charter of 1226, by way of thanks for the
support during his minority. The king never expected Blasco to succeed given his own failure in Peniscola
in 1225. Nonetheless, Blasco took Morella in 1231–2.
104 Ibid., p 141 at chapter 133 and p 141 n 16; Fernando Diaz was a key player in the success of James’
campaigns in Valencia, receiving many rewards of lands in the Repartimiento of Valencia.
105 Chaytor (1933) p 84–85; Shneidman (1970) p 310
106 This was in late 1237. (Llibre dels Fets p 187–188 at chapters 206 to 208)
107 This baron was Bernat Guillem d’Entenza, James’ uncle. His death occurred in either December 1237 or
January 1238, whilst James was at Zaragoza. (Ibid., p 202 n 37)
108 Chaytor (1933) p 86; the knights left behind at Puig by Entenza’s death desired to return home (Llibre
dels Fets p 205 at chapter 236); Ferdinand expressed his amazement that James “should wish to act upon
this plan that we had made; because to take Valencia was a great thing, and we were trying to do something
that none of our line had ever been able to achieve…” (Ibid., p 208 at chapter 240)
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James ignored the scepticism of his uncle and the nobility, pressing on with his
Valencian expedition.109 The prospect of a positive outcome grew and previously–lacking
support was galvanised into fresh optimism, James’ numbers being duly swelled in time
for the profitable siege of Valencia in the spring of 1238.110 James’ tactics significantly
diverged from those adopted in the Balearics. His men, looking forward eagerly to a
week of slaughter and pillage following the surrender of the city in September,111 were
disgusted when James gave a twenty–day window to Zayyan and his followers to
abandon the territory and retreat to friendlier climes, an offer which 50,000 Muslims are
said to have accepted.112 Any chance of assuaging his disgruntled nobles was missed
when the planned distribution of spoils amounted to more than the land that was
available. James was forced to renegotiate the division, much to the chagrin of his
detractors.113
James organised his Valencian conquest into what amounted to a separate
kingdom – it had its own privileges, coinage, legal code and parliament. It had an
extensive water supply (with thirty-five rivers) and was heavily fortified with castles
which supplemented the natural mountainous geography of the region. It soon took on the
colour of its conquerors, “mutating into a world of communes, guilds, hospitals, banks,
109 “Now we saw their intentions, for they desired us to go to Catalonia and Aragon.” Llibre dels Fets p 208
at chapter 241
110 Chaytor (1933) p 86; 22 April 1238, to be more exact (Llibre dels Fets p 216 n 69)
111 28 September 1238. (Ibid., p 229 n 104)
112 Chaytor (1933) p 86; James’ barons were furious that the king had taken the city without their help,
again increasing his power at their expense. (Llibre dels Fets p 229 n 105); Burns states that there were
only 15,000 (Burns, R. I. Islam under the Crusaders (Princeton 1973) p 76)
113 Chaytor (1933) p 87; James claims that trickery by the barons had led to too many promises being made
and as a result there was not enough land to go around. Therefore, “we took land from those who had too
much, and redistributed it fairly, so that all had adequate land there.” (Llibre dels Fets p 231 at chapter 285)
The Repartimiento was negotiated in October/ November of 1238. (Ibid., p 231 n 111)
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town halls and Gothic churches.”114 There would be a big clash between mercantile and
baronial life in Valencia, which had a predominantly mercantile culture. The conquests
fortified the ‘dominant urban–commercial’ interest of Aragon–Catalonia and brought
confrontation with the upland barons.115
114 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 5
115 Burns (1985) p 21
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Chapter Two – Christian Conquest: Tactics and Philosophies
Tactics and Philosophies before the Conquest
The faith of Islam had a clear attitude towards non–believers from the seventh
century; all lands should be subdued by Islam so that everyone might have the choice
to convert and live as Muslims. The world was deemed to be in two parts, the dar al–
Islam (“abode of Islam”) and the dar al–harb (“abode of war”), and every believer
was obliged to provide periodic military service to advance the frontiers of Islam, as
an expression of their faith.116 Such religious fervour fired the initial Muslim
conquest of Spain. An equivalent sentiment provided the inspiration for, and then the
actions of, Christian Reconquest, as shown by western ecclesiastical documents and
chronicles from 881 to the twelfth century. Yet the conquests of James I of Aragon
ended in negotiated surrender, peaceful settlement and relatively little bloodshed.
Was this the same Christian sentiment at work?
Forays by the crown of Aragon into Valencia and other Muslim–controlled
territory had occurred as recently as the reign of Alfonso II (to limited effect) but the
last major reclamation of lands from the Muslims was completed under Alfonso I
(1104–1134) in the Ebro valley. His conquests have often been criticised for the lack
of consolidation which followed, leaving the lands open to retaliation and reprisals.
However, “the immediate context in which settlement occurred and the motivations
of those carrying it out” should be considered.117 Study of Alfonso’s campaigns is an
important part of Spanish frontier history, as these conquests turned Aragon into a
major Iberian power. It struck the double blow of ending Almoravid control of the al–
116 Catlos, B. A. The Victors and the Vanquished – Christians and Muslims of Catalonia and Aragon,
1050 – 1300 (Cambridge 2004) p 81
117 Stalls, W. C. ‘The Relationship between Conquest and Settlement on the Aragonese Frontier of
Alfonso I’ in L.J. Simon (ed.) Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages – Essays in
Honour of Robert I. Burns S.J. – Volume I ‘Proceedings from Kalamazoo’ (New York 1995) p 231
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thagar al–acla (defensive border) guarding the Islamic part of Spain and also pre–
empted Castilian ambition in a region of geographical, strategic interest and economic
viability.118
Given his own limited resources, Alfonso struggled to consolidate his
conquests. It is an obvious statement that any Christian–conquered lands in the region
would have been strengthened by the presence of a strong Christian population119 but
Alfonso did not import settlers into the region with any frequency. Alfonso did use
grants effectively to secure some of his conquests but this was all too often motivated
by a desire to ward off political opponents; whilst defensive purpose sometimes
provided motivation, more often personal reasoning spurred on the decision to
allocate royal grants.120 Three–quarters of the population of the conquered territories
were Muslim. The remainder were likely to have been Mozarabs and Jews and whilst
Christian immigration from the north and Muslim migration to the south would
gradually redress the military danger of such a situation, it would be too gradual a
process. Alfonso’s attention was desperately required.121
The act of settlement itself was designated by the king as something to be
carried out by the lesser nobility: transactions revolved around the payment of money
rather than feudal holdings. Christians buying property from Christians ensured the
circulation of property and the establishment of a permanent residence in the Ebro.
Resettlement was therefore informal rather than being directed by king, nobility and
118 Stalls (1995) p 216
119 Ibid., p 218
120 Ibid., p 223; Grants were a key mechanism for all medieval monarchs in their alliances with the
nobility. Alfonso gave the community of Anesa, which he had originally conquered as part of his
campaigns up to 1106, to the Aragonese nobleman Lop Garces Peregrino in 1117. This was no doubt
an assuaging measure to annul the effects of a potential rival.
121 Reilly, B. F., The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain 1031–1157 (Blackwell 1992) p 162
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church.122 Many settlements remained exclusively Muslim. Christians were usually in
the minority; sometimes the only Christians in a community were a priest, a notary
and a tavern keeper.123
Alfonso’s tactics were instead to cut off the obvious routes of attack for the
Muslims pressing his Ebro borders. Much as James would do a century later, Alfonso
ensured the continuation of a Muslim community’s rights under their established law,
to prevent reprisals from the Murabit regime to the south. They could not be pressed
into military service or have a Jew placed in authority over them and the annual tax
was maintained at the usual tenth of all produce. Alfonso then swept south, through
Valencia, reaching as far as Murcia, destroying crops, killing livestock, savaging the
hinterland; a plan that was at best preventative, but still effective. Alfonso was
accompanied back to Aragon by sizeable contingents of Mozarabs, who helped solve
part of his settlement problem.124
In spite of Muslim political weaknesses and Alfonso’s tactics, they still
represented a considerable threat and continued to put unbearable pressure on
northern Christian territories through their incursions and raids. The survival of royal
grants from 1124 for Bajo Aragon (to the south of the Ebro river and directly
bordering Muslim territory) demonstrate that Alfonso was really set on establishing a
bulwark against Islamic Spain rather than simply fostering settlement. Belchite, a key
city in the area, was undoubtedly a target of frequent Muslim attacks and Alfonso’s
122 Stalls (1995) p 227–8
123 Ibid., p 224; this was the same in thirteenth–century communities like Eslida and Alfandech.
See p 57–60 below.
124 Reilly (1992) p 162–3 and 165–7
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stocking of the villages, which surrounded the city, with heavyweight numbers of
Christian settlers suggests an attempt to shore up failing defences.125
The conquered lands of the Ebro would remain vulnerable to small–scale
Muslim attacks beyond the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, right up until
James’ subjugation of Valencia,126 perhaps as a direct result of Alfonso’s settlement
policy. Yet, “in view of the difficulties with which he was confronted both in his
domestic and public life,” Alfonso’s “achievements were remarkable and placed the
idea of reconquest before his successors as a feasible policy.”127 The Muslims were
militarily weak and disillusioned with their leadership and the Aragonese – unable to
garrison enough towns for a prolonged attack on the region due to their limited
resources – always had one eye on Castile, their competitor for the conquered
territories. Their respective goals – Muslim autonomy and Christian revenue
collection – were not mutually exclusive.128
Tactics and Philosophies during the Conquest
After his glorious successes in the Balearics and a flawed but ultimately
successful early campaign in Valencia, which led to the capture of the capital in 1238,
James was distracted by domestic concerns. Trouble was rapidly brewing in the
hinterland of James’ northern domain. French advances into Occitania proved an
ever–present threat and the king became increasingly alarmed at the progress made by
the French crown under Louis.129 A considerable amount of time was spent away
from Valencia trying to maintain Aragon’s presence in southern France. James was
125 Stalls (1995) p 221–222
126 Catlos (2004) p 93
127 Chaytor (1933) p 55
128 Catlos (2004) p 95
129 Chaytor (1933) p 87
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unable to use marriage pacts,130 so he initially attempted to unite Toulouse and
Provence as a check against Louis’ progress. In a bizarre twist, the Pope with whom
James had negotiated the necessary dispensations died and in the ensuing
interregnum, the king lost control of the situation.131
In 1245, after the death of Raymond Berenguer V, Charles of Anjou and his
brother, Alphonse of Poitiers, took advantage of the unstable political situation to
disrupt the marriage plans of the Count of Toulouse, who subsequently died. The
Provencal line, now a generation removed from its links with Catalonia and Aragon,
passed to Charles and Alphonse. Viscount Raimond Trencavel II, supplanted by this
change of ownership, treated James more as a protector of his own interests than as an
ally.132 As the chance of a united southern France disappeared entirely, the king’s
own actions in 1258133 were the ones that ensured Capetian domination as far as the
Pyrenees and the end of any ambitions Aragon might have had. James was forced to
accept Louis’ control in Montpellier, for fear of being seen as provocative towards his
neighbours.
He tried to curtail his losses by apportioning his birthplace as the inheritance
of his youngest son James and refrained from pressing claims on his less substantial
holdings (an action which, after his failures in the 1240s, would have led to the king’s
status being redefined as ‘vassal’ to Louis, something which would have been
unacceptable to the Aragonese king). James then arranged a strategic marriage with
Charles of Anjou’s closest enemy, in an attempt to check the French noble’s greedy
ambition. His machinations were less than successful. Rather than strengthening his
130 Bisson (1986) p 68; Close blood relations in the region made this impossible.
131 Chaytor (1933) p 87; a revolt against Louis’ authority had failed (Shneidman (1970) p 311)
132 Bisson (1986) p 68
133 1258 was when he renounced all claim to lands in Occitania and legitimised the state of affairs by
betrothing his daughter to France’s heir.
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own position, he merely riled France, further alienating any possibility of
reconciliation. He also lost support from the Papacy (although such a rebuke had been
a long time in coming), already anxious about his real motives in conquering
Valencia. To Rome, they seemed increasingly far from religious–inspired.134
The fact that Christians were animated by the desire for a united Spain, re-
conquered from the Muslim infidel, has been taken for granted by historians.135 Often
presented as an organised, steady recovery of territory from the Muslims, a long
process which took over eight centuries,136 the Reconquest was in reality an extended
series of brawls between Christian and Muslim protagonists in different parts of the
peninsula. Furthermore, the process of conquest was not so much ‘a pattern of
regional subordination,’ as part of a process of the conquerors extending their existing
forms of life and ways of living.137
To the east, the Reconquest was punctuated by the conquests of Alfonso I and
James I in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. James aimed to increase Aragon’s
influence and presence. He was mindful of the burgeoning expansionist ambitions of
his neighbouring rivals Castile, which extended to intrigue, alliances with his Muslim
enemies and even an invasion of his land interests. James’ campaign in Valencia
centred upon three large sieges at Burriana, Valencia city and Jativa. In the first two
examples, a bloody outcome led to the expulsion of the Muslim population. The third
proved to be more of a challenge as the defenders put up more of a struggle.138
134 Bisson (1986) p 69–70; James married the infant Pedro to Constance of Hohenstaufen, the daughter
of Manfred and heiress of Sicily in 1262.
135 Pick (2004) p 16
136 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 3
137 Bartlett, R. J. The making of Europe: conquest, colonization, and cultural change, 950–1350
(Princeton 1993) p 306–7
138 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 4; Burriana and Valencia were exceptions. (Burns (1973) p 139)
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But James, like Rodrigo Jimenez de Rada in Castile, increasingly understood
the importance of words in creating identity and fostering unity.139 The success of his
surrender negotiations was “largely due to the liberal terms he was prepared to grant
to Muslims who surrendered and to their faith in his word.”140 Muslims were bound
to trust his verbal promises and choose surrender over a bloodier conclusion. They
had the evidence of the Balearic Islands, as well as early defeats to the north, to
provide them with proof of what could happen if James felt so motivated.141 James
appears to have been prepared to trust the Muslims when conducting his surrender, on
more than one occasion being able to wait outside a conquered Saracen fortress alone.
This is true in particular of the capture of Peniscola (on the east coast of
Aragon) in 1233. James sent his own men with the alfaquim and his companion into
the city to raise the royal pennon on the tower, while
“the other Saracens, a good two hundred of them, were in front of us and
remained with us; and we made sure that none of them could seize the
reins of our horse. When we saw that our men cried “Aragon!” we went
up, together with the Saracens.”142
139 Pick (2004) p 70
140 Hillgarth (1976) p 249; At various stages during his conquest, James could not complete some parts
of the surrender negotiations because he frequently outran his court entourage and had to wait for them
to arrive with the necessary papers. (Diplomatarium Vol. I p 21)
141 James used a trebuchet to slingshot the head of the local Muslim leader into the town to force a
quick surrender during the Majorcan campaign. (Llibre dels Fets p 95 at chapter 70) The king did not
miss the opportunity to end the bloodshed and add another prize to his already growing list of
achievements. It was ironic that Muslim technology afforded him the opportunity; they were at the
forefront of trebuchet (siege engine) development, possibly introducing the use of the counterweight
version in the twelfth century. (Chevedden, P. E. ‘The Artillery of King James I the Conqueror’ in P. E.
Chevedden, D. J. Kagay & P. G. Padilla (ed.) Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages
– Essays in Honour of Robert I. Burns S.J. – Volume II ‘Proceedings from Spain and the Western
Mediterranean’ (New York 1996) p 57)
142 Llibre dels Fets p 174 at chapter 184
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James did not trust the Muslims entirely, despite his inherently chivalric nature being
on display here. His extra precautions ensured that he could not be taken by surprise
by any of the Saracens if they happened to have concealed weapons. This suspicion is
not simply the product of years of conflict and isolated war. It is indicative of a
struggle that would continue into the many centuries ahead; three cultures, thrown
together by geography and circumstance, attempting to live together in relative peace
and harmony.143
The victory of the Christians at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212 had caused the
collapse of the Almohad Empire, which had disintegrated into a gaggle of squabbling
factions.144 Valencia was the last remaining Almohad province in Spain by the time
that James was planning his invasion. The historian Ibn Khaldun describes the
situation between 1212 and 1236 as confused; ““every qa’id and man of influence,
who could command a few score of followers, or possessed a castle to retire to in case
of need, styled himself sultan and assumed the insignia of royalty” so that Islamic
Spain “afforded the very singular aspect of as many kings as there were castellated
towns in the countryside.””145 The region was a mess of inter–related and inter–
dependent rivalries. Jativa was one of these mini–states, as was the mountain
principality under al–Azraq.
Conquering Jativa
James and his dynasty had long since claimed the right to re–settle the coastal
lands to the south of Aragon and Catalonia146 and the cities of Valencia were high
143 James displayed ruthlessness at Valencia city, when he burned Muslim defenders calling for mercy
because they had not surrendered straight away. (Llibre dels Fets p 222 at chapter 268)
144 Burns (1967) p 3
145 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 4–5
146 The 1151 and 1179 treaties between the Aragonese and Castilian monarchs set out the rights, and
areas, of conquest for each to pursue (Chaytor (1933) p 66)
41
amongst his priorities. More practical issues eventually drove his campaign, as he
bequeathed lands encompassing Jativa to his son Peter in 1241, therefore making it an
imperative to secure the city at the earliest opportunity to meet the provisions of the
bequest. James effectively ignored a recently agreed treaty with Zayyan (which
stipulated that he should not advance south of the Jucar river) in the scramble to
control the city.147 The qa’id, Abu Bakr, had actually rejected James’ early attempts
at surrender, stating that it would be an insult to Muslim and Christian alike if he
were to surrender Jativa city so casually and without true cause. To surrender would
bring shame.148
Jativa lay along a crest of mountains, some fifty miles southwest of Valencia
city, one hundred feet above sea level. It is considered to have been the most
formidable of the free-standing castles of Islamic Spain. The surrounding region was
filled with other settlements and fortifications but the praise of Islamic geographers
and historians was directed at Jativa. The thirteenth–century historian Desclot
commented that James was able to conquer the city only by cunning diplomacy.
Nowhere in the world was there “a castle so strong and regal.” The town had been the
centre of an administrative region under the Muslims; it continued to be so under the
Christians.149 James was taken aback by the splendour of the city when he saw it for
the first time, great joy filling his heart.150 Jativa was the key to the kingdom; without
it he could not be king of Valencia.151
147 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 77–8
148 Llibre dels Fets p 258, at chapter 336; Abu Bakr was a member of the powerful and influential Banu
Isa dynasty. (O’Connor, I. A. A Forgotten Community – The Mudejar Aljama of Xativa, 1240–1327 in
The Medieval Mediterranean – Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400–1500 Volume 44 (Boston 2003)
p 28)
149 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 63–4
150 Llibre dels Fets p 250, at chapter 318 and p 268, at chapter 353; James’ queen exhorts him that he
should not delay matters for a castle or two if he was able to obtain Jativa since “it is the most beautiful
and richest castle that I or anybody has ever seen.”
151 Ibid., p 268, at chapter 350
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The turbulent French situation would interrupt matters at Jativa at two key
stages, in 1239 and in 1245, on both occasions forcing him to enter into an uneasy
truce with the Muslim qa’id and on each occasion breaking the stranglehold which
James had over the situation there.152 In 1240, a year after aborting his first effort,
James returned to Valencia for another attempt at subjugating Jativa. What he found
was chaos, with his forces engaging in opportunistic raiding and exploitation of the
conquered Muslims. His interim governor was forced to admit that one of those raids
had gone disastrously wrong and that Christian knights now needed rescuing.153
James feigned that he had returned for that very purpose but he must have been
secretly fuming at the incompetence of his officials.
James assured the qa’id that he would make good the cost of his men’s
misadventure (provided that the captives were returned) whilst at the same time
covertly establishing siege operations once more, dismantling the waterworks and
infrastructure feeding the city.154 When the Muslims demanded a ransom, James was
pleased because it meant that he could attack the city, something which he wanted far
more than to free his captured knights.155 Abu Bakr hurriedly attempted to offer up
the captives, realising his earlier folly but any further damage was minimised when
news of a possible defection by one of the king’s nobles allowed the Muslim to take
advantage.156
152 In the case of the 1239 siege, this lasted only a few weeks before James had to contend with
pressures being exerted by French advances being made in the wake of the Albigensian crusade.
153 Llibre dels Fets p 249, at chapter 317
154 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 84; James concealed his larger plan from his men because they were
notoriously and stubbornly opposed to large scale actions that would primarily benefit the crown.
155 Llibre dels Fets p 250, at chapter 319
156 Ibid., p 254, at chapter 325; this baron was Garcia Romeu, whose defection could have meant defeat
for James. In fact, Abu Bakr knew that even if Romeu defected, James would merely return with yet
another army, so he decided to make the situation work to his advantage.
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The Muslim envoys revealed the treachery to the king, manufacturing a peace
agreement and James, in turn, took the opportunity to perform an elaborate ritual
usually reserved for an uncontested surrender. However, all this was posturing. James
knew that the Muslims “had played word games, committing themselves in no sense
offensive to an Islamic sensibility.”157 By 1242, all but Jativa had formally
surrendered to the king down to the Jucar river and in his autobiography James shows
his distinct unconcern about the region remaining unconquered.158 But “if the chaotic
political situation made the conquest of Jativa… possible, the intrusion of Castile
would soon make it necessary.”159
It was clear that the Castilians saw the city as a natural extension of Ibn Hud’s
Murcia-based realm and the qa’id, noting the better situation enjoyed by his
neighbours, decided to put his lot in with Castile.160 In the autumn of 1243, concerned
at the potential outcome, the king re-focused his attention on the region. James
discovered the Castilians and Muslims locked in a conspiracy and manufactured a
situation that gave him the opportunity to declare fresh hostilities.161 The siege camp
that sprang up in the ensuing months became a thriving concern of its own, with
civilian merchants, pharmacists, tailors, entrepreneurs, provisioners, hangers on as
well as livestock such as sheep, cows, goats, hens and pack animals.162
Neither protagonist was prepared to make the first overture for peace,
although it is possible that Abu Bakr sensed James’ impatience and desire to come to
157 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 85–6; the date of this truce was 1240.
158 Llibre dels Fets p 255, at chapter 328
159 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 77; In addition to the threat of Castile, the campaign was given more
impetus by the attempts by Zayyan to replace Ibn Hud in Murcia, a cause to which Jativa was
particularly attracted.
160 Llibre dels Fets p 260, at chapter 339
161 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 89
162 This was a situation replicated up and down Valencia during James’ campaigning (Ibid., p 93);
Zayyan is said to have remarked that he felt the whole of Valencia to be surrounded by so great an
army (Llibre dels Fets p 223, at chapter 269)
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an arrangement because he was the one to eventually break the deadlock.163 The king
repeated his call that it made no sense for the siege to continue, something motivated
by the danger of being bankrupted by its duration.164 James was apoplectic as to why
it proved beyond his forces to take the city after the relatively swift progress through
the rest of Valencia to date.165 Only the smaller, outlying castles would be
surrendered immediately, with the other castles following after a two-year period of
truce.166
The date of surrender for the city of Jativa is best evidenced as 1244 since the
king’s itinerary and his own autobiography best support this. Other dates (1248, 1249
and 1251) are probably post–siege linked activities, further extending the king’s
conquest programme.167 Negotiations demonstrated some form of pre–existing close
bond between the Muslim family and the Aragonese royalty.168 The king looked upon
the relationship as that of vassalage, even if the Muslim perspective was unlikely to
have been the same.169 He comments in his autobiography that Abu Bakr would not
163 Desclot, a contemporary historian, takes a different view, suggesting that the initiative was all
James’ own because he was eager to lay his hands on the castle. (Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 99)
164 A prolonged siege would be a potentially crippling, expensive enterprise. It wasn’t just the fact that
the king had to feed and water his army but also that the day to day running of court and kingdom went
with him. James “relied on an increasingly complex network of servitors who managed his household,
wrote his documents, presided over his tribunals, and carried his “government” away from the crucial
nucleus to the local periphery.” Kagay, D. J. ‘Army Mobilization, Royal Administration and the Realm
in the Thirteenth–Century Crown of Aragon’ in P. E. Chevedden, D. J. Kagay & P. G. Padilla (ed.)
Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages – Essays in Honour of Robert I. Burns S.J. –
Volume II ‘Proceedings from Spain and the Western Mediterranean’ (New York 1996) p 97
165 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 96; The proposals that James received from the qa’id were far from
the meek ones he expected would lead to an easy surrender (Llibre dels Fets p 266, at chapter 349);
Campaigns against the Muslims were sustainable so long as the material costs to society were
outweighed by the ensuing benefits. Momentum was very important to James and the speed of his
conquests considerably boosted the morale of his men and ensured its continuity whilst his own
international reputation was considerably enhanced. Any delays only served to tarnish that reputation.
(Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 189)
166 Ibid., p 97; James was clearly apprehensive about leaving Abu Bakr in a position of strength. He
hoped that the pressure exerted by the constantly–rolling Christian military machine might convince
Abu Bakr of the wisdom of joining with James and becoming a good ally. (Llibre dels Fets p 267-8, at
chapter 353 and 354)
167 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 67
168 Llibre dels Fets p 268, at chapter 354
169 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 73
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surrender the castle to anyone, Christian or Muslim, except James, as per his father’s
wishes.170
The king devoted over twenty chapters in the Llibre dels Fets to what he
considers to be a monumental achievement. Yet the narrative swiftly moves on, the
conquest complete, with James leaving for Valencia city.171 For such a momentous
conquest, the king visited sparingly until the war with al–Azraq forced him to focus
his attentions once more upon the city. Like Alfonso I a century before him, there was
no wholesale movement of Christian settlers into the city with the initial conquest,
and the Muslim population itself remained predominantly undisturbed. This extended
to the generous terms of the treaty itself.
The treaty provided for the freedom to worship publicly and privately,
preserving the mosques. This was not a novel provision and was indeed common to
many of the surrender agreements into which James entered with the Muslims around
this time.172 Recognition of Islamic practices by the Christians was a high priority for
the Muslim community and therefore one of the first provisions to appear on a
surrender document. The call to prayer was often invoked, with James commonly
agreeing to it as an important instrument for fostering Muslim solidarity. The fivefold
daily prayer was also guaranteed.173
In submitting themselves to James and his officials, the Muslims guaranteed
security for themselves and their kin within their homes. Christians would not take up
170 Llibre dels Fets p 266, at chapter 350
171 Ibid., p 268, at chapter 354
172 Since Christian theology and law at the time prohibited forced conversion, Muslims were always
guaranteed some form of religious freedom under the terms of surrender. However, what these pacts
conceded was public worship as a community “affording recognition to… the local aljama… as a legal
personality with specific rights.” This was much more important to a Muslim than the recognition of
individual liberty. (Burns (1973) p 184–5)
173 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 169
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residence in Muslim quarters and no–one from either faith was allowed to oppose the
treaty, therefore ensuring by way of consequence that the Muslims would not be
forced into full–time military service. They still had to fight against any castles in
rebellion, although most Christian lords were extremely mistrustful of their Muslim
contingents, whom they expected to betray them at any time.174
There is protection for both movable and immovable property, with the
Christians promising no interference with either property or principal Muslim men of
the community when travelling. Such persons would be escorted where necessary.
Given the hostile political climate of the time, aggravated by James’ campaigning, it
was nonetheless a necessary condition. It also served as a way of convincing the
Muslims of the king’s good intentions and of ensuring that his Christian subjects did
not break the terms of the protection.175 This guidaticum (royal pledge of protection)
permitted the Jativan Muslims to go wherever they wanted, to depart the city
whenever they wanted and to return whenever they wanted to collect any of their
residual belongings.
The freedom to travel was a privilege usually enjoyed more widely by Jews
than Muslims but here at Jativa, it appears to have been freely given as a privilege.176
Procedures are laid down for lawsuits. Judgments would be made on the basis of two
male witnesses’ testimony (one Muslim and one Christian).177 Witnesses from outside
Jativa’s territory did not command the same level of trust from the Christians; their
version of events would only carry credence if there was more than one witness. The
treaty confirms that only Muslims within the town could give testimony against each
174 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 134
175 Ibid., p 170–1: Personal protection of such high order, with special armed escort was rarely made
explicit.
176 Ibid., p 135
177 Ibid., p 172: In normal European lawsuits of this kind, this had become standard practice.
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other. Those from communities outside Jativa could only do so if the sunna conferred
sufficient social standing upon them.178
This is a fascinating insight into the future, where Muslims preserved their
civil justice procedures intact and where Muslim judges passed sentence on all men,
whether they happened to be Christian, Muslim or Jew. The treaty also features an
exemption from punishment for those harbouring Muslim fugitives. A desire was
instead expressed for the restoration of the status quo and the return of the fugitives to
their masters. However, the lack of any penalty was the main emphasis, not the return
of the captives, who were themselves, as a by–product of this process, immune to any
retribution. This approach actually intensified Muslim efforts to assist runaways and
James’ tactics effectively established Jativa as a key city in the underground trade in
wanted Muslims.179
The 1244 treaty was generally light on tax obligations and restrictions but
does make mention, however, of the salt mines. There were to be no taxes paid by the
Muslims towards their upkeep or the upkeep of the olive presses. In 1263, James gave
the Jativa salt works monopoly over the territory south of the Jucar river, ordering all
people there to use this salt – Muslim, Christian and Jew alike. This monopoly was
confirmed in 1270, even to the extent of requiring any individual over the age of
seven to purchase at least one measure of this salt each year.180 The 1244 treaty was a
property treaty, an instrument used to bring the military action to a close. The
178 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 135–6; The Christians had their own understanding of the word
sunna. In Aragon, it was used to represent the totality of Islamic law, including the shari’ah. (Ibid., p
179–180)
179 Ibid., p 173–4
180 Ibid., p 136
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resultant effect was to leave all things Muslim in place, whilst the king claimed some
modest share of the community’s taxes.181
The qabalah tax (the revenue from which was put towards the maintenance of
Jativa’s fortifications) was abolished in the 1244 treaty, providing some financial
relief to the Muslims of Jativa. Generally associated with special revenues, qabalah
taxes in Spain and the Maghrib were collected especially in towns and were usually
excise taxes on manufactured goods, levied on salt, public baths and as customs
duties. Revenues from the magatzem (Catalan for merchandise warehouse or store)
were to be given over entirely to the Muslims, as well as the makhzani taxes usually
given to the ruler. The Christian tax regime probably proved, as a whole, to be less
burdensome than the one endured under the Almohads.182
Similar themes (such as retention of order, religious ideals, the exclusion of
Christians, autonomy, freedom to travel, justice, economy and privileges) were found
in similar agreements from the period. These included the pardon granted to Buñol in
1254; a charter given to Sierra de Eslida on 29 May 1242; and the capitulation of
Sierra’s Mudejar rebels on 15 February 1277. The latter document added the
interesting proviso that those who had converted must stay so within Christian lands.
If they wished to ‘relapse’ back into Islamic tradition, then they had to head for
Muslim–controlled lands. The parallels of castle delivery and the guarantee of
succession in the 1231 Minorcan surrender reflect almost exactly the terms of the
Jativa treaty.183
181 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 142
182 Ibid., p 182
183 Ibid., p 139–42
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“Political, economic and military constraints moved both parties to accept a
compromise peace” but the 1244 treaty represented a good bargain, particularly for
Abu Bakr, who was prepared to make short–term concessions, giving him and his
community respite, for the benefit of a more profitable long–term future. James came
to mistrust his 1244 arrangement in light of the 1247 rebellions (which demonstrated
the need to move the entirely Muslim population outside the city and the Christians
into it, in order to ensure Jativa’s continued non–belligerent stance);184 revolts which
marked the start of proud Muslim defiance, destined not to be broken until James’ son
and successor Pedro invoked a formal crusade.185
Taming an Enemy: Treating with al-Azraq
The immediate geographic setting of al–Azraq’s domain was striking.
Valencia sat atop a great curve at the southernmost tip of Spain with a hinterland
comprised of a tumble of mountains, allowing for a plethora of valleys which
accommodated the Muslim leader’s fortifications.186 These were the main obstacle for
James in his attempt to defeat his opponent. The effect was to create military tiers.
The king established himself in the first tier, Laguat Valley. Al–Azraq was based in
the third tier, at Alcala, where the treaty was eventually signed. The area conceded by
the treaty comprised the two valleys below Laguat, in the tier already occupied by
James and therefore of little immediate threat to the Muslim’s hegemony.187
Al–Azraq is a mysterious figure, occasioning no comment from Muslim
authors.188 Not much better acknowledged by Christian historians, he is left with the
184 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 188–90: another Muslim, al–Baqqar, revolted in 1246 at Alcoy, about
sixty miles south of Valencia. (O’Callaghan (2003) p 107)
185 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 156–7
186 Burns (1973) p 325; there were eight valleys in total.
187 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 24
188 Burns (1973) p 324
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image of a marginal sheikh who routinely surrendered to James’ son in 1245, then
mounted a serious rebellion against Christian authority, dying in the counter–crusade
of 1276. More importantly, he was the last of the three principal Muslim leaders from
the dying days of al–Andalus to surrender to James’ conquest.189 James does not
mention al–Azraq during the initial campaigns but his narrative does refer to the
formidable opposition provided by him during the revolts of 1247 and beyond.190 The
Muslim war lord controlled ten castles191 and James tells us that al–Azraq was made
leader by the Muslims.192
Why did this powerful Muslim lord consent so readily to a truce in 1245? His
rebellion against James’ authority in subsequent years showed that he was not, like
his Muslim colleagues in the rest of the region, content with merely acquiescing to
the continuance of his community’s sunna. Both sides wished for a bargain which
gained them some more time. James hoped that the treaty might hold whilst he was
called away, undoubtedly to deal with Raymond Berenguer V’s death in France,193
and maybe well beyond that period of time. The king “could afford only an
intimidating military promenade into the mountains and a truce disguised as a
surrender treaty and vassalage.”194
189 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 7–8: Of these, Ibn Hud of Murcia was killed in 1238; Ibn al–Ahmar of
Almena started weak (but eventually would provide the basis for the preservation of Islamic culture on
the peninsula for a further 200 years through his Granada kingdom); and al–Azraq himself overcame
initial adversity to thrive in his mountain enclave.
190 Llibre dels Fets p 274 onwards; al-Azraq’s victories, culminating in an attack on Benicadell, cutting
off Alicante to Christian settlers, would prove to cause James great heartache. Burns notes in his article
Crusade against al–Azraq how communication in the whole of southern Valencia could have been
affected. (Llibre dels Fets p 277 n 132) Indeed, James’ autobiography all too often plays down the
seriousness of what could have been a difficult situation.
191 Before the 1257 revolts. This is confirmed by Desclot. (Burns (1973) p 327)
192 Llibre dels Fets p 277 at chapter 370
193 In 1245; See page 40 following.
194 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 10
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Al–Azraq, whilst being ignorant of James’ own motives, had his own
concerns and it paid him to wait and watch the situation unfold. Jativa had already
surrendered to the south–east, leaving Denia (its secondary citadel) vulnerable to
James and his armies. Every scrap of Islamic land to the north of his position now lay
in Christian hands and, by 1245, had done so for a number of years. Biar directly
south had fallen to James and Castile had crushed Murcia, with Granada at this time
too weak to offer assistance.195 Under the safety of a surrender treaty, the Muslim
could more easily pick his moment for rebellion, since recent events had proven that
dramatic reversals of fortune were not uncommon in Valencia.
The leap in the chronology of James’ Llibre dels Fets makes it seem as though
al–Azraq was defeated quickly but the events he describes took place over a matter of
years, not months. The condensed timeline falls apart under further scrutiny.
Benicadell, which James apparently rushed to defend after signing the 1245 treaty,
was not in fact threatened until the summer of 1249.196 After advice from Don Jimeno
Perez de Arenos, James decided not to venture himself into the hills to recover
Muslim gains around Benicadell but left it to Perez’s own forces, which were
successful in securing the two hills near the castle that the Muslims had defended so
fiercely.197 James clearly either held no respect for al–Azraq, or realised how much of
a threat he was and deliberately limited his importance when writing of him in his
autobiography, because he comments that Ibn Bassal, who was the leader of al–
Azraq’s forces at Benicadell and killed during the fighting, “was the best man that al–
195 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 8
196 Llibre dels Fets p 277 n 132
197 The re-taking of the two hills probably did not take place until four years later after a protracted
effort at diplomacy from 1250 when al-Azraq treated with Yolanda, James’ queen. “Diplomacy may
well have been the result of financial exhaustion on both sides.” Ibid., p 278 n 135
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Azraq had, and the most powerful, and in valour he was worth more than al–Azraq
himself.”198
The treaty shows the differing ways in which the parties viewed the
agreement. The Christian text proclaimed al–Azraq as a vassal, namely someone who
should feel obligated to obey his Christian overlords, whilst the Muslim text sees the
agreement as nothing more than a three–year truce. Neither is a translation of the
other. The Arabic text re–works the terms agreed between the two parties,
approaching the situation from a different perspective. There is no vassalage,
obligation or idea of fidelity expressed in its lines or even any Islamic equivalents. It
is a very impersonal and objective instrument, demonstrating none of the enthusiasm
and moralising of its Christian counterpart.199
The titles accorded to the participants in the treaty illuminate the shifting
social scene and cast further light on the vanity of the two main protagonists. The
Muslim is referred to as the most illustrious wazir yet vizier (its transliteration) had
long since failed to carry any sense of real importance, and had no specific office
attached. It had a multitude of potential applications, from referring to an ordinary
bureaucrat or courtier to a peace officer, a governor, a minister or indeed a class of
administrators (for example those at Tortosa).200 Equally the king and Alfonso liked
the term malik yet this too no longer carried any great significance other than what
they themselves attached to it.
The Christian text in interlinear Castilian is a conversation between the
Muslim and Prince Alfonso – although al–Azraq clearly identifies with James –
198 Llibre dels Fets p 278 at chapter 371
199 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 26
200 Ibid., p 28
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where the Muslim lord proclaims himself as Alfonso’s vassal.201 His rights, as they
are spelled out in the treaty, are specifically protected by the Arabic text. Any
coinciding content with the Christian text is much more businesslike, the aim being to
achieve clarity not charity. The Muslim’s own agenda was considered from a position
of strength amidst the security of the mountains and inside his fortress. The only
concession of any kind of link between the two parties given in the Arabic text was
the opening address acknowledging Alfonso as the exalted prince.202
The Arabic document takes an interest in the Muslim lord’s personal benefit
from his own castles. According to the Christian text, al–Azraq gave the prince eight
castles along with their jurisdictional areas, and any rights, pasturages and villages
over which they have control. Pop and Tarbena transferred immediately to royal
control whilst the Muslim retained Alcala and Perpunchent permanently for the
benefit of him and his family. The remaining four castles were kept by the Muslim for
three years, ceding half the revenues to Alfonso until the period expired, upon which
event they reverted (revenue and possessions) fully to the Christian.203
Alfonso conferred the two castles to al–Azraq for the benefit of him and his
family, with the usual restrictions for disposal of property lifted, leaving the Muslim
free to sell, pledge or give away the castles to anyone and treat them in any way that
he liked as his own property. Two villages (Ebro and Tollos) were mentioned by
name so that the Muslim would benefit from their revenues in the three years
201 Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 25 and 50; Al–Azraq identifies with James at line 12 of the Arabic
text.
202 A very different meaning was applied to tributary status by Muslims. Mikel de Epalza called it a
traditional rationalisation of tribute; a koranic military payment used to forestall an enemy, giving the
impression of a temporary state of impasse. It was a state that would not last and therefore was not
really a state of subjugation at all. It was merely a way of biding time until the next resurgence by the
Muslims. (Ibid., p 49 and p 26)
203 Burns (1973) p 326–7
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governed by the terms of the treaty. The Muslim lord was expected to act as a vassal
for Alcala castle.204 A provision which indicated the strength of al–Azraq’s position
was the one allowing him to keep property and retainers associated with the castles
which he held. If the Muslim captured any castles, he was allowed to keep half the
revenue. It seems that there were still plenty of strongholds to take and that James’
boast to the Pope that his ‘crusade’ was complete was a rather weak one.205
The Christian text makes a provision for al–Azraq to assist James’ conquest;
he is given licence to acquire more castles, purely for the benefit of the Christians.206
The Arabic text interprets this as an alliance for the benefit of the Muslims, whilst the
three–year truce was in force.207 These fortifications could be allied through
‘friendship.’ Such a provision ultimately allowed al–Azraq to reconcile more Muslim
leaders to his cause, and his revolt in 1247 was probably expedited by the acquisition
of these allies. Conversely, Alfonso obviously believed at the time that he had broken
the resistance of this obstinate Muslim and this may help to explain why the mountain
campaigns ended so quickly and why a region so vigorously defended by its
passionate Muslims (as well as nature herself) seemed to surrender so readily.208
It would be wrong to suggest that James’ subjugation of the troublesome
Muslim was easy. The accession of Alfonso X to the throne of Castile led to great
hostility between the two kingdoms, something of which al–Azraq was not slow to
take advantage.209 He allied himself with the rival kingdom, until relations between
204 Burns (1973) p 327; Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 37 and 49: In the Arabic text, Alcala was to
remain (revenues and all) under the perpetual possession of al–Azraq, with no mention of vassalage.
205 Ibid., p 27
206 Burns (1973) p 327; Burns & Chevedden (1999) p 37
207 Ibid., p 50
208 Ibid., p 27
209 In the period between 1247 and 1256, al–Azraq placed James under inordinate amounts of pressure.
(Burns (1973) p 327)
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James and Alfonso improved in 1256 and they resolved their differences over land
and personal ties.210 James devoted nearly fifteen chapters to the ensuing war between
al–Azraq and himself in his Llibre dels Fets although the king tries to pass off the
whole encounter as merely a post–conquest crusade, making an oblique reference to
the four or five, rather than the actual ten, intervening years. He claims that a more
in–depth discussion would detain his narrative.211 1258 saw a second truce between
al–Azraq and James212 but it would be broken again and again until the former man’s
death during the final revolt of 1276.
Tactics and Philosophies after the Conquest
The conquest of Valencia was officially completed in 1245, with the fall of
Biar.213 James recalls the event vividly in his Llibre dels Fets, stating that “towards
the end, when all that had passed, the alcaid who was there, and was called Murça
Almoravid, surrendered the castle to us and we retained the Saracens in that town,
and we drew up the charters of their sunnah, so that they should remain for all time
with us and with ours.”214 James did not destroy the systems in place and kept the
Muslim communities in their villages. Guaranteeing the continuation of their laws
was an important part of the peace process and an even more important part of the
surrender terms that brought the initial capitulation.215
210 Llibre dels Fets p 278 n 140; James and Alfonso were warring over Navarre, territorial boundaries
and Alfonso’s treatment of Queen Violante.
211 Ibid., p 281, at chapter 376; James was actually quite annoyed as the rebellions prevented him from
undertaking his long-awaited crusade to assist the liberation of Jerusalem. Instead of volunteering his
services to the Pope, he was forced to plead for a plenary indulgence so that he could repel the
challenges to his authority in Valencia. (O’Callaghan (2003) p 107)
212 Llibre dels Fets p 279 n 141; this was likely to have been provoked by the threat posed by a strongly
placed al–Azraq to James’ lieutenant in Valencia, Don Jimeno de Foces.
213 Harvey (1990) p 120; although Muslim revolts would continue.
214 Llibre dels Fets p 270 at chapter 359
215 James solved the problem of surrender, as he solved so many other problems, “by applying inherited
patterns, filling in the outlines drawn by his forebears.” Burns (1973) p 155
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James boasts that the terms of surrender at Biar were enough to convince any
remaining opposition to crumble and yield. “When they saw that we held Xativa and
Biar, the rest of the kingdom from Xuquer to the lands of Murcia surrendered to us,
according to the agreement that we had made allowing them to remain in the
kingdom. And so we had it all.”216 The conquest of the region had been relatively
swift but that was merely the start of more heated Muslim resistance, particularly
from al–Azraq and the community at Jativa. Valencia was essentially a territory of
contradiction; a land of opportunity yet still distantly alien and severely under–
populated by Christians.217 James spent almost double the amount of time he had
spent conquering the frontier trying to secure it, and would die without ever really
achieving that goal.
The revolts in the late 1240s marked the commencement of the second stage
of James’ campaigns. After implementing the much needed legal codes (or customs)
of Aragon in 1247, a Muslim revolt spurred James to propose an expulsion of the
population. This was met with heated resistance from nobles in charge of Valencian
estates, who angrily retorted that they relied on their Muslim workers to cultivate the
land and could not hope to do so if they were expelled. 100,000 Muslims are said to
have left Valencia during this turbulent period although there are no indications that
this was a direct result of the proposed expulsion or that it was ever rigorously
enforced.218
216 Llibre dels Fets p 270 at chapter 360
217 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 5
218 Chaytor (1933) p 89
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The biggest threat to James’ Valencian supremacy came in the dying years of
his reign, during the 1270s, when community after community rose in rebellion.219
There are two key surrender treaties from the 1270 rebellions, both from 1276 – one
is from Alfandech and the other from Eslida, a stronghold that had already
surrendered once to James in 1242.220 For a region abundant in agricultural promise,
Eslida had very modest returns of olives, grapes and cereals. So dense was the
Muslim population that the only Christians there were saloon–keepers and the
castellan, the former occupation being something, by virtue of their faith, that
Muslims were bound to delegate to others. For many years, the town had no priest.221
After the original surrender of May 1242, the taxes collected from Eslida went
towards refunding the support of the Templars and its control eventually went to
James’ commoner wife Teresa Gil de Vidaure. The community had little part to play
in revolts against the king until 1276.222
The treaty gave amnesty to those who had participated in the revolts, allowing
continued Muslim rights over their farms, houses and possessions, with perpetual
tenure. Any registered inhabitant, whatever their status, was free to return and reclaim
property or alternatively they could leave, selling their property to other Muslims.
The value of taxes amounted to a tenth of crops raised for harvesting.223 This tax
219 Al–Azraq was again a key figure, rallying many Muslims to his cause and threatening all Spain.
(Burns (1973) p 331)
220 Burns, R. I. Muslims, Christians and Jews in the Crusader Kingdom of Valencia – Societies in
Symbiosis (Cambridge 1984) p 60: This hill–top castle protected a compact town in the north of
Valencia and was yet another refuge for Muslim malcontents, providing a focus for future revolts well
into the sixteenth century.
221 Alfandech was equally bereft of Christian ecclesiastical buildings, able to ‘make do’ with just one
church right up until 1298. (Burns (1973) p 131)
222 Burns (1984) p 60–1
223 This was the only tax Islam levied upon the believer. (Burns (1973) p 195)
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affected cereals, oil and produce, with the exception of the vegetables and fruit used
in the household from which they originated.224
Religious rights and practices under Islamic ‘law’ (or sunna) were kept intact,
particular reference being made to their mosque rites of prayer, the schooling of
Muslim children in understanding the Koran and the drafting of marriage and
commercial contracts. The complex business of wills and probate fell expressly under
the auspices of these Islamic laws. The operation of baths and public bakeries was to
follow Islamic custom. The Eslidans could elect their own qadi and amin,225 enjoyed
the protection of the king’s guidaticum (which was a reasonably effective form of
protection offered by the crown to its Muslim subjects) and profited from the
condition that the small settlements surrounding the community were to yield to
Eslida’s Islamic customs. This was a local pre–occupation with regional jurisdiction
which the crown preyed on well.226
It is worth noting whether the changes from the original 1242 charter were
beneficial or detrimental to the lives of the Muslim community. The main difference
between the two charters was length: the earlier charter was much more detailed, such
as an express guarantee of the cemetery, muezzin’s call and the ‘other books’ (named
as those of the Hadith).227 The later treaty ignored the irrigation system, included a
liability to meet demand for daily water and wood for the castle and removed the
224 Burns (1984) p 63: The restrictive conditions for selling property were designed to prevent
interested Christian settlers from breaking up the aljama.
225 This comprehensive jurisdiction demonstrates the importance of the correct implementation of
contracts in Islamic Spain. (Burns (1973) p 224)
226 Burns (1984) p 64; an amin acted as a go between for the Christian controller of the region and its
Muslim inhabitants and, in Valencia, served as a finance officer.
227 Burns (1973) p 192
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prohibition on Christians settling in the community without Muslim permission,
although in reality this notion was defunct.228
The charter for the community at Alfandech was fairly traditional, thereby
reinforcing the point that Muslim surrender agreements throughout the region were
based on a common policy, but was extremely detailed with regard to religious
privileges. Their law continued as usual, with them able to maintain an imam (sahib
al–salat) to lead prayers and continue teaching children from the books of the faith.
Alms and prayer remained the same, the mosque retaining its supporting buildings,
but the major guarantee of the charter was the continuance of the endowment which
provided the finance for the community’s religious activities and institutions.229
Members of the community were not to be arrested unless they themselves
had committed a crime and were permitted to carry weapons wherever they might go
in the lord’s land. Rents and taxes were to continue as they had been during the time
of the Almohads. The community was given the freedom to buy salt and to put
livestock out to pasture as well as the right to live on the same lands that had been
granted them before the conquest. They were forbidden to sell their lands to anyone
other than another Muslim. They also enjoyed the same protection of guidaticum as
their Eslidan brothers, as well as the right to elect a qadi and amin.230
Alfandech had unusual topography: “the hills that terminate Valencia city’s
countryside at the south coast enclose a long, intensively irrigated valley” with nine
villages and the surrounding castles overshadowed by Alfandech itself on top of a
228 Burns (1984) p 65
229 Ibid., p 76; ‘Alms and prayer’ usually included the zakat (or community tax) as well as pilgrimage
and the muezzin call, although not specified here.
230 Ibid., p 77; Only almagran (the single most important basic tax on irrigated land) is specified in the
charter.
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hill, described in the time of the Cid as “castrum Sarracenorum in monte magno.” Its
proximity to the region’s capital meant that Alfandech certainly had strategic value
but it also had economic importance. The aljama was a continued source of profitable
revenue for the Christians231 and the resultant money was put to many and varied
uses, including rescuing Pedro from a burdensome debt.232 Although the community
played a key role in the 1276 revolts, after James’ death, agreement was swiftly
reached and Pedro III was therefore able to leave a troubled region for the first time
since joining his father in quashing the rebellion.
The surrender constitutions from the revolts of the mid–1270s demonstrate
that the uprisings in the years after 1245 had done little to affect James’ strategy of
conquest and appeasement. This approach had evolved alongside a change in thinking
across the Christian world, particularly amongst the Papacy. The great reforming
Pope Innocent IV, preaching tolerance and charity, had enabled Christians to
reconsider how they conducted relationships with other communities and faiths. Key
to Gregory’s thinking was that to eject an entire community, just because it did not
belong, offended the concept of charity; such groups had a right to autonomy and
should not be converted by force.233 This was a policy to which James was an avid
subscriber. The by–product of these attitudes was that the Islamic communities were
able to remain in a cohesive block and therefore comprise a more viable threat.
On the battle front, in one swift move, James had effectively ensured the
harassment that would follow him for the next thirty years by moving Yahya b.
231 A large tax assessment was gained from Alfandech in 1258. (Burns (1973) p 131)
232 Burns (1984) p 72–74; Nuno Sanç, a close relative of the king and a powerful ally, was awarded
control of the community, suggesting that James placed a great deal of importance on its revenue.
Nuno’s death in 1241/2 marked a watershed for the Christians, as James’ later attempts to re-settle the
area never succeeded in supplanting the predominant Muslim population.
233 Ibid., p 59
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Muhammad to Montesa. This became the focal point for bold Muslim resistance, with
those Muslims who defied James’ regime successfully seeking sanctity and refuge
there, during times of strife. Al–Azraq, despite the treaty of 1258, would continue to
prove a stubborn adversary in later years. It was he who would call James to the
battlefield one more time before his death in 1276, the Muslim making James fight for
the control of his conquered lands right to the end. The king and al–Azraq died in the
same year, leaving the field of conflict open to the successors on both sides.234
234 Harvey (1990) p 121–2; Originally established at Jativa, Yahya b. Muhammad was moved to the
stronghold of Montesa, having been swayed by James’ promise of money.
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Chapter Three – Shaping the Conquered Lands and the Question of Convivencia.
The Christian and Muslim society of Catalonia and Valencia was mercantile in
nature, centred upon the port cities of the Western Mediterranean rather than the Spanish
upland (meseta).235 This Mediterranean coast was different in geographical, human and
historical terms from other areas of al–Andalus. Mediterranean Spain and meseta spoke
different languages, had different authority structures, evolved differing social forms and
lived on very different landscapes dominated by different economies.236 Valencia was
regarded as a place of advanced civilisation and luxurious paradise by both Muslims and
Christians alike. The region was a huge expanse for James to re–conquer, given his
limited resources,237 “a frontier society, attractive to the wild and adventurous, a
receptacle for strangers from all sides.”238
The population was predominantly Muslim, overwhelmingly greater than those of
the conquerors who stayed there, and was fixed in place by long-standing tradition.239
The Christians would become nothing more than a blot on the landscape, a cluster of
235 “Ports and cities offered an unlimited horizon of commercial possibilities.” (Burns (1973) p 8–9)
236 Burns (1984) p 6–7
237 His kingdom was short on supplies and men – his invading force consisted of feudal levies who would
disappear once their period of service was ended, a small group of faithful enthusiasts, unpredictable
crusaders and members of the town militias. (Burns (1967) p 3); The largest force of armed horses
mentioned is 1,300 knights and squires in 1229, during the siege of Majorca. (Llibre dels Fets p 73–78 at
chapters 50–55, p 78 n 49; Hillgarth (1976) p 241); James was able to defeat Muslim troops in Majorca and
Valencia “because Muslim cavalry could not stand against even a small number of heavily armed knights,
provided that they kept together.” (Ibid., p 242); “Warfare in this period… centred on the construction,
defense and capture of fortified complexes” (Chevedden (1996) p 47) and Valencia had a myriad of these.
The castles of the Valencian landscape were too strong to be taken by force, certainly by this motley group
of fighters. (Burns (1967) p 3)
238 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 193
239 Muslim traditions may well have continued, and they formed a continuing threat of rebellion, but the
dominant society would be Christian. The church led the movement to establish Christian society in these
foreign lands. “They were serenely sure that the Moslem world would dim before it and mysteriously
recede. And they were right.” Burns (1967) p 304–5
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outsiders dotted around the demographic area, surrounded by a sea of Muslim faces.240
Valencia was also a fertile province, which made it a most desirable possession. The
ingenious industry of its Muslim population had raised the region’s productivity to
amazing levels and its famous produce included flax, rice, wine, oil and fruit of every
kind.241 “The Mediterranean littoral formed a continuum with its sister ports… so that the
great movements of Mediterranean Europe centred here as much as in Italy or
Languedoc–Provence.” 242
In 1195, kings in Navarre and Leon would have considered Castile to be more
dangerous than the Muslims.243 This would suggest that political circumstance as well as
ideology had a big role to play in deciding the policies of the conquering kings. What
James did very cleverly was to manufacture an almost bloodless conquest, through
manipulation and political manoeuvring. The king wanted to avoid pitched battles in
order to achieve cheap victories, unless his armoured troops could be used effectively
against mobile Muslim formations or he could make effective incursions against Muslim
territory “with swift raids which disrupted enemy commerce and agriculture and by
capturing Muslim castles through blockade, bluff and liberal surrender terms.”244 The
surrender constitutions helped him achieve that.
From the original campaigns of the Cid in the eleventh century and Alfonso’s
conquests of the early twelfth, right through to James’ campaigns in the 1230s and 1240s,
240 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 7
241 Chaytor (1933) p 85; the remains of the Muslim industries from the thirteenth century can still be seen
today. The productivity of Valencia when compared to Aragon put the Christian kingdom to shame.
242 Burns (1984) p 7
243 Catlos (2004) p 89
244 Kagay (1996) p 96
64
Muslim carta pueblas served as surrender constitutions.245 They established an existing
Islamic colony as a necessary evil, in support of the Christian good. With one document,
the Christians defined conditions for the holding of land, the terms of residence upon that
land and the rules by which people were expected to live; the standard of living that they
could expect. And as a result they created a link between the social structures of Islam
and those of Christendom.246
The agreements were essentially pacts between the two cultures, laying down
new laws and judicial rules in the context of a Christian administrative framework,
granting privileges and exemptions for each community. It was a structure that would not
remain static but would evolve over the years as practicalities and priorities changed. The
policy of surrender on terms was the only one that the king could seriously follow but the
most impressive thing about it was its effectiveness. James’ “exercise in raiding, feinting,
bypassing, blocking, storming minor points and offering generous terms” achieved many
great things.247
It was the moment of surrender itself, when James, upon entering the city,
dismounted and ceremoniously faced East, kissing the ground, which carried the seeds of
contact, which in turn germinated so that a fear of conflict transmogrified into the reality
245 The new challenge for James was applying old rules to a new situation, for the extent of his new
territories was vast. (Burns (1973) p 158) Examples of these treaties were considered in Chapter Two.
246 Burns (1984) p 58
247 Provisioning also dictated James’ campaign route, as well as its pace, with fixed supply depots difficult
to maintain when the territory was not in Christian hands. These bases would have required sizeable
garrisons of men, of which the crown of Aragon was in short supply. The impracticality of a long siege,
therefore, “can help explain his strategy of very generous terms, amnesty, and tolerance.” (Burns, R. I. ‘The
Crusade against Murcia: Provisioning the Armies of James the Conqueror, 1264–1267’ in H. J. Hames (ed.)
Jews, Muslims and Christians in and around the Crown of Aragon – Essays in Honour of Professor Elena
Lourie in The Medieval Mediterranean – Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400–1500 Volume 52 (Boston
2004) p 38); the previous chapter showed how James’ surrender agreements successfully established
interim – and longer lasting – arrangements with the Muslim settlements that allowed him to more quickly
overrun the Valencian territories. (Burns (1984) p 54)
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of daily interaction.248 This worked at different levels for Christians and Muslims; the
elite mingled at the academic, noble and administrative level whilst the commoners
shared the need for good irrigation and farming techniques. More general contact
between the cultures occurred in domestic service, through entertainment (whether it
happened to be gambling, drinking in the many taverns or indeed prostitution) and in the
marketplace.249 Attempts were made to interfere with trade that was felt to be damaging
to the Christian cause. “Commonly restricted goods were those related to military
industries, but other commodities, including agricultural products, iron, wood, cloth, and
lead were also frequently prohibited from export.”250
Patterns of settlement and administrative priorities created natural barriers
between the two communities. The Christians naturally seized control of the city centres
and the bureaucracy which oversaw taxes, commerce and officialdom but an offset of
that was that the Muslims consolidated in the countryside, taking a hold on the
agricultural life of the region. Islamic society threatened to become almost completely
rural and become concentrated in small, outlying villages.251 These rural Muslims were
excellent sources of revenue for the new Christian rulers and also useful as jurats,
providing a confirmed declaration on affidavits.
The region of Valencia was highly regulated, where planning was the watchword.
With the acquisition of huge tracts of land from Islam, “administrative innovation and
248 Llibre dels Fets p 230 at chapter 282; Burns (1984) p 52
249 Countless ecclesiastical councils attempted to bar such social interaction, particularly with regard to
eating with Muslims and Jews or eating food which they had prepared. (Nirenberg, D. Communities of
Violence – Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages (Princeton 1996) p 169; Burns (1984) p 13) A
further issue, of sexual mixing between the groups, is discussed under The Reality of Convivencia below.
250 Catlos (2004) p 290
251 Burns (1984) p 14
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colonization became priority activities.”252 Thorough regulation was also apparent in the
way that the region’s social progression can be measured, the fact that this progression
was caught up in the terms of the surrender charters, the way its population was
distributed, and the way that the power was shared out, all culminating in the eventual,
overall balance struck upon by the conquerors.253 The re–organisation of the architectural
and town shapes was an extremely gradual and slow process. James was very careful not
to shatter the already strained network of truces which he had worked so hard to
engineer. The initial changes were therefore only necessary ones: namely re–
prioritisation of the water supply and the establishment of a Christian legal and tax
regime. Eventually the changes would extend to encompass the re–design of street
layouts, as at Valencia city.
Valencia had been split up into two regional capitals (Valencia city and Murcia),
which oversaw the several local capitals (or ‘amal – a taxation district), which in turn
oversaw a number of hamlets (or alquerias; qarya) and small villages (mawdi). Ten or so
of these alquerias were arranged around a castle (hisn) for defensive purposes.254
Frontier territories (thughur), to the north and east, and judicial districts (kura) made up
the geographical and administrative extremities.255 From the end of the tenth century,
when Umayyad authority began to fragment, a city state became the political model and
centres like Valencia, Jativa, Denia and others assumed both political and economic
252 Burns (1985) p 21
253 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 191
254 Glick, T. F. ‘Berbers in Valencia: The Case of Irrigation’ in P. E. Chevedden, D. J. Kagay & P. G.
Padilla (ed.) Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages – Essays in Honour of Robert I. Burns
S.J. – Volume II ‘Proceedings from Spain and the Western Mediterranean’ (New York 1996) p 191
255 De Epalza, ‘Islamic Social Structures’ p 181
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importance, forming a focal point for the diffusion of ideas and techniques.256 The
Almohads had solidified this organisation of the territories and when the Christians
arrived in the 1230s, this was the system that was still in place.257
Religions and government were intertwined in this period. Peoples’ lives and
ethical concerns were almost governed by the church itself. Thus the government paid its
due diligence when establishing its presence in the new society. Yet the concern spread
beyond just Christianity itself. Since James went out of his way to protect the privileges
of the Muslims’ religion within Valencia, he effectively presided over a dual religion. In
such a society, facets of its identity (legal, moral, social and political) were fused with
more theological and ecclesiastical concepts. James used the church as his main
proselytising tool for westernising Valencia post–conquest.258
Segregation was attempted at the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 – the
‘difficulty’ of distinguishing between Muslim, Christian and Jew was tackled by
introducing codes of dress for Jews and Muslims. “The Jewish cap and badge of colored
cloth and the Muslim haircut and dress were enacted and justified as visual
representations of a sexual boundary not to be transgressed.”259 James later attempted to
increase the legislation because, although strict penalties had been laid down in statute,
the attitude of secular authorities had been very lax. The king’s minority–relations
charter of 1242 suggests this. A clause was later appended which stated that Christian
256 Glick (1996) p 197 – 8
257 Burns (1973) p 51
258 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 207–9
259 Nirenberg, D. ‘Religious and Sexual Boundaries in the Medieval Crown of Aragon’ in M. D. Meyerson
& E. D. English (ed.) Christians, Muslims & Jews in Medieval and Early Modern Spain – Interaction and
Cultural Change (Indiana 1999) p 143
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women should not live with Jews or Muslims. A two–month period of grace was granted
from the date of the issue of the charter, after which point women caught in such
relations would be unable to have a proper Christian burial unless their Archbishop gave
them special leave.260
The official line might well have been one of distance and rejection of all non–
Christian ideas but at a local level it became increasingly easy and sensible for traders,
dwellers and merchants of all three religious groups to work more closely together and
for their own mutual benefit. In reality, little effort was made to derail a predominantly
Islam–driven culture, with consultation taking place with Muslim elders to decide
boundary disputes or correct agricultural practice. Well into the later years of the
conquest’s aftermath, Muslims were kept involved in municipal councils.
“In 1262 …Jaume I confirmed a settlement between certain inhabitants of
Tarazona, led by Petrus Valerii and the “whole council [of Aranda], both Christians and
Muslims” (“totum concilium tam Christianos quam Sarracenos”) who were represented
by four Christian and two Muslim members.”261 In 1274, James supported a papal decree
forbidding the export of military and agricultural items, as well as rope, bread and other
foodstuffs to any Muslim lands. Wheat, barley, beans, all types of flour – all were
banned. Conflict still occurred – the Pope wished to enact a trade embargo on the “Sultan
of Alexandria.” But whereas Egypt was a key military objective of Crusader forces and
260 Catlos (2004) p 307
261 Ibid., p 265
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their papal supporters, the Ayyubid Sultanate was one of the trading partners for the
Crown of Aragon and they had maintained a consulate there since 1264.262
The idea for accommodating Muslim needs may derive from the dhimma system
operated by Islamic leaders for Christian and Jewish communities under their rule.263
This was a practical exposition for the Koranic belief that tolerance should be extended
to those communities. The Byzantines had extended similar philosophies when dealing
with the Jews. In James’ period, Pope Innocent IV was a key exponent of the political
theology inherent in this concept of tolerance, by condemning violence against Jews and
commenting that the Catholic religion should allow them to live together with Christians.
Scripture (in the form of St. Paul, ch. 2) extended God’s approval to the Jews, who would
all be saved at the time of judgement, and Augustinian theology created a communal role
for Jews within medieval Christian society.264
Out of this understanding for Jewish faith had come a parallel concept for Muslim
communities, although this did not rest on the same scriptural foundation. The dhimma,
ostensibly, was an excellent model to borrow for subservient Muslim communities under
Christian occupation. However, its eventual spread (becoming the rules and ideals
governing Mudejar settlements) was more, as Burns puts it, ‘a matter of mechanics than
of substance.’ The fact that a dhimma shares similar characteristics to the Muslim
surrender constitutions of the thirteenth century acts like a magnet, drawing historians
towards the conclusion that it must simply be a case of adoption. These constitutions did
not simply arise out of the concept of the dhimma alone, but as a product of supportive
262 Catlos (2004) p 290
263 Resemblances between Muslim and Christian provisions proved remarkable. (Burns (1973) p 157)
264 Burns (1984) p 54–5
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causality, “the influence of a neighbouring model reinterpreted as an expression of one’s
own values and mechanisms.”265
Tariffs and taxes were carefully thought through. Whilst the king sometimes
dispatched his own officials to oversee tax collection, the tax duty usually fell to the
highest bidder at a public auction. The king’s personal touch was felt in financial matters.
If a problem arose with a community’s taxes, James himself would often go to
investigate and put it right. He was often inclined towards issuing instructions for the
assessment of tax on property. James remained at the centre of financial operations even
in his absence, announcing the sanctioned exchange rates and regulating the work of his
officials. Sometimes he would leave the tax burden in the charge of the collector, who
might have to relieve the burden himself, if the community was struggling to meet its
obligations.266
The Muslim industries in Valencia provided the newly established Christian
rulers with profitable crops and products with which they could trade. In contrast, prices
in Catalonia “of manufactured goods were disproportionately higher than those of
agricultural products”267 and the region lagged behind its French and Italian cousins in
terms of industrial development. It was the capture of Valencia and its accompanying
industries which allowed the Crown in Aragon to finally authorise profitable exports
from Catalonia in 1316.
265 Burns (1984) p 57
266 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 196–199
267 Hillgarth (1976) p 238
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The Christian conquerors did little, in the thirteenth or fourteenth centuries, to the
systems that were already in place. James carefully thought about changes in industry,
the retention of practices, the implementation of procedures and the detailed planning of
public works. Bureaucrats stood at the centre of this new creation, law the driving force,
with surveyors, land distributors, tax farmers, engineers, local Muslim officials as well as
royal ones reaping the benefits of such change and spearheading the administration of a
new order.268 Linked into the administrative and architectural organisation was the
network of waterways and irrigation practices necessary for the Muslims’ day to day
lives.269 Every centre needed water for religious purposes – for the mosque and the ‘hot
bath’ (hammam). In addition, domestic, hygienic, craft, agricultural and pastoral needs of
the general populace needed to be catered for. This dictated the path which the waterway
took. Clear water would start on the high ground, go through to the main mosque, and
then to other mosques. It would be used to power public fountains and then supply the
baths at the lower end of the town before finally ending up on the outskirts where the
‘dirty’ occupations such as tanning, pottery and dyeing put it to use.270
Islamic towns were highly compacted with a tangle of houses and alleyways and
tended to have market areas that were busy, crowded affairs.271 Valencia city was still
very Muslim in character according to the planner Eiximenis, who visited in the next
century. Christians had a much more ordered, ‘Roman’ way of laying out their streets
268 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 191
269 The water system was “a unity imposing itself everywhere.” Burns (1973) p 59
270 de Epalza, M. ‘Islamic Social Structures in Muslim and Christian Valencia’ in P. E. Chevedden, D. J.
Kagay & P. G. Padilla (ed.) Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages – Essays in Honour of
Robert I. Burns S.J. – Volume II ‘Proceedings from Spain and the Western Mediterranean’ (New York
1996) p 187–8; Glick argues a Berber tradition: “Various elements of eastern Spanish practice are
consistent with Berber irrigation practices, although those practices are sufficiently generalized so that an
Arab introduction may be just as likely.” (Glick (1996) p 201)
271 Burns (1973) p 81
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and towns, and proceeded to cut additional access routes through the existing melange of
houses, buildings and passages to create a more logical layout. James ordered that a
vastly wider market street be created and that it should run almost the length of Valencia
itself. Plazas became public spaces and settlers were encouraged to make windows in the
town walls, absorbing spaces to create entryways. Effectively, the complex arrived at
was a European commercial commune revolving around a city hall with an engulfing
street–maze of Islamic influences. It was all legislation designed to Christianise a
community and make it attractive to settlers, whilst falling short of alienating the
natives.272
The Christians also concentrated on maintaining and repairing the irrigation
system that was in place when they arrived. Their rearrangement of the system was
simply into the more familiar peri–urban huertas.273 That is not to say that such
maintenance was not vital. “In Valencia not only orange trees but grain, vineyards, and
even locust–bean trees were irrigated when this was possible.”274 James did not miss out
on the good fortune of being able to talk to local Muslim officials who knew how the
system could be put to best use. The way water continued to be controlled in the
Christian era was almost certainly derived from the inherited Muslim systems.
James moved slowly in attempting to change the nature of official control over
the paper manufacturing centre at Jativa. The rapid expansion of the royal archives has
often been attributed to the acquisition of the city during the conquests. Paper from Jativa
272 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 194–5; the layout of Muslim towns and cities was indicative of their close–knit
communal existence.
273 Glick (1996) p 192
274 Hillgarth (1976) p 188
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had, after all, been used by James as early as the 1230s. Yet the constitution of 1244
(regulating and preserving Muslim traditions in industry, taxes, marketing, officialdom
and the exclusion of Jews from the highest office) made no mention of Jativa’s paper
industry, which was in the hands of the aljama. The absorption of the city into the crown
realm was only completed in 1252, with direct crown control increasing up to 1257. Al–
Azraq’s desperate actions in attempting to prolong the conflict came as James was
steadily eroding the aljama’s privileges. This was a key turning point, as a state of truce
was reached after the Muslim revolts, allowing for a greater elaboration of the Barcelona
section of the archives, in particular, using Jativa’s famous product.275
“In a society which had not yet developed independently many important
institutions – schools, hospitals, poor relief, proper taxation – the church had either to
substitute for or to foster these.” The multiplication of dioceses within Valencia gave
moral cohesion and direction to a conglomeration of minorities, increased James’
prestige and also acted as a buffer to alien ecclesiastic interests, such as Toledo, from
establishing any grip on the territory.276 Just as noblemen and merchants from outside
Valencia acquired lands in the new frontier, so too did clergymen, monasteries and
churches. James was particularly full of conviction when it came to the hospital–come–
monastery of St Vincent, claiming that prayers to the Blessed Saint had compelled Christ
to subdue “the whole kingdom of Valencia and [had] snatched it from the power and
275 Vanlandingham (2002) p 17; Diplomatarium Vol. I p 159; the previous chapter showed how
preoccupations elsewhere delayed James making any changes to the existing systems, particularly to the
successful manufacturing industries, when concluding the first treaty at Jativa in 1244; an action which
would have made him even more unpopular with his new Muslim charges.
276 Burns (1967) p 10–11
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hands of the pagans.”277 The shrine within the monastery was generously endowed as a
result. Counterbalancing this generosity was a requirement for the church to share the
expense of maintaining roads, bridges and the irrigation canals.278
Although the immediately visible world around the church was Muslim, the
Church performed a westernising role and transcended their surroundings to assist in
transforming the frontier. The church itself became more than just a church; it was a
frontier institution. Christian documentation pertaining to the diocese and its
ecclesiastical responsibilities is all but silent on issues relating to the Muslims.279 The
church preoccupied itself instead with the same goals as other European powers and the
fact that it chose to ignore its largest audience says a great deal about the church’s part in
the process. James expected only the mendicant orders to have any sort of conversant
role with the minorities and even then, it was purely with the purpose of conversion in
mind. The church proper was charged with the task of establishing and reinforcing
Christian dogma in the midst of the enemy and giving it a sound foundation in the
strange land in which they now found themselves.
An ambiguous attitude towards Valencia’s Muslims, treating them as political
enemies but also at the same time, and apparently contradictorily, as peaceful subjects
ripe for exploitation, along with their industries, was a continuing theme throughout the
thirteenth century and “the thesis proposed by some recent historians, that the
development of a Crusade ideology heralded some revolution in the policies and attitudes
277 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 207
278 Burns (1967) p 10
279 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 210
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of Christian princes towards Muslim peoples, is not reflected in events in Iberia in the
twelfth century (nor, for that matter, in the thirteenth).”280
The Reality of Convivencia
The state of union between the three religions of the Spanish peninsula has often
been referred to as convivencia (living together). This is part of the revolution in policies
and attitudes referred to above. “Narrowly defined, the word [convivencia] is not
controversial: Christians, Muslims and Jews certainly “coexisted” in Iberia,”281 although
there is no reason why this should mean peaceful coexistence. The peculiarity of the
Christian conquest of their southern Muslim neighbours is that it seems almost
inconceivable that after centuries of fighting, people who were engaged in suppressing
the infidel should come to an abrupt and immediate understanding of their foes and their
ways and cease hostilities at any level.282
Medieval minorities in Spain were not striving to assimilate like modern
minorities might do but instead resorted to the opposite extreme of shrinking completely
away from the prospect, appalled at the possibility of belonging to the other community
and actively seeking to avoid assimilation at all costs. Those wishing to find fault with
the ideal of convivencia would therefore point to the abuses of the system and the
brutalities committed against the Muslims, an insecurity arising from the prevailing
attitudes of both lay and clerical factions of the invaders and the fact that a Muslim
subject was reliant on the whim of a Christian king for the retention of his privileges.283
280 Catlos (2004) p 88
281 Nirenberg (1999) p 141
282 Boswell (1977) p 20
283 Burns (1984) p 21
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The Jews held the Talmudic concept of convivencia; that the law of the kingdom is the
law. Spanish rabbinic authorities supported the application of that principle to their
kingdoms – there was a need to acknowledge the justice of law and court processes of the
land in which they lived, which included the power of government–appointed judges.284
Attitudes towards the minorities
Mosques continued to outnumber Christian churches and, since surrender treaties
preserved the right to correctly observe services in the Islamic tradition, this, coupled
with the lack of any knowledge of Romance, “closed them into a solidarity as strong as
their religious and demographic unity.”285 Diet, tradition of communal bathing and the
right to exclude Jews from the aljamas could also be taken as indication of a good deal
for Muslims resulting from the surrender treaties.286 Yet, whilst continuations of religious
practice may well have been allowed, the very fact that they were within Christian
control meant that clashes were always going to occur with Christian courts and when it
came to the appointment of religious functionaries.287
Worship patterns were not changed but Mudejar feudal lords were created and
former aljama councillors were addressed as corporate jurats. Old institutions were
therefore bastardised and, indirectly, Muslim traditions mocked. James’ own attitude
towards his Mudejar charges is not entirely without grey areas. He found, at least
initially, the lure of Islamic tradition quite appealing. Perhaps by way of satisfying his
284 Roth (1996) p 150; a key example comes from Zaragoza in 1264 when Ibn Adret, a leading judge, ruled
that communities could not pick which rulings and enactments they chose to follow, nor could they impose
a ban on someone contrary to the ruling of an official. The widow who was claiming exemptions from
taxes received a privilege from James himself, the text of which has been preserved. The ruling effectively
extended the Talmudic principal to encompass all government – appointed judges. (Ibid., p 158 – 9)
285 Burns (1984) p 13
286 Ibid., p 22
287 Ibid., p 19
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vanity, he set himself up as successor to Abu Zayd and Zayyan by adjudicating in
disputes between Muslims, hearing evidence sworn on the Koran rather than the Bible
and prided himself on a particularly esoteric knowledge of Muslim susceptibility and
prejudice.288
But his autobiography reflects a different attitude. After a Muslim revolt broke
out in Valencia during the late 1240s, James was informed by Don Jimeno Perez de
Arenos that al–Azraq, with whom he had already signed a peace treaty in 1245, had
recaptured some of the region’s castles. He said:
“It pleases us much, because we could not expel the Saracens from the land
because of the agreements that they had made with us. And now they have
done something by which we can expel them. And as it pleases God, it greatly
pleases us that there where the name of Mohammed has long been proclaimed
and invoked, the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ will be invoked.”289
The king expelled many Muslims as a result of the revolt; even those who had not been
involved. This was much to the distress of the local barons, who relied on the Mudejars to
work their lands. Other Muslims would be granted the lands in later years.290
Early thirteenth–century church legislation also reflects this attitude. The synods
at Jaca in 1208 and Huesca in 1243 decreed that Christians should not be servants of
Muslim households because they denied the sacrament.291 The feeling was even reflected
288 Burns (1984) p 15
289 Llibre dels Fets p 271 at chapter 361
290 Hillgarth (1976) p 210
291 Catlos (2004) p 299
78
amongst the Jews, who in many instances, because of the nature of the population, held
power over Islamic communities as tax officials and bailiffs. Ibn Idhari felt that his
community’s behaviour signified enmity towards the Muslim population. In fact, it was
probably more symptomatic of the new political reality, where they returned to lands
formerly controlled by Muslims as allies of the Christians.292
Looking at the evidence so far revealed, Jews would appear to be the favoured
minority in James’ Valencia. They had played an important role as dragomans during the
conquest and therefore, because of their dependability the king did not hesitate to install
Jews as landowners and set them up as bailiffs and tax officials. Other sources show that
a slight leniency was exercised in the application of law to the Jews. Legislation issued
by James in 1228 decreed that Jews were forbidden to hold office where they might have
authority over Christians: this was never enforced during his reign.293
A document surviving from 9 May 1262 shows that “Jews imprisoned anywhere
in the Valencian kingdom on tax charges were to be paroled on Friday evening and all
day Saturday up to ‘tempus quando stella apparebit, singulis diebus S(abbati) vestris.’”294
The Morella charter of 10 February 1264, included in Orti Miralles’ history of the
community, tells how the newly settled will receive full crown tax exemptions for the
292 Nirenberg, D. ‘Love Between Muslim and Jew in Medieval Spain: A Triangular Affair’ in H. J. Hames
(ed.) Jews, Muslims and Christians in and around the Crown of Aragon – Essays in Honour of Professor
Elena Lourie in The Medieval Mediterranean – Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400–1500 Volume 52
(Boston 2004) p 134
293 Hillgarth (1976) p 239; this is hardly surprising. Aragon as a realm had come to rely very heavily on
Jewish expertise in finance and administration. They were therefore very important to the crown in this role
and it would also be Jewish money that would effectively finance James’ campaign against Murcia in 1265
and also allow him to make an appearance at the church council of Lyon in 1274.
294 Burns (1984) p 130
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first year, with their contributions being limited during the next four years to a flat sum
of 20 sous per household.295
That is not to say that the Jews escaped the round condemnation of faith meted
out to the Muslims. The disparity, evident in the law codes (Furs) of regions such as
Valencia, between the punishment for sleeping with a Jew and sleeping with a Muslim is
striking; “where Christian males caught with Jewish women are to be burned… those
caught with Muslim women are to be whipped naked through the streets.”296 Relations
between Christian men and Muslim women were much more likely to be tolerated.297 The
Synod of Huesca in 1243 forbade the buying of wine from Jews by Christians. The by–
law was supposedly in support of the ideology that to sit down and eat and drink with a
Jew would be a mockery of Christian faith.298
Why was there such a mixed attitude towards the Jews, whom the Christians so
obviously viewed as a valuable commodity? In many ways, the attitude was even more
puzzling because the documentation relating to the Jews is so sparse when compared to
the Muslims. They seemed to have been a readily accepted part of thirteenth–century
Aragonese society. Indeed, during the violence of the 1260s, James granted a restriction
to the Jews of Barcelona which meant that no more than ten Christians were allowed to
attend mendicant meetings, for fear of violence and subsequent injury to the Jewish
295 Burns (1984) p 131
296 Nirenberg (1999) p 140
297 A more detailed discussion of sexual mixing – miscegenation – appears below at p 90.
298 Catlos (2004) p 299; In reality, it was more likely to have been motivated by a desire to economically
protect the authorities’ own wine merchants.
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audience.299 Later in the same year, the same restriction was granted to the Jews of
Lleida. The king was clearly concerned that no harm should befall them whilst they
listened to the mendicants’ conversion–orientated sermons, yet there seems to be such
disparity between this on the one hand and the harsh punishments for sexual contact on
the other.
Part of the answer lies in the Christian understanding of the Jewish faith. Early
Christians had been confident that they knew everything that they needed to know about
the Jews and their dogma.300 Increased contact on a daily basis and an entwining of
cultures in the thirteenth century showed the Christians that they did not have a complete
knowledge. There were huge gaps in their understanding of a constantly evolving and
flexible religion; one that was as malleable and as open to contemporary influences as
their own faith.301 Such a realisation merely served to harden attitudes towards the
minority and Christians proceeded to adopt irrational attitudes towards Jews.302 The
efforts at protection were not so much to balance good and bad but instead an effective
means of ensuring their own self–serving interests. The sources provide glimpses of a
painful co–existence, with the Jews – just like the Muslims – trying to fashion out a
practical way of life for themselves under the thumb of their Christian overlords.303
299 Johnston, M. D. ‘Ramon Llull and the Compulsory Evangelization of Jews and Muslims’ in L. J. Simon
(ed.) Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages – Essays in Honour of Robert I. Burns S.J. –
Volume I ‘Proceedings from Kalamazoo’ (New York 1995) p 12; this was in 1268.
300 Pick (2004) p 8
301 Ibid., p 10
302 Ibid., p 14
303 Burns (1984) p 136
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The thirteenth–century dream of conversion
Christians gradually began to gather a textual heritage for Islam that would
accompany their centuries’ held appreciation of Judaism, but not with any express
intention of learning more about the faith and how it worked. It was more “to stabilize,
make accessible, and defend an orthodox Christian view of the world against the attacks
of heretics within and unbelievers – or misbelievers – outside the area of organized
Christendom.”304 The ultimate prevailing attitude towards Muslims was shaped by what
Burns calls ‘the thirteenth–century dream of conversion.’305 Whilst essentially a
European–wide fascination, conversion of misbelievers was also something which
infiltrated the rapprochement between Christians and Muslims in Valencia.306
This thirteenth–century movement could have been the culmination of a push for
conversion begun by the Popes themselves, starting with Gregory VII in 1074.
Ultimately, James himself had undertaken his Valencian conquests under a banner of
conversion, publicly baptising Muslim converts outside the walls of the conquered
city.307 Shortly before its end, James made public a decree that enabled Muslims to
convert freely, without hindrance from anyone.308 Two key movements, both mendicant
in origin, were at the forefront of conversion efforts in the mid–thirteenth century. One
group was the Franciscans, the other the Dominicans.
304 Pick (2004) p 13, quoting R W Southern.
305 Burns (1984) p 80
306 The state would never allow freedom of conversion, as this would facilitate conversions to Islam and
Judaism; leaving truth and embracing falsehood. Strict regulation was needed to ensure that it was
voluntary and to guard against reprisals from a convert’s former community. (Shneidman (1970) p 428)
307 Burns (1984) p 87
308 James decreed that no-one should be disinherited for conversion. (Shneidman (1970) p 428); Converts
were allowed to keep their property at Jativa (O’Connor (2003) p 130)
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The latter group was instrumental in the introduction of language schools, which
served to bring intellectual minds together, to expose Muslims to Christian arguments
and ways of thinking, with the ultimate aim being that such exposure would lead to
eventual conversion on a massive scale.309 James himself was seemingly fully behind the
concepts of conversion and evangelisation through his support of these school initiatives,
granting lands to one at Jativa in 1248310 and appointing crown overseers such as
Raymond de Penyafort and Joan de Puigventos, who threw themselves enthusiastically
behind the enterprise.311
The Franciscans were dubbed the martyr movement and sought to inveigle
themselves with the indigenous Muslim population by serving as chaplains to merchants,
advising princes and meeting Islamic sages head on in debate.312 The Franciscans, as
ordinary friars, did not need a “special license to proselytize unbelievers.”313 Like their
ninth–century predecessors, who had so disturbed early Islam, the Franciscans “proposed
to preach boldly in mosques and Muslim crowds the iniquity of Islam and the triumph of
the Cross.”314 Shortly before the Valencian crusade, two Franciscans from Italy,
Giovanni of Perugia and Pietro of Sassoferrato, were executed by the Almohad wali Abu
Zayd, after publicly courting death. Zayd’s “own conversion, not long after, was
309 The Franciscan Roger Bacon’s argument was that “Arabic serves little use for theological study, but for
philosophy and for conversion of the infidels much.” Burns (1984) p 94
310 Ibid., p 98
311 Raymond de Penyafort, as a key Dominican advisor of James throughout the 1240s, inspired an initial
decree that demanded Jews attend the friars’ conversionist sermons. (Cohen, J. The Friars and the Jews –
The Evolution of Medieval Anti–Judaism (Cornell 1982) p 106); Raymond instructed the friars in Arabic
and Hebrew so that they could better engage the minorities in debate and understand their scriptures.
(O’Connor (2003) p 126)
312 Burns (1984) p 88
313 Johnston (1995) p 6
314 Burns (1984) p 89; Franciscans attempting to ‘persuade’ Jews to convert would be rebuked by Pedro III
(James’ heir and successor) for being too violent in their methods.
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popularly attributed to their blood, while their field of execution became a Valencian
holy place.”315
The Dominicans, in order to “dispute formally with Jewish or Muslim theologians
did require a special licence, [which was] available in Spain from their missionary
studia.”316 They generally sought a less controversial route to successful conversion.
Reason alone was not enough, the Dominicans philosophised, there was a need to
infiltrate establishment preconceptions and change attitudes from within.317 By
influencing a Muslim sage, because of the way Islamic society was constructed, there
would be an impact on not only religious ideals but also on the workings of academics,
government, administration and mercantile practices. These mendicants used rationalist
arguments in university centres and concentrated on cultural adaptation in the language
schools.318 They were successful in converting large numbers of Muslims but not in
displacing the still sizeable Valencian population.319
The famed evangelist Ramon Llull put forward the notion in his Libre de
contemplacio that converts, rather than the minorities themselves, were the ones who
faced hardship. He believed that the stigmatism of being a convert, through their
economic exploitation, was really an example of ‘failing virtue among Christians.’ The
love of God – which has motivated Christians to save these minorities – should not cease
simply because they have converted. “Many Jews would convert if they had a way to
315 Burns (1984) p 90
316 Johnston (1995) p 7
317 The Dominicans were better suited, by the nature of their apostate, to public preaching, teaching
theology and converting the minorities. (Burns (1967) p 203)
318 Burns refers to their strategy as a novel double tactic. (Burns (1984) p 91–2)
319 Ibid., p 105; O’Connor (2003) p 129; The crown hoped that these measures would lead to mass
conversion but the relative failure in Valencia is apparent from Boswell’s figures for the fourteenth century
in his book, ‘The Royal Treasure.’ See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion.
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live, and many Muslims [would do the same] if they were not scorned by all the
Christians.”320
Anti–Jewish polemic had increased in volume since the eleventh century,
something never readily explained, and anti–Islamic writings had even been written in
Arabic by the twelfth century. Such a development was arguably an indication of
worsening attitudes towards the minority groups, going hand–in–hand with changing
legislation. Yet it could also be argued that it was part of the medieval Christians’
attempt to more clearly define boundaries between the cultures. Such polemic and
legislation defined groups in relationship to each other – since they knew where they
stood, Christians could permit themselves to live alongside other religious groups. Pick
therefore suggests that medieval religious polemic must be interpreted as another strategy
employed in Christian expansion; resulting in self-definition and representation.321
Thirteenth–century violence
“Violence, hostility and competition can only be seen as destructive breakdowns
of social relations, the antithesis of associative action. Strange as it may seem, accounts
of sexual intercourse between minority men and Christian women… and the violence
such accounts provoked provide a vantage point from which to argue against… polarized
views of convivencia and to create new space for violence in models of coexistence.”322
Christians, Muslims and Jews had co–existed for centuries under Islamic rule but, as the
new Christian regime established itself across Valencia, and the balance of power shifted,
barriers began to change and the concept of acceptable behaviour between communities
320 Johnston (1995) p 15–6; Llull first became prominent in the 1270s.
321 Pick (2004) p 3–5
322 Nirenberg (1999) p 142
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altered radically.323 Muslims and Jews are more prominent in the sources as victims of
violence because of their secondary social and legal status. But Christians were also
vulnerable. If they went to the defence of their minority neighbours, they exposed
themselves to the same dangers.324
The Council of Lleida on March 12, 1243 made a provision aimed at promoting
the legal, social and economic welfare of converts, which stated that there should be no
obstruction at law or in practice that might prevent a Jew or Muslim from converting.
There was to be no confiscation of property and anyone convicted of abusing a convert
would suffer the penalty of a fine.325 This aimed to establish the same support and
protection in Aragon which was available to converts throughout the rest of Europe,
although clerics may have felt conversions were more likely to happen on a sporadic
basis in Spain rather than en masse.
On 26 August 1263, another royal edict declared that all Jews and Muslims
should attend sermons given by the mendicants and stressed once again the importance
of protecting converts from being abused physically and financially. Only three days
later (on 29 August) James issued a further decree, giving evangelists the power to tackle
Jews in dispute at any time and in any place and requiring the Jew to respond patiently
and politely. Almost immediately, the king was flooded with appeals from his Jewish
subjects asking for exemptions and only a day later he was re–instructing his officials.
323 The irony is that violence between Christians and Muslims was concentrated in the central and northern
parts of Valencia and not the southern/frontier areas. (O’Connor (2003) p 129)
324 Catlos (2004) p 271
325 James also empowered his officials to compel unwilling Jews or Muslims to attend sermons given by
friars, bishops or archbishops. Thus the decree’s main aim was not to increase the advantages offered to the
minority communities but to encourage them to convert in as many ways as possible. (Johnston (1995) p 7–
8); James also ordered local officials like the amin to welcome friars when they came to a town to preach
their sermons. (O’Connor (2003) p 127)
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He limited their powers, restricting the pressure that could be applied to Jews, who could
no longer be forced to leave their neighbourhood in order to be preached at in their own
places of worship. Preachers had been known to enter synagogues and forcibly subject
their Jewish audiences to sermons.326
Examples of violence whose aim was to injure Muslims and their faith seem to
have been rare in the thirteenth century. The best examples again come from the 1260s,
when tensions were high, such as the attack on the moreria at Ambel in 1263.327 Most of
the time, incidents were not motivated by racial or segregation issues. Here, the Muslims
could be said to have been unfortunate to get caught up in a wider conflict between the
townspeople and the Temple, of which the minority group happened to be subjects. The
eighty–one Christians involved offered to forfeit their lives and their families’ liberty,
such was their guilt at injuring a party not involved in the dispute. The terms of
punishment meted out by the Provincial Master did not mention the Muslim attacks but
concentrated instead on the tax, monopolies and irrigation rights of the Temple.328
There was still plenty of regulation for the potential violence that could emanate
from this mix of cultures. As a result of tensions and the violent nature of the Valencia
hinterland into which the settlers entered, James fashioned his own safeguard, known as
guidaticum, which, if breached, carried the severest financial penalties.329 The safeguard
seemed to prove a most effective deterrent, since there are few documented cases
326O’Connor (2003) p 128; Johnston (1995) p 10-11; The decree of 26 August 1263 set the precedent for
the future “licences” that were granted to more prominent evangelists, such as Ramon Llull. Large crowds
of Christians had been known to accompany friars and therefore represent a threat to the Jewish
congregation.
327 Five Muslims were left dead.
328 Catlos (2004) p 318
329 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 194
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recording its breach. This does not mean that the violence was stopped completely. Royal
interference was necessary well into the 1270s.330 A declaration from James’ successor
Pedro in 1279 stated that Jew, Muslim and Christian alike should be protected and
supported by justice. Of the charters issued to this effect in twenty–four of the major
towns of his kingdom, six were in Valencia.331
For those starting out in new territory, the prospect of losing what little they did
have was terrifying, particularly as financial ruin was potentially the least of their
worries. Particularly amongst Christian land owners, swords were easily drawn and a
major drawback of the fragmentary enterprise culture which evolved was apparent from
the over–protectiveness of a number of Valencian entrepreneurs when it came to their
businesses. Suspicion was rife and conflict could erupt over the most trivial of matters,
such as the theft of a sheaf of corn or part of a crop of wheat. The king himself was often
required to intervene and settle what had become highly elaborate cases but which had
arisen out of almost nothing.332
Problems of enforcement and abuse of process
Another phenomenon that aggravated existing tensions was that of sexual
relations between the groups. Contact between Muslims and Jews was, in reality, a three-
way one with their Christian masters. The Jewish community, with a long history of
living among other peoples, had particular concerns about sexual interaction with non–
Jews. “It was one thing to be exogamous in a position of power, quite another in a
330 O’Connor (2003) p 136; in 1268, James had to order local officials in Jativa to protect Jews and their
property, particularly on Good Friday.
331 Burns (1984) p 136
332 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 194
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position of weakness, yet another when the situation was genuinely competitive.”333 For
Muslims, the situation was more straightforward, if only slightly. Muslim men could
marry Christian or Jewish women, as all children from the marriage were considered
Muslim. Yet Muslim women had no such liberty. The fact that this ideal was established
during Muslim supremacy did not prevent it from becoming adopted policy as part of the
Mudejar legal codes, since the male was presumed the dominant party within a mixed
relationship.334 Both sets of rules continued almost unabated into the years after the
Christian conquest.
“The fears of pollution that arise when the boundaries of such groups come under
pressure are expressed through metaphors of the body: the female body becomes the site
of fears of penetration and corruption, the male of diffusion and enfeeblement.”335 But
such apparent continuity in Jewish and Muslim custom hides a distinct shift in the
patterns of sexual relations within the Spanish peninsula. Whatever stance the rabbis
took, inter–faith intercourse was a very real possibility for Jews living under Christian
rule in medieval Spain and was most likely to take place with Muslims, not just because
of claims that Arabs were erudite and Christians rustic in the art of harlotry.336
For one, Christian laws forbade sexual mixing with a Jew or Muslim and they
were strongly and consistently enforced.337 For another, since they were not technically a
conquered people and owned Muslim slaves, the balance of power in the Peninsula
333 Nirenberg (2004) p 128
334 Ibid., p 130
335 Nirenberg (1999) p 145
336 Nirenberg (2004) p 131
337 Sexual mixing was unlikely given the various punishments for committing sexual acts with a minority
(discussed at p 86 above), even if transgressions with one group carried more severe penalties than
congress with another.
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initially favoured a Jew accessing Muslim women rather than the other way around.338
Jewish communities used similar laws to restrict Christian access to their women.339 Men
from both groups were less concerned with the prospect of marrying converted Muslim
women.340 The ongoing struggle to maintain a sexual boundary between the minority
communities was hindered by the involvement of a large number of Muslim women in
prostitution;341 such practices often led to enslavement in non–Muslim households and
the resultant contact often led to the continuation of prostitution in this new
employment.342 Jewish households that could afford slaves would undoubtedly have
Muslim ones, making the latter practice a more likely occurrence.343
In addition to lax attitudes amongst the communities, religious decrees, direct
from a Christian church desperate to exert some kind of control on the situation, were all
too easily overlooked. Archbishop Sparago at Tarragona ignored all of the orders issued
by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, and it was not until 1228 that the legate Jean
d’Abbeville began to apply the injunctions laid out by the Council.344 In 1268, action was
taken to address the issue of convivencia. The Cortes of Jerez, “following the teaching of
the Church, prohibited Christians living together with Muslims or Jews.”345
Theoretically, both minorities should have been confined to a separate portion of a town
338 Nirenberg (2004) p 132
339 Ibid., p 136
340 Nirenberg (1999) p 144
341 Nirenberg (2004) p 137; once women became ‘public females,’ there was nothing their community
could do to prevent intercourse with Jewish men.
342 Nirenberg (1996) p 141; “any Muslim woman involved in miscegenation lost her freedom and her
person.”
343 Nirenberg (2004) p 138
344 Sometimes church decrees did affect the attitudes of local lawmakers; for example, at Huesca, after the
synod of 1243, an ordinance was issued which forbade the buying of meat from Jewish or Muslim butchers
by Christians. (Catlos (2004) p 299)
345 Hillgarth (1976) p 169
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but this was something not effectively realised until the Muslims and Jews were expelled
from the peninsula in later centuries.346
Statutes standard in other regions were not adopted in Valencia until much later
or even adopted at all. The dress code of the cortes of Valladolid, 1258, “stated that
Mudejars in Christian towns should wear beards and [have] their hair cut in a wheel
round their head.”347 Neither Muslims nor Jews were allowed to wear brightly–coloured
clothing, in other words, something that might cause them to be improperly identified as
nobility. This code was not adopted by the Aragonese authorities until the beginning of
the fourteenth century. James’ policy statement on convivencia from 1242 included an
obligation that Jews and Muslims should dress differently from Christians but it was
directed more at men and used as a way of combating miscegenation.348 This was a
charge that was effective at “bringing the judicial apparatus unpleasantly to bear upon the
accused.”349 Officials would use charges of miscegenation to raise additional revenue for
themselves, lords convicting their own subjects in order to achieve this end.350
When contested at law, rulings often favoured the continuing cohabitation of the
accused, since neither was a Christian, thereby indicating the relatively unregulated
nature of Muslim–Jewish relations.351 Often, mundane cases were raised to the level of
346 Despite the fact that the ecclesiastical authorities repeatedly ordered them not to do so, Christians,
Muslims and Jews often drank, gambled and went to war together, sometimes living not just in the same
neighbourhood but also in the same house. (Nirenberg (1999) p 145); see also pp 68 and 71 above.
347 Hillgarth (1976) p 167
348 Catlos (2004) p 300–1; James’ policy was based on the rulings of several church councils.
349 Nirenberg (1999) p 149; Minority groups were just as manipulative in the use of judicial apparatus
against their enemies. Lower–class Jews brought complaints against wealthy Jews and similar complaints
were made by Mudejars about the factional fighting in their own communities. Both minorities fought
amongst themselves for control of positions of authority.
350 Ibid., p 151
351 Nirenberg (2004) p 140
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defences of the faith. A Christian debtor might start with a standard complaint about a
loan, with charges of usury, move on to an allegation that a Jewish creditor had made an
unfair seizure of goods, ending with a charge that the creditor had attempted the rape of
the Christian debtor’s daughter.352 Whilst convictions were extremely rare, especially
those carrying the death sentence, there were plenty of cases that came before a court and
plenty more that probably did not get that far. A potentially violent charge became more
or less neutralised by its use as a tool for exploitation, “often a costly nuisance.”353
The legacy of thirteenth–century sources
Thus far, the study has concentrated on matters from what is very much a
Christian angle. This is dictated, in the main, by the nature of surviving sources, which
tend to be Christian in origin. If Muslim authors did survive the conquest – and all the
evidence points towards many authors and commentators leaving the peninsula along
with the aristocratic elite – then their outpourings were not given encouragement by their
Christian overlords. History is relatively silent as to why Jewish authors did not feature
prominently in the archive, but one suspects that the reasons are the same as for the lack
of Muslim sources. Christian control prevented the extensive distribution of Muslim
material and Christian archives were unlikely to carry plentiful copies of documents
originating in their subject communities.
This chapter has illustrated clearly the ultimate intentions of the Christians – and
that was conversion or expulsion. The fact that this took over two centuries from the
original conquest to actually happen, was more down to circumstance and potential profit
352 Nirenberg (1999) p 150
353 Ibid., p 152
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for the Christian lords than for any religious or moral reason. The great reforming Pope
Innocent IV had preached tolerance as part of his theme of Christian charity but the
over–arching belief throughout the post–conquest period was that Jews and Muslims
should ultimately be assimilated and as long as they were not, they should be segregated
and prevented from having direct contact with Christians in their day–to–day activities.
This ideal was never achieved, much in the same way that Muslims and Christians had
continued to mix during the period of Islamic control over the peninsula. Sheer
demographics dictated a path of least resistance for the authorities.
Muslims could not be permanently removed from Valencia for the same reasons
that segregation could not be attempted; it would have created a financial and social
crisis that could have destabilised the region. This much had been clear from the
approach of the king himself when conducting his tour of conquest. Why else would the
surrender treaties have taken their apparently lenient stance? In the light of this apparent
tolerance (forced and contrived as it was), by a king who was ever eager to make
profitable use of the Jews and Muslims under his control – both those in Aragon–
Catalonia and those in his newly acquired lands in the Balearics and Valencia – and with
careful study of surviving documentation, the lives of the minorities themselves can be
examined, as well as whether there was any marked change in the way that they
conducted themselves and their business at a day–to–day level.
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Chapter Four – Exploring Minorities under Christian Rule.
Minorities in Valencia
Muslims
The irony of Christian–Muslim relations in this period is that, in the conquest
of Valencia, Christians were not the only ones to benefit from their enterprise. The
Muslim wali Abu Zayd converted to Christianity during the conquest and, together
with his followers (who had aided the Aragonese invasion) received rewards of land
as well as being installed as vassals of the king.354 They became ‘our men and
vassals’ (homens nostres e vassals). “The lord offered his protection, including
protection of the vassals’ religion, and in return the vassals provided their profitable
labor: “Whoso has Moors, has wealth” (Quien tiene Moro, tiene oro).”355
It is almost impossible to calculate how many Muslims were living in
Valencia during the thirteenth century, because there is a distinct lack of information
on this topic and there are too many variables.356 However, Boswell’s study of the
Muslim communities for the fourteenth century notes the peculiarity of population in
the east of the peninsula. A century later than the period that directly concerns us,
around 1365, the figures are still extremely interesting. Catalonia had the biggest
population, circa 470, 000 yet the smallest percentage of Muslims. By contrast,
Valencia’s population was mostly Muslim, Christians being very much in the
minority within a total population that was around 117, 000. Aragon was very much
354 Burns (1984) p 10
355 Harvey (1990) p 133
356 Numbers could only be decided after reaching a conclusion about the numbers of Muslims which
the Christians expelled. The map would be tentative at best. (Burns (1973) p 72)
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in the middle of the two on both counts; its population was 235, 000 and Boswell
estimated a 30% presence by the Muslims.357
Most of the Muslims under Christian control did not have the advantage of the
same level of protection afforded to the select few amongst their upper strata or even
to some Jewish financiers or professionals. The closer a man was to power, the more
political protection he would enjoy, as was the case in most societies. Although the
Muslims enjoyed crown protection as part of their status as the royal treasure, it was
also confirmation of their exclusion from that majority.358 It represents a fundamental
clash in human nature – the instinctive fear of the incomprehensible against an
equally natural inclination to live at peace with one’s neighbours. Valencian society
at its base level, as Boswell suggests, was a military element, which desired to ‘kill
everything in sight,’ vying with the more pragmatic agricultural element, which
argued that everything should be done to maintain the stability which would allow for
the continued growing of crops and maximisation of the land’s potential harvest.
Most Christians responded to the Muslim presence by essentially ignoring
them, erecting physical and mental barriers between the two cultures; such as
intimidating Gothic churches and administrative restraints.359 Military service was
prominent in both societies. The early surrender agreements and fueros had limited
the amount of military duty expected of Muslims, but periodic military service (or
exercitus) was expected by the end of the thirteenth century. Muslim villagers were
also expected to contribute to their own defence and the defence of their lands and
territories, just as Christians were obliged to do.360 Muslim soldiers and mercenaries
357 Boswell (1977) p 7
358 Harvey (1990) p 102
359 Burns (1984) p 14
360 Catlos (2004) p 263–5
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were employed in James’ military campaigns and he made particular use of Muslim
crossbowmen. “Through the last decades of the thirteenth century these privateers
operated across the territories of the Crown, achieving a remarkable degree of
economic and social integration,”361 some settling permanently, others maintaining
their status both home and abroad.
Muslims were scattered throughout Valencian society, forming the largest
mass of farmers and workers in industries like ceramics and paper manufacture as
well as being servants in households, successful merchants and sailors and well–
regarded shopkeepers. Pottery was the most important occupation for Muslims
outside agriculture.362 In Valencia, Muslims formed several strata. There was an
artisan strata; this included Muslim artists, millers, barbers, bakers and shopkeepers.
Workshops (which were usually an inner recess of shops that opened onto the street)
turn up quite frequently in records because they yielded a regalian tax and, as a result,
the Christians encouraged all sorts of trades, such as linen manufacture, textiles,
dyeing operations and even book production.363
In another stratum, Muslims were also active as merchants. James regulated
groups engaged in commerce throughout the kingdom (including banking financiers
and shopkeepers), listing them as a merchant class or mercaders. They imported,
exported and distributed, just like their Christian contemporaries, receiving the same
protections in 1261 for travelling to and from Valencia market and benefiting from
the same tax exemptions. The thirteenth century was a key time for Muslim export
activity. As the Catalan naval power increased into the later centuries, so the minority
looked ever more inwards. It also formed an effective part of the acculturative
361 Catlos (2004) p 292
362 Hillgarth (1976) p 183
363 Burns (1973) p 90–3
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process, as trade “crossed all boundaries of religion, language, culture and holy war
hostilities.”364
The third key stratum in which they were involved was as farmers and
stockmen. They provided the backdrop for urban life, as in many medieval societies,
although it is very apparent from the sources that the average Muslim townsman was
also a small farmer. Within this stratum there were all sorts of sub–divisions; there
was the amateur and the professional; differences between farmers who owned their
land or rented it; those who were sharecroppers or labourers. They could be wealthy,
destitute or somewhere in–between. In fact, such was the blur between townsman and
countryman that the tax system instead split communities up into the landed and the
non–landed classes. The final key stratum was that of the slave class, or sarracenus
captivus. Slavery was an urban rather than a rural phenomenon, although the
occasional rural helper may have been classed as a slave. In general, Valencian slaves
tended to be in positions of trust rather than simply fulfilling a menial role.365
At Uxo,366 water rights and the rents from mosques could be distributed how
the Muslims saw fit. The same restrictions on the sale of property applied, in that they
could not sell to the conquerors. Christians would never be allowed to settle there,
either voluntarily or through forced occupation. Muslims were free to travel to other
Islamic areas without restriction, although it is interesting to note that James does not
guarantee their safety, as no truce was in force.367 One eighth of all produce would be
paid by Muslims to the crown. No other payments would be required, the sole
exception being the peyta raised from the Muslims of the Lieutenancy of Valencia, to
364 Burns (1973) p 96–9
365 Ibid., p 99–101 and 109
366 This was a charter which James granted the Muslims of the Uxo valley in 1250.
367 Harvey (1990) p 125
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which they will be obliged to contribute according to royal assessment. The charter
finishes by saying “Let the Moors remain as they were wont in the time of the Moors,
before they departed from the land” although they were forbidden to enter territories
where the king was waging his campaigns.368 Presumably James feared his enemies
being supported by Muslims from his own territories.
Muslims were free to travel, perhaps on pilgrimage to Mecca. If they left the
kingdom, they could take both family and moveable goods with them and they were
free to return at any time. Muslims remained mobile on a large scale and those who
were free came from abroad as a constant source of settlers of which the Crown could
make good use throughout the thirteenth century.369 This impression of freedom is
very much confirmed by the Uxo charter. Full and unhindered privileges under their
existing sunna was granted by James, along with the privilege of being able to travel
anywhere in the lands without the hindrance of any man.370 This “movement does not
seem to have been an issue, however, until the beginning of the fourteenth century,
when lords who stood to permanently lose a Muslim subject endeavored to prohibit a
change of residence or extract some compensation in return.”371
A qadi “was at once the spokesman for divine law and the prestigious
embodiment of the ruler’s judicial powers.” He was a key member of the Muslim
judiciary and a central figure in the religious, social and intellectual life of a town.
The post of amin, carrying the meaning “trustworthy,” was actually an equally
important and specific office in Valencia. He was the main administrator of an aljama
with similar jurisdiction to a Christian justiciar. Non–capital criminal cases involving
368 Harvey (1990) p 126: Fresh fruit and vegetables were excluded from the produce tax.
369 “As Burns notes, Muslim lands remained a preferred source of immigrants, even during the height
of al–Azraq’s insurrection in Valencia.” Catlos (2004) p 286
370 Harvey (1990) p 125
371 Catlos (2004) p 288
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Muslims were often bound over to be dealt with by him.372 At Jativa, the amin was
chosen by the Christian authorities, specifically with the raising of taxes in mind. In
addition, the city had its own sahib al–madina (police chief), in anticipation,
presumably, of any mob unrest.373
This official, sometimes a city prefect, served a repressive function. A highly
prestigious office under the Almohads, it had begun to wane by the time the
Christians conquered Valencia and Jativa provides the best information for the role he
played in the region’s cities. He looked after the prison, arrested those accused of
crimes, handled those cases brought by Christians against the Muslims and executed
faciat – or justice and punishment – in non–capital cases. His payment amounted to
ten percent of the fines collected. The muhtasib derived his office from the concept of
a private obligation to obstruct evil and promote good. He censored and supervised
community morality, which covered a multitude of areas from liturgy to ‘bad
examples.’374
“His main function was regulating commercial and industrial activity,
professional ethics, public morals, and community utilities or amenities. He combined
the jobs of building inspector, health officer, policeman, and watchdog of the public
interest.”375 A muhtasib was often known as a market inspector because he checked
weights and measures, along with the standards of construction work and
manufacturing processes. The natural accompaniment to these powers was the right to
mete out punishment in cases of public disorder in the marketplace. Under Islamic
372 Burns (1973) p 231–4
373 Harvey (1990) p 130
374 Burns (1973) p 235–9
375 Ibid., p 239
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rule, the office held little prestige but the Christians saw its value and used it
extensively, turning it into an ‘effective instrument of municipal government.’376
The Muslim presence was a major factor in the continued success of paper
production at Jativa and textile production at Valencia city, Jativa (again) and Seville
in the thirteenth century. James ensured Jativa’s continued success by forbidding
Muslims elsewhere in Valencia from making paper.377 The cartas pueblas granted by
the Crown for the settlement of Valencia gave Christians the right to live in local
morerias. The Mudejar aljamas were governed by Islamic law, with mosques,
religious schools and a Muslim cemetery. Muslims were encouraged to become
Christians even though they would lose their immovable goods. Yet a Christian who
became a Muslim, or even reverted to Islam would be lucky to escape punishment.378
No attempt was made to expel the vast numbers of Muslims in Valencia
during the thirteenth century, much to the chagrin of the papacy. Their presence was
undoubtedly bound to cause friction but the Muslim “labour force was essential to the
economy of Valencia. There was also the hope that the [Muslims] and Jews would be
peacefully assimilated into Christian society.”379 Valencian Muslims continued to
speak Arabic post–conquest but they do not have appeared to have contributed to the
Islamic cultural exchange and did not produce any writers of note. Islam itself could
be said to have suffered when members of the learned classes took up positions as
local officials, helping the Christian king to keep his peace instead of remaining (or
becoming) members of the Islamic scholarly community.380
376 Harvey (1990) p 130
377 Glick, T. F. Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages (Princeton 1979) p 223
378 Hillgarth (1976) p 183
379 Ibid., p 163
380 Harvey (1990) p 120
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The multi–lingual Jews traditionally formed the bridge between the three
communities, as they often had classical Arabic. What of the Muslims? “If the two
[communities] stood isolated at the elementary level of language... conditions for
forbearance of fusion were very different.”381 The sheer vastness of Valencia’s
territory meant that a sub-community of Muslim scribes sprang up in addition to the
Jewish officials to deal with the enormous job of preparing and processing local
documents.382 James may well have preferred to have Jews in the position of notaries
for his kingdom but the territory’s size simply did not allow for this to happen.
Two schools of thought operate as to the linguistic skills of the indigenous
Muslim population. One is that they spoke only Romance, using very little Arabic by
the thirteenth century (mainly in their prayers), the pure language being the preserve
of the intellectual elite.383 Certainly from the end of the eleventh century, Berber
influence positively discouraged bilingualism, which was already on the wane upon
their arrival. However, the presence of Romance had influenced the language enough
for Ibn Khaldun, a noted Arab Hispanophile, to bemoan “an Arabic which seemed
‘no longer Arabic.’”384
There are also indications that the second school of thought (that the Muslims
were bilingual with knowledge of Romance and Arabic) could also be justified. There
is evidence that at Elche, no-one among the Muslim population spoke the Romance
language at the turn of the fourteenth century. James had arranged his surrender
381 Burns (1984) p 172
382 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 126
383 They had mostly abandoned the peninsula upon the arrival of the Christian forces.
(Burns (1967) p 175)
384 Burns (1984) p 178
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treaties in Arabic,385 and knowledge of the language would appear to have been an
essential requirement for day-to-day interaction and legislation in much the same way
that it was for negotiation.386 James’ chancery, which featured a strong Arabic
department run by Jews, grew exponentially in size after the Valencian conquest.387
Negotiation was always conducted in the presence of a dragoman (king’s
translator). The very fact that Jews were valued for their skills as translators suggests
the presence of a language barrier, at least on the Christian side. The Muslims had no
such use for a dragoman, although it is possible that their knowledge of the existence
of these men enabled them to persist in the use of their native language, since
translators would always be at hand.388 The king’s determination to establish a neo–
bilingualism was a key factor in the alienation of the native Muslim population from
their Christian paymasters. It helped to reinforce the separate identities of invader and
conquered and the mutual hostility which would eventually lead to revolt.389 The
disappearance of the Muslim elite could have spurred the lower classes to cling to
Arabic as a nostalgic memory of the past. “The young, the facile, the adaptable, the
opportunist, and to some extent all those thrown into closer contact with the Christian
neighbors who constituted the new establishment, would either acquire or sharpen
Romance.”390
Conquered Muslims were employed as warriors and crossbowmen, both in
Valencia’s own campaigns and in helping James’ son Pedro repel the French
385 It has been argued alternatively that this was merely a deliberate and courteous regard for the
surrendering Muslims’ official language.
386 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 125
387 This was still not enough to avoid the selected use of Muslim scribes, as noted above.
388 Burns (1984) p 182
389 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 122
390 Burns (1984) p 191
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invasions of the mid–thirteenth century.391 The king viewed Muslims partly as
profitable tenants, partly as a minority to be converted and partly as an exotic
chivalric encounter.392 A striking feature of Christian–Muslim interaction was not
only the disparity between the behaviour of Muslims in the northern regions and
those in Valencia but also that Christians in Valencia were markedly different from
their Catalan brothers in the nature of their acceptance of Muslim practices. The
predominantly Islamic demographic of the region led ultimately to confrontation.393
In Catalonia, Muslims were much more assimilated into a Christian identity.
Jews
Alfonso II had already granted privileges to Jews in Aragon–Catalonia, to
include them, their families and their descendants, in perpetuam; privileges which
granted freedom and liberty. Fearing that they might lose valuable Jews from their
territories, both kings and lords endeavoured to keep important men such as doctors
and physicians happy so that they would stay.394 The Jews were servi camerae (‘serfs
of the [royal] chamber’) under the control of the king, “for at all times they are ours”
according to the Furs of Valencia in 1240. An overlord needed to have gained
possession of his Jew through donation for the king to lose his dominion. An
important caveat was that Jews were still classified as free men.395
If surviving documentation is predominantly Christian in origin, any
acknowledgement of minority communities within it tends to refer to the Muslims.
391 Muslims and Christians had been serving in each other’s armies for many years and it was an
expected duty to aid a king in times of military danger. James became incensed during the rebellion of
al–Azraq in the late 1240s when Muslim leaders refused to provide troops to fight for him.
(Burns (1973) p 288–9)
392 Burns (1985) p 19
393 Burns (1984) p 16
394 Roth (1996) p 153
395 It is easy to see the influence of French and European laws. (Ibid., p 141). In the thirteenth–century
costums of Tortosa, Jews were classed as citizens. Book nine of the Fueros of Aragon placed the Jews
under the personal protection and guard of the king. (Ibid., p 148)
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James’ autobiography virtually ignores the Jew but his attitude is perhaps not
surprising if consideration is given to how much of an intrinsic part to society a Jew
actually was. More easily marginalised in a northern Europe which placed little value
on his usefulness, in Spain the Jew was valued as a significant component of its
societal forms.396 If this was true, there can be no surprise that a memoir that was a
chronicle of the king’s unmitigated successes against the Muslims should overlook
his Jewry.
The peace laws are sometimes completely quiet on the issue of the Jews, such
as at Lerida in 1214, and sometimes not, such as at Villafranca de Penedes in 1218.
The Cortes at Tarragona in 1233, as part of the peace laws, forbade Jews from killing
Muslims and vice versa. The following year, a law was passed that everyone should
sell their sword. It was never enforced – a fact confirmed by the various references to
Jews fighting with swords in the synagogue and sometimes on the Sabbath, when it
was strictly forbidden. Jews were given castles to garrison and maintain throughout
Spain. They served in the city guard and were obliged to carry weapons, with only a
few applications sought for exemption from this duty.397
Documents for Valencia show Jews owning a great deal of property, whether
it was farms, vineyards, bakeries, baths or salt mines. Issues such as
excommunication, attitudes towards homosexuality, travel and migration (through
mentions of passports), markets and trade and fashion appear in the documentation.
However, a document may also contain more than just its surface information – for
example, the account of a murder case showed how the widow of a culprit recovered
her dowry and late husband’s gifts to her; “by ‘the laws and privileges of the Jews’
396 Burns (1984) p 126
397 Roth (1996) p 145–6: the peace laws of Villafranca de Penedes were incorporated into the Fueros of
Aragon.
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she won from the court a third of the joint property and purchased back the
confiscated portion for 4,200 sous.”398
Taxes
Whilst the overall tax burden for Valencia was probably lighter than many
Muslims had become accustomed under the Almohads, there was still a substantial
list of taxes levied by James in his new kingdom. Since he did not wish to
inconvenience his nobility, who provided much–needed authority on the new frontier,
the majority of the burden fell on the conquered minorities and on the Muslims in
particular. Taxation varied from aljama to aljama and the total for all taxes is more
revealing of a community’s relative tax burden than the assessment of one tax
alone.399
The most usual tax was the besant or head tax. This in itself was one of the
few reliefs for Muslims; unlike the jizya, from their former regime, the besant was
levied upon households rather than all adolescent and adult males, amounting to a
considerably smaller burden. Military obligations, such as sofra, also evolved into a
form of taxation. The host (or army duty) and cavalcade (involvement in raids and
forays) came to assume any form of military foray by the mid–thirteenth century and
these, together with the theoretically distinct obligation of local defence were
gradually commuted to a payment of money under James’ rule.400
James invoked a salt tax in Valencia, a land less entrenched in privilege than
his northern realms and therefore somewhere in which it was easier to establish de
facto monopolies over the salt industry. Awarding these monopolies to consortiums
398 Burns (1984) p 133
399 Burns, R. I. Medieval Colonialism (Princeton 1975) p 19–20 and 22–3
400 Ibid., p 79 and 138–9: For a more detailed discussion of sofra, see p 114.
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was a common practice to maximise regulation and revenue and the king did this in
1263 when he awarded salt revenues in the upper part of Valencia to a five–man
group. He also levied moneyage to substitute any government interference with
coinage, allowing merchant and household alike a guaranteed currency. James also
levied the novel herbatge tax on livestock.401
This was particularly aimed at maximising revenue from sheep, which
provided extensive material for the profitable Valencian wool industry. In return for
every six out of a thousand lambs and kids born each year, rights of pasture were
guaranteed. A further livestock tax, the bestiar, was levied per head like the besant.
Finally, the dreaded tithe (a Christian tax, but paid increasingly by the Muslim
minorities who worked church lands) amounted to roughly ten percent of personal
and commercial industrial and agricultural income.402 The law of the church and state
explicitly said that Jews should also pay the tithe, but they never did in Aragon in the
thirteenth century.403
Minorities in the realms of Aragon
The other communities of Aragon–Catalonia earned their living through trade
and the sale of produce from their land. Simple land grants allow a detailed glimpse
into a Jew’s life in Zaragoza; namely, the securing of a crown grant, an ability to win
immunity and privacy and the social standing which he could command.404
Christians, Muslims and Jews all lent money to the crown and the latter were the
predominant collectors in Valencia, just as they were in Europe generally. Efforts by
the nobility to remove Jews from crown offices in the reign of Pedro III seem to have
401 Burns (1975) p 146–7, 150, 153 and 157
402 Ibid., p 158 and 190
403 Since Jews’ property belonged to the crown, to allow the church to levy the tithe would be
tantamount to admitting the right to tithe royal property. (Shneidman (1970) p 430)
404 Burns (1984) p 144
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been motivated by resentment to the growth of crown influence rather than any racial
hatred or financial envy.405
Muslims had settled in Aragon’s Ebro valley in small groups, although they
could really be identified as morerias at this stage. In Catalonia, the Muslims lived, as
an urban minority, in amongst the Christian urban majority.406 Those who settled did
so along rivers, in fertile lands, living on there from the twelfth century until 1610
when they were expelled.407 From the conquest of Huesca in 1096, there was
considerable diversity in the status of Muslims. They could be free men (usually
those who accepted Christian rule unconditionally, sometimes embracing it) or as low
as an exaricos (a form of share cropper, from the Arabic sharik meaning sharer). The
latter would be required to cultivate a particular strip of land, maintaining it both for
himself and future generations. The owner of the land could not expel an exaricos,
even though another cultivator might offer him a better deal.408
Muslims in the Ebro valley could be described as having the two different
social extremes of patrician and slave. The former class409 was populated by
tradesmen and merchants, with commercial activity providing the best opportunity for
the furthering of personal interest within the new state. Muslims also inherited
offices, passed down through their families. This was not something peculiar to them
alone, of course, with various Christians benefiting in the same way. In 1274,
Guillemenus de Darocha inherited the office of sayon of Tarragona, held by his father
405 Burns (1984) p 133
406 Harvey (1990) p 99
407 Hillgarth (1976) p 182
408 Harvey (1990) p 101: There was no real difference in status for an exaricus under the Christians,
who simply adopted the Islamic system. He could be referred to as a contract–tenant or a tenant–owner.
(Burns (1973) p 102)
409 This was an administrative class within an aljama.
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and grandfather before him.410 At the lower end of the social spectrum to the patrician
was the slave, who should not be ignored because, like free men, slaves were just as
much a part of the character of a ‘free’ Islamic society. They were acquired either
from foreign lands on official campaigns or through private raids and trade, like any
other commodity.
Middle–status Muslims living in Aragon did not suffer unduly in their tax
obligations, although, unlike Christians, they were forced to pay a special corporate
tax. Muslim communities were ruled by a qadi (judge) and local mosques owned their
own property, much like their Christian equivalents would do. Many of the cortes
held in Aragon sought to protect its Muslim population (in much the same way that
James himself went to some length to protect his Jewish charges), although many of
these Muslims moved from royal aljamas to communities under seignorial
jurisdiction because the feudal lords imposed lighter taxes.411
The Christian laws of Aragon, such as the 1247 fueros,412 also had an impact
on the lives of the Muslims residing there. They and the Jews were to pay tithes
(except where the land had never been in Christian possession); in legal battles, a
witness from both sides413 had to be found, as it was not sufficient to bring evidence
solely from the same religious community where the complaint originated; if a
Muslim was involved in violence towards a Christian man or his property, two
Christians were obliged to affirm such an event and, if they were not available, the
Muslim’s owner had to swear that his charge had not committed the offence.414
410 Catlos (2004) p 214–215; Commercial enterprise provided a spring–board for families to purchase
and maintain administrative offices.
411 Hillgarth (1976) p 182
412 They were issued by James and compiled by the Bishop of Huesca.
413 I. e. Christian and Muslim, or Christian and Jew
414 Harvey (1990) p 104–5
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A Muslim was not allowed to make his own legal representations; members of
all religions were forbidden to charge interest on loans above 100% of the loan;
Muslims could convert to Christianity without penalty and Muslims had to be allowed
to attend preachers’ sermons of their own free will;415 if anyone wounded a Muslim, a
substantial financial penalty would ensue; whilst Muslims were free to sell to other
Muslims, any sale to a Christian had to receive royal approval and the crown then
kept a third of the proceeds;416 where there was a dispute over beasts being grazed on
their masters’ lands, their own oath in a mosque was enough to satisfy ownership; a
Christian helping a Muslim to escape his obligations would have all his goods
confiscated.417
A further law provided for the status of a Muslim who changed residence.
They were allowed to move from the king’s to a noble’s estate, and vice versa, but if
they were caught, they forfeited the right to every single one of their possessions.
Once they reached their destination, however, they were immune and the noble
inherited the same rights over the Muslim as the king had enjoyed. However, the king
held ultimate jurisdiction in the matter and would not allow Muslims to be detained
against the royal will. This law demonstrates that the Muslim was oppressed in this
new society, a pawn in the manoeuvres of those wishing to profit from his labour.418
A Muslim was a resource to be exploited.
415 This reflected the measures put in place in Valencia, in the wake of the Mendicant attempts at
conversion through sermons and Language Schools.
416 This was merely an extension of the principle that the Muslims were a property of the crown
themselves. For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see Boswell (1977).
417 Harvey (1990) p 104–5; as was remarked in Chapter 3, a Christian who went out of his or her way
to help a Muslim could come to harm, which would not always be physical danger.
418 Ibid., p 106
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Equally the Jew; by “1294, it is estimated that the Jewish communities
contributed 22 per cent of all direct taxes in Aragon. In Catalonia, the proportion
contributed by Jews was probably higher, since the Catalan communities were
richer.”419 Baer says that Jews were a sponge to be squeezed dry for taxes.420 Yet this
does not seem to apply to the church tithe, a tax which was only paid on property
bought from a Christian owner, often with numerous exemptions. Taxes tended to be
universal and the one that was not (a deeply unpopular thirty dineros tax paid to the
church, reflecting the betrayal of Judas) was not imposed upon the Jewish
communities of Aragon–Catalonia.421
James’ conquest of the Balearics seems to have dissipated the Muslim
population and there are only snatches of information concerning very small groups
or even individuals. If they did survive in large numbers, they left precious few
documentary clues behind. Those documents that do survive indicate a Muslim with
precious few similarities to his cousin in Valencia, either in status or privileges.422
The market for North African slaves brought in a steady flow of Arabic speakers.423
Yet James’ inability to settle many Christians on Majorca meant that there were
plenty of Muslim craftsmen in the towns – blacksmiths, dyers, tanners, bakers and
weavers, to name but a few. These formed several groups of freemen who were
required to pay a special poll tax not dissimilar to the one Christians paid on dhimmis
(protected territories) whilst under Islamic rule.424 Majorca’s Jews thrived through
419 Hillgarth (1976) p 240
420 Baer, Y. A History of the Jews in Christian Spain (Die Juden) Volume I (Philadelphia 1961) p 175
421 Roth (1996) p 156
422 Simon, L. J. ‘Muslim–Jewish Relations in Crusader Majorca in the Thirteenth Century: An Inquiry
based on Patrimony Register 342’ in M. D. Meyerson & E. D. English (ed.) Christians, Muslims &
Jews in Medieval and Early Modern Spain – Interaction and Cultural Change (Indiana 1999) p 127
423 Harvey (1990) p 100: Captive slaves were no doubt part of this trade.
424 Ibid., p 115–6
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skills in artisanry, money lending, medicine and trade and enjoyed success and royal
protection in spite of Christian public objection.425
At first glance there seems to have been a limited amount of interaction
between the two minorities on the island of Majorca. Despite Jews making loans to
Muslims and sometimes entering into land transactions with them, the predominant
emphasis of legislation was on the Jews themselves. James issued decrees, conferring
the right of Jews to purchase property and to possess Muslim slaves in 1250;
forbidding Christians and Muslims to remove earth or stones from the Jewish
cemetery in 1252; and preventing Muslim slaves from bearing witness in a case
against a Jew in 1269. The king confirmed that single testimony by Muslim or
Christian in legal cases between a Christian and a Jew would not suffice, only that of
a Christian and a Jew or a Muslim and a Jew.426
Middle–status Muslims have often been analysed over the slave class by
historians because “the boundary between slave and mudejar was blurry and
permeable in the thirteenth century.”427 Muslim craftsmen in the towns were subject
to the institution of debt slavery. If money was outstanding, debtors became the
property of the creditors in a very real sense. They could be sold during this time and
might have become slaves permanently if the debt was not met. The crown kept a
detailed record of such contracts because it did not wish to have free Muslims
becoming permanent slaves.428
425 Simon (1999) p 125
426 Ibid., p 128–9
427 Catlos (2004) p 221
428 The king was the protector of all Muslims. However, the motivation here was undoubtedly concern
that there could be a severe loss of tax revenue for the crown. (Harvey (1990) p 115)
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This minority could not be enslaved by private individuals without the consent
of the Crown although free Muslims might sometimes unwittingly contribute to this
class through judicial enslavement. When a crime under the sunna was punishable by
death, the Crown could choose to exercise enslavement as the punishment. Muslims
should have been protected from capital punishment because they belonged to the
Crown and the imposition of the death penalty for severe crimes was not an option
open to the courts. Thirteenth–century documentation shows that this rule was very
rarely breached, although there were always exceptions.429
The real reason for it not being exercised was probably far removed from a
royal concern for Muslim well–being. It was more likely that convicts and captives
were able to ‘buy’ pardons for extortionate amounts of money. Just as on the
mainland, Muslims slaves in the Balearic Islands could ransom themselves from
captivity for a price. This steady trickle to and from the institution of slavery
therefore makes an estimate of the numbers of free and enslaved Muslims virtually
impossible. The two categories were not mutually exclusive.430 Whether slavery was
ultimately forced or voluntary, it was not a permanent condition in the Crown of
Aragon as a whole.431 A way of expediting release from servitude was conversion.
The principle of Canon law forbade Christians from becoming enslaved and Jews and
Muslims were forbidden from owning them. In light of this, slaves had much to gain
from baptism.432
429 Sources still speak of the death penalty being employed, suggesting that this ruling was just as
arbitrary as every other measure being enforced on the Muslims by the Christians. For example, a
Muslim was burnt at the stake for sodomy in 1270 Tarazona. (Catlos (2004) p 222–3)
430 Harvey (1990) p 116
431 Catlos (2004) p 232
432 Ibid., p 254
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In March 1274, the king guaranteed to the Christians on Majorca that Jews
were not allowed to loan on security to their Muslim slaves. Jews had a high number
of these slaves, with both men and women being employed in a Jewish household.
They underwent ritual immersion before being entrusted with household tasks,
although conversion was unnecessary, particularly for males, who were already
circumcised. Perhaps Jews had a more enlightened sense of social charity than
Christians when it came to slavery, mindful of their own biblical past.433
The issue of slavery actually highlights conflict and competition between all
three religious cultures. If a Christian offered up a slave as collateral to a loan from a
Jewish lender and the slave subsequently converted, died or fled that the balance of
the loan would still be outstanding. Jews could not own Christian slaves and so opted
for compensation money by way of redemption rather than lose out on their
investment; in their disadvantaged state, Muslims contemplated apostasy, large
numbers of their community going one step further, often holding the threat of
apostasy over their Jewish masters; and the circle was completed by Christians legally
discriminating against Jews. Behind the entire process was the dramatic conquest.434
Thus is encapsulated the relationship between the three cultures – one of antagonism
and mutual benefit, each desirous of a split from the other yet unable to break up a
society which relied so much on that same interdependence.
Privilege and Obligation
The previous two chapters have examined the benefits which the Muslims
derived from the surrender treaties of the mid–thirteenth century. However, there was
one key obligation that the Christians imposed upon their Muslim charges. They
433 Simon (1999) p 128 and 132–3; Jews were extremely scrupulous about their record–keeping, so
this prevalence in the documentation is unsurprising.
434 Ibid., p 135
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introduced their own version of castle provisioning (or sofra), a form of service to the
community prevalent in the Islamic societies of both Egypt and Spain; for the latter,
its application was usually the repair of town fortifications. Specifically in the case of
Valencia, it came to be associated with the obligation of providing the castle with
wood and water or paying the landlord an equivalent sum.435
Money was certainly a substitute for the more usual forms of provisioning.
The maintenance of city, town or castle walls was onerous and was an obligation
endured by Muslims well after the conquest, as Boswell’s fourteenth–century study
testifies. The conception of this obligation began with the surrender treaties of the
thirteenth century. Additional obligations for Muslims included the repair of the roads
that they used, maintenance of the king’s palace at Valencia and guard duty at various
defensive points throughout the region. An Aragonese model (from the Ebro to
Tortosa and evident in charters for Muslims crossing the border in 1258)
demonstrates that sofra was identified with opera from a very early stage. Over a
century, the two would collide, combining as the same obligation.436
For Christians, there was no practical difference between provisioning and
maintenance. The system was open to abuse and Muslims found their community
activity swiftly changed into a tax burden.437 The imposition of alien overlords might
leave areas of Muslim culture untouched, thanks mainly to the protections offered in
the surrender treaties, yet even changing a few elements could affect the entire
society’s self perception. When the Christians wrapped the existing culture in a
framework of promises and guarantees, they appeared to provide the Muslims with
435 Burns (1984) p 67–8
436 Ibid., p 68–9
437 The Catalans borrowed the Arabic sukhra as sofra and this would indicate an identification of one
for the other. (Ibid., p 70)
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comfort and continuity but in effect they created a situation where they took away as
much as they retained.438 By 1276, many things looked the same to an outsider but in
reality, much had changed.
For the Jews, life continued as it had done before, whether in Aragon or under
new rulers in Valencia. The freedom to travel was the most highly valued and rare
privilege in Medieval feudal Europe and, thanks to very few restrictions in Aragon–
Catalonia, it was a privilege jealously guarded by the Jewish communities.439 Unlike
Muslims, only rarely did Jews have to seek permission to move from one lord’s
jurisdiction to another. Exemptions from legislation abounded during James’ reign, as
exemplified by the concession granted to a Jew in 1268 which allowed his wife to
wear any material apart from Persian scarlet and overrode any Jewish law to the
contrary.
The special nature of this concession is brought into sharp relief by the decree
in 1283 by James’ son, Pedro III, forbidding all the Jews at Jativa from wearing
anything ostentatious.440 In the settlement of disputes between Christians and Jews, if
a Christian was allowed to choose a champion to fight on his behalf, then so was a
Jew – ultimate equality of status. A serf, royal or otherwise, would scarcely be
allowed the right of trial by combat.441 Numerous Jews were addressed as don or
doña, a formal address usually reserved for Christians, indicating their attainment of
high status within society.442
438 Burns (1984) p 71
439 Roth (1996) p 142
440 Burns (1984) p 151; Persian scarlet was expensive, highly sought after and usually the preserve of
royalty.
441 Roth (1996) p 147
442 Ibid., p 154
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James also gave control of important centres to Jews, such as the salt mine at
Arcos. When the new owner found himself in financial trouble and was unable to
meet the encumbrances upon the property, James even waived these responsibilities
after Easter 1264 by giving over the full crown revenue of the salt works for
eliminating the debt. This may seem like needless generosity but James understood
the importance of keeping revenue flowing from the very profitable salt works there.
And there was another good reason. The Jews of Teruel were forced to buy Arcos salt
which helped to improve the infrastructure of the region; a separate document charts
how Alcira’s irrigation network benefited from all the revenues and profit received by
the crown from Teruel, allowing it to be improved and be adapted to cope with the
influx of settlers into the region.443
Stereotypes and myths
This mainly affected the Jew, who took a prominent role as financiers after the
Christian conquest. Yet a Jew’s role in Valencian society extended much further than
simply providing sound financial advice. Jews owned estates, farms and associated
livestock, working as merchants and urban artisans, sometimes in partnership with
Christians. But they did not dominate the mercantile and monetary fields, even if they
were key treasurers and bailiffs, acting as counsellors and diplomats.444 Jewish
doctors also assumed great importance. “In Catalonia, Arnau de Vilanova, possibly
actuated to some extent, by professional jealousy, complained that, although
Christians who used Jews as doctors were told by friars that they were
excommunicated, normally all religious communities – nuns as well as monks –
preferred Jewish to Christian doctors.” Arnau himself served the Aragon court, with
443 Burns (1984) p 157
444 Burns (1975) p 270–1; Shneidman (1970) p 424
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James’ later successor James II employing many Jewish doctors, translators and
scientists.445
The role of doctors reflects upon the status of the alfaquim or hakim in James’
administrative body; why was a doctor (a typical translation of alfaquim) at the head
of the Arabic secretariat? The ambiguity impacts upon the real stature accorded to
this royal department. It could have been an economy on the part of James and his
hierarchy or that the language of Arabic was only known amongst the Jewish medical
community. Perhaps issues relating to Muslim business were deemed so unimportant
that the royal doctor could simply fill in the role during his spare hours. Medieval
Christians may have applied the term alfaquim to include those Jews at court with a
good knowledge of Arabic, using a word meaning physician to apply to those skilled
in ‘dissecting’ the language.446
In fact, the word hakim actually carries more of a meaning of philosophical
erudition than of any particular medical skill. Although these men were physicians,
they were also savants who preferred this more exalted term. To be a man of learning
(a savant–physician) was to achieve the highest goal in Islamic educational circles
and it served an excellent purpose in James’ Valencia. Jews performing this role were
not bound by the same constraints as those with direct religious links and often had a
knowledge that encompassed philosophy, language, poetry and medicine, alongside
the usual well–versed understanding of the Talmud. Specialist knowledge might
445 Hillgarth (1976) p 176–7
446 Diplomatarium Vol. I p 128–9
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include calligraphy, commerce and industry and this enabled them to assume
positions of authority both within their own community and within government.447
In the same way that it was felt that the possession of more books equated to
greater understanding, so having more physicians in one’s entourage ensured a
greater access to knowledge. In an age of fluctuating borders and allegiances, it paid
to be well–informed. Anyone performing such a role in James’ court was not just
moonlighting as a secretariat worker but was valued for what he might offer the state
as a whole, forming part of the enriching process that James embraced in order to
upgrade the cultural class of his kingdom. Muslim savants would never have worked
in the Aragonese court but the king realised that a non–territorial Jew could be relied
upon to feel tied to the kingdom by their loyalties and gratitude for key involvement
in high office. A Jew in this post could also move effectively between the Muslims
and Christian worlds.448
In addition to the vision of Jew as financier and doctor, part of the stereotype
was that he was urban. This stems from the commonly misunderstood grant of a
house in thirteenth century Valencia, which often included a small farm in the
countryside, worked by a Muslim exarici. A Jew might therefore be a country squire
like the Christian equivalent. Many towns amounted to little more than villages set in
rolling fields, so in any event the tone was more rural than urban, hence suggesting
that a Jew was actually rural.449 Communities such as Perpignan fulfilled the financial
Jewish stereotype but that was largely down to the novelty of their community (and
447“The Jewish community probably held the larger share of available educated men endowed with the
language and expertise so valuable… for supervising the collection of Mudejar taxes.” Burns (1975) p
272; Diplomatarium Vol. I p 130
448 Ibid., p 130–1
449 Burns (1984) p 134
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the usefulness of such an occupation in the light of the local cloth-dealers’ need for
loans), which had not existed before 1200.450
Important figures
That Muslims could be wealthy and influential like the Jews is very apparent,
at least in the Ebro valley. The best example of the thirteenth century is the Bellidos
clan, whose prosperity was based on craft and trade; their expansion into Valencia
coincided with James’ conquests. Abraham Bellido amassed great wealth through his
work for the crown and acted as moneylender to Christian and Muslim alike.
Eventually falling out of royal favour, he was still able to extend his influence from
abroad, based in Tunisia. In about 1212, the family were commended to the
Dominican convent of Zaragoza (their donation putting them in a strong position for
future claim of fraquitas) and they can be traced up to the 1430s. The Bellidos were
undoubtedly the wealthiest Muslim family in Zaragoza and possibly of their time.451
In terms of the general character of the Jew in James’ Valencia, one particular
case seems to have consolidated him as a rural dweller in the minds of historians –
that of the Valencian lender Adam de Paterna. Burns demonstrates that he was
actually a Christian, who “was influential enough to secure a crown pardon for a ward
of his own, Joan Sanç, who had ‘wickedly killed’ a Valencian Mudejar. Adam died
just before 1270 and was buried alongside Pere Adam de Paterna, in Valencia city’s
Hospitaller church.” James could be seen to thank Adam as early as 1258 for his
services to the crown which Adam continued to provide on a daily basis. That a figure
450 Hillgarth (1976) p 177
451 Catlos (2004) p 217–8; fraquitas means privilege of fiscal immunity. Abraham Bellido was a royal
administrator who supervised maintenance for the royal castle at Valencia.
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such as this has remained catalogued as a Jew means that the urban moneylender
stereotype has endured.452
One other Jewish figure deserves to be mentioned. The rabbi Bahya appears
prominently in James’ autobiography and handled the surrenders of Jativa, Majorca
and Murcia as the king’s alfaquim. His son, Moises, benefited from the Repartiment
(land division) of Valencia but was made more prominent by his humbling departure.
Acting as treasurer and alfaquim to the crown and becoming bailiff of Valencia city
for five years (being head judicial authority for the Jews there from 1258), his fall
was rather more ignominious, forging a document as he attempted to resolve intra–
aljama quarrels and getting involved in the beating of a rabbi. He was ousted from his
post for unscrupulous behaviour, pardoned only shortly before his death.453 He
provides proof of Jewish figures extending their influence beyond James’ own reign.
Conflict
Just as in the previous chapter, when the frequent conflict between conqueror
and minority was discussed, so too did minorities clash with each other, sometimes
through Christian discourse. Although there are practical difficulties in discerning
these points of contact, namely that the predominantly Christian documentation is
unconcerned with interactions between minorities, records do show a great deal of
agitation between Muslim and Jew. This seems to contradict some historians, who
have argued an affinity between Judaism and Islam, as well as pointing to knowledge
452 Burns (1984) p 135; Burns, R. I., Diplomatarium of the Crusader Kingdom of Valencia: The
Registered Charters of its Conqueror Jaume I, 1257–1276, Volume II: Documents 1–500 ‘Foundations
of Crusader Valencia – Revolt and Recovery, 1257–1263’ (Princeton 1991) p 82–4
453 Burns (1984) p 160; the rabbi had gone before the king (Pedro III) to provide details of the fights
between factions in Zaragoza.
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of the language and interaction at social levels (such as cuisine, music and poetry) as
an indication of this affinity.454
Yet there was scarcely a universal admiration of Arabic culture by eminent
Jews (the Catalan Joseph ben Shalom Ashkenazi attacked Muslims as idolaters in the
fourteenth century) and there is a great difficulty in accessing the truth of minority
interaction and attitudes towards one another. Instead, the contact expressed through
documentation is that of commercial and social interaction, namely money–lending,
meat buying and selling, sexuality, the issue of conversion and participation in civic
processions. Indeed, if a deeper understanding is desired, it is often necessary to scour
the sources in the hope of chancing upon more pertinent information.455
Documents from the period can demonstrate how inconsequential records of
criminal cases could have been but for the intervention of a third party. In the case of
the troubles of a Jewish man called Mubarak, (habitator) of Alcira to the southwest of
Valencia city, who was accused of killing a Muslim in 1258, it was the intervention of
his widow, who was looking to recover her share of the confiscated property from the
case which provides the most interest; lacking the personal revenue to recover it
herself, she sought assistance through legal channels by exploiting the laws and
privileges of the Jews.456
The barriers between neighbourhoods affected the minorities as well.
Proximity bred rivalry, and there was much for which they could compete; economic
power, in the markets and through money–lending, for prestige amongst their
communities and for sexual congress with women. All of the latter could also be
454 Nirenberg (1996) p 166–7
455 Ibid., p 167–8
456 Burns (1984) p 147; a habitator was a resident rather than a citizen (vicinus)
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achieved through conversion. Monopolies could arise on ovens, meat markets and
even jails – yet more incentive for competition between the two groups. The meat
markets often went to overall Jewish control, as a result of possibly greater wealth
amongst their aljamas and the fact that their rules for ritual slaughter satisfied Muslim
requirements whereas the reverse would not have been true. Despite the apparent
logic inherent in the situation, meat markets in particular formed a point of conflict
between the two communities and the Jews often exploited their position.457
Often the disputes that arose between the minorities were a result of personal
interest rather than differences of faith. Henna was a valuable commodity in the
textile industry of the time and the Alfandech valley in Valencia was a key production
area, rooted as the product was in areas of Islamic industry. It was also an extremely
popular commodity for dyeing hair and beards. Muslims and Jews often attempted to
entrap their neighbours with extreme charges, such as embezzlement, in order to
maximise their own profit. This was the case for Ben Vives in 1274, when his Jewish
competitors accused him of illegally undercutting the established price for the
product. He was someone who ultimately secured royal protection from the king as a
result of this fraudulent lawsuit.458
Muslim communities were often poorer than their Jewish counterparts in the
city aljamas and the tax record shows that financially the Jews were of much greater
benefit to the royal treasury, contributing vast quantities of taxes. Whilst this is a sign
of exploitation by their Christian masters, they also held a great deal of influence over
the Muslims, being assigned to financial roles and receiving royal monopolies denied
to the other minority. As tax collectors, they were hated by the Muslims, but the latter
457 Nirenberg (1996) p 169–172
458 Burns (1984) p 149
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were hardly in a position to resolve their hatred. Money was immune to faith, with
bankruptcy the only thing regarded as heresy.459
Christian laws were designed to achieve three things – discouraging Christians
from usury, protecting Christians from the exorbitant rates of interest and filling the
royal treasury with the resulting collections. As a result of this law, it is hardly
surprising that the Muslims were the ones caught in the middle, severely
disadvantaged in their credit dealings with Jews. However, it is clear that the
Muslims, in a show of solidarity, caused a great deal of problems for Jewish
collectors. The Crown archives are full of examples of Jews complaining about
Muslim officials refusing to act fairly in matters of litigation with Muslim debtors.460
The End of Tolerance
Life in Spain was undoubtedly hard for subjugated Jews and Muslims.
Disaffection had grown yet more violent in the fourteenth century and its roots lay in
the thirteenth–century Muslim’s position of being despised for his religion, ethnically
hated by Christian mobs, feared by his new lords because of the potential for
rebellion and marginalised as irrelevant in public life, useful at best for gathering
revenue and suffering unprovoked and brutal harassment at worst.461 The fact that
Jews were not displaced as a culture, as well as their importance in the
interrelationship between Christians and Muslims, gave them a somewhat different
experience of life in the aftermath of the conquest.
Towards the end of the thirteenth century, however, attitudes would sway
towards a feeling that it was Judaism that could never be countenanced rather than
459 Nirenberg (1996) p 173–4
460 Ibid., p 175–6
461 Burns (1984) p 50–51
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Islam. A Jew who converted to Islam could regard it as an improvement in his
religious life. The Church was clear which minority was worst; when prayer was
made for all people on Good Friday, there was no genuflection made by Jews
whereas there was by Muslims.462 Oldradus, the thirteenth–century lawyer who was
one of the intellectuals to put forward this argument, refused to accept that Jewish
conversion to Islam should be punished.
Indeed, it was to be the Muslims who would grow closer in ideology to their
oppressors, adopting Christian anti–Semitic themes to express their concern about
Judeo–Muslim relations. Initially greeted with indifference during the fourteenth
century, when their concerns did not match closely enough those of Christian society,
by the fifteenth century the same arguments began to resonate with their conquest
overlords. The way sexual boundaries had changed between Muslim and Jew was one
result of the way that Christian thought had impinged upon this society and the
significance of this is that the examination of relationships between subjugated
communities can rarely be completed to the exclusion of an examination of the
dominant power’s own ideology.463
The Jews were expelled from the peninsula by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1492,
whilst the Muslims received a stay of execution after expressing a desire to accept
baptism.464 This was to prove temporary at best. Contemporary writers no longer
made an attempt to identify with or understand Morisco465 culture, taking the view
that their very difference was an indication of their hostility, both to Christ and the
462 Nirenberg (2004) p 142
463 Ibid., p 155
464 Boase, R. ‘The Morisco Expulsion and Diaspora: An Example of Racial and Religious Intolerance’
in D. Hook & B. Taylor (ed.) Cultures in Contact in Medieval Spain: Historical and Literary Essays
presented to L. P. Harvey (London 1990) p 23–4
465 Spanish Moor or Muslim
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Spanish nation. The attempts to establish dialogue encouraging conversion had long
since died away.466 No longer deserving of serious study, slanderous distortions of the
truth became an increasingly acceptable way for Christians to denigrate Islam.467
Years later, in the seventeenth century, radical sentiment would move to the forefront
of Christian thinking and reasoning and the Muslims would be welcome no more. In
less than four centuries, any pretence of understanding and tolerance had been
stripped away to be replaced by the drive for total expulsion.
466 See Chapter 3
467 Boase (1990) p 22
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Conclusion
The conquest of Valencia was an encounter involving three societies. Each had an
equally important part to play in the drama which unfolded. The Christian king, James I,
was influenced by the military backdrop both of his ancestors and to his own accession,
the crusader sentiments of the Papacy, an institution to which he was very close, the
Templars, who brought him up in the fortress of Monzón, and by the thirst for conquest
sweeping not just his realm but that of all the Christian kingdoms in northern Spain,
particularly Aragon’s neighbour Castile. The Muslims were fractious and divided after
the collapse of the Almohad Empire, with the once powerful al–Andalus separated into
small kingdoms run by greedy, over–zealous and self–styled Muslim wali. Their own
concern was the continuation of their way of life and their religious freedoms, which
shaped not just their behaviour but their agricultural, administrative and commercial
practices. James’ surrender treaties allowed them this continuance and many Muslims
comforted themselves with the possibility that they might one day overthrow the
Christian oppressors. The Jews continued much as they had before the conquest, already
a heavily–embedded part of Aragonese society in their roles as administrative officials
and valued translators. The latter function was extremely useful during the time of
conquest.
The three parties were pressurised by heavy concerns; James by the gradual
dissipation of his influence in the realms of Southern France; the Muslims by the sense of
abandonment they felt after the departure of their intellectual and administrative elite for
North Africa; and the Jews by an increasing vitriolic religious sentiment directed at them
by their Christian and Muslim neighbours. Their prominent status in Christian society
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was gradually diminished by these new theological ideas. Geographical, commercial and
political concerns were the overriding forces in the lives of people in Iberia during the
thirteenth century. The Papal desire for Crusade, conversion and expulsion merely
became convenient tools for each of the parties, to varying degrees, in achieving their
own individual goals. James’ autobiography, the Llibre dels Fets, might at first glance
have extolled the virtues of God’s guidance but this book was a guide on how to rule,
how the glory of God might better advance the lot of a medieval king. For James’
concerns were purely territorial.
The thesis demonstrates that the conquest of the Iberian peninsula’s eastern
realms in the thirteenth century was more than simply a moralistic crusade. It was driven
by individual concerns and ambitions, by circumstance and by a deep rooted desire for
power and control over lands which, in the case of Valencia particularly, provided great
wealth and prospects for expansion of trade and commerce. It is important to understand
the Valencian surrenders from the Muslims’ point of view. They yielded to the king as a
result of his diplomacy and readiness to negotiate; he granted manifold concessions and
continuations of their way of life. The Muslims cleverly exploited James’ need for a
workforce and his external preoccupations by acquiescing to his terms, ensuring their
continued presence in their ancestral homes and an existence which proved hardly more
arduous financially than it had under the Almohads.
However the concessions were often dictated by pragmatic concerns. Valencia
was a huge kingdom to maintain and his lands now stretched the length of eastern Spain
from the French borders to the southern coastline. Often called away to the troublesome
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French frontier, the king was short of men and supplies and securing the Muslims’
freedoms was a good way to ensure their relative compliance and good behaviour. For
the most part, this endured but the revolts of the 1240s and 1270s showed that, under
strong leadership, the Muslims were not about to simply accept their plight, even if they
had their religious freedom and the tax burden was bearable. The Jews, for their part,
exploited the Muslims as a profitable source; enabled by a Christian willingness to allow
relations between the two communities to be relatively unregulated. They became
landlord, tax collector and slave–owner to thousands of Muslims.
The minorities were regarded as crown property; their lands belonged to the king,
as did their possessions. Whatever liberties they had, they owed to James and his
concessions. Therefore it was in crown interests to see that they were not unduly harmed.
Hence, guidaticum and protection of travel for both Jews and Muslims ensured a
convenient interchange of personnel amongst the profitable Valencian land holdings and
industries. Religious legislation was arbitrarily applied, with variance from region to
region, a classic example being the rulings of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. There
was an attempt to segregate the communities but whilst the establishment of external
morerias and aljamas would appear to have served that purpose, in reality, there was
frequent mingling of the religious groups at work, at play and in sexual encounters.
Regulation of behaviour between the minorities did not concern Christian authorities,
whose main preoccupation was regulating contact between themselves and the ethnic
groups.
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Muslims were left in charge of industries, trades and merchant routes because
they were very familiar with the systems and procedures which had made Valencia so
profligate. The realm of Aragon, after all, was a poor relation in the value of its export
market at the time of conquest. Jews were given positions of authority because they were
intellectual, reliable and highly skilled. Their roles in the chancery were granted to them
precisely because of their knowledge of Arabic and therefore their ability to converse
with their fellow minority. This gave the Christians the excuse they needed to keep their
distance from the Muslims at a higher level. James, in particular, liked to think of himself
as a substitute Islamic lord. Therefore the Jews tended to handle most of the interactions
with the Muslims – from meat markets to tax collection.
The contrast in attitudes between Valencia and the Balearic Islands is striking. As
an outpost suitable for the expansion of Catalonian trade, the island of Majorca in
particular suffered from the might of the Christian onslaught. Muslims were expelled,
cities razed to the ground, Christian garrisons established and a steady trade in Muslim
slaves established with North Africa. In Valencia, Muslims travelled freely between
territories, retained their rights of sale over land (purely between each other), continued
their traditions and, in some instances, profited from squabbles between Christian
landlords. This thesis posed, and answered, the question of why James should display
such differing attitudes in these regions.
Concerns for minority and cultural change were far from the king’s mind;
pressured by an anxious and vexatious nobility, constantly squabbling and a perpetual
nuisance from his minority to his death, James was in dire need of lands into which he
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could expand and satisfy not just the nobility’s desire for spoils and territory but his own.
His conquests were not unilateral and universal in their tactics or in their treatment of the
conquered. They were, instead, pragmatic. His first campaigns in the Balearics proved to
be a valuable learning experience, making him battle–hardened and tactically more astute
when conquering the more difficult obstacle of the kingdom of Valencia.
The policy of conversion and assimilation reflected the cultural diversity of the
region, where cultures were so inter–twined that to remove one of those elements (by
expelling the Muslims) would be to cripple Valencia completely, leaving it a barren
hinterland bereft of settlers and workers, a region ripe for continuing conflict. Whatever
the motivation of the Christian conquerors, the minorities of the region lived in a state of
relative harmony with each other, feeding off each other’s strengths to the benefit of
Valencia as a whole. Yet the reality of this convivencia was that religious difference was
another excuse to profit; both for the conquerors and the minorities themselves – whether
it be through taxes, legal entrapment or profitable slave emancipation. The sexual
chemistry between the three groups could also be an excuse for profit – the charge of
miscegenation was particularly valuable to landlords, with simple legal proceedings
concerning debt often rising to defences of the faith. Jews and Muslims used the same
charge to gain superiority over each other.
Conversion was a spur for violent confrontation, between Christians, Muslims and
Jews alike. Christians coming to the defence of their Muslim neighbours could be
persecuted and those minorities that converted were hardly better placed for establishing
themselves in the new society. Conversion was a double–edged sword. On the one hand,
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there was much to be gained for a slave who emancipated himself by converting to the
Christian faith. On the other, converts were treated as outcasts, not merely by the
community which they joined but also by the one which they had abandoned. Ramon
Llull was quick to point out the plight of a convert and it was a situation which garnered
much sympathy from religious figures of the time. The very violence which accompanied
attempts for conversion, particularly the sermons of the mendicant orders, meant that
James had to introduce legislation restricting the pressure applied to minorities such as
the Jews. This led to what Burns described as the less than successful implementation of
the thirteenth–century dream of conversion.
The myth that minorities had no power or presence here has been dispelled by the
evidence that shows all three religions interacting at every level of secular society – and
indeed Christians were in the minority in Valencia but ruled in spite of this. There is a
need to focus on the thirteenth century on its own to understand contemporary events and
to disperse with a teleological interpretation by which the relationship between three
cultures was bound to deteriorate and bring humiliation to each minority, excluding them
and finally expelling them. That was not the thirteenth–century reality yet, as the years
following the conquest drew on and the Muslims in particular proved to be more and
more unreliable, mass expulsion from the cities led to the substitution of Christian
personnel for Muslim and Jewish officials. Many minorities converted to Christianity
through the efforts of the mendicant movements and later, such movement would be
enough for the kings and queens of the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to
reward their ‘valued’ royal treasures with expulsion from the peninsula.
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The Spanish Historiography of Mudejars in the kingdom of Aragon during the
Middle Ages – Minority and Reconquest
Before 1950, the history of the Mudejars had not garnered much interest.
Western historians had a Christian perspective, coloured by personal motivations
and assumptions, when they looked out on the Medieval European map. The
theme of minority in medieval Spain, and the Mudejars in particular, increased in
popularity over the latter years of the twentieth century. As the twenty-first
century goes on, the sheer explosion in volume of additional texts has opened up
entirely new fields of study along with an incitement of debate over matters as
varied as political, military, art and social topics. From a narrow field of study
centred firmly on Valencia and Aragon, other previously neglected fields such as
the Balearics have begun to receive much overdue attention.
Northern European historiography from the nineteenth century shows that
the preoccupation centred on relating of the glories of contemporary industrial
powers such as England or France. The bibliography of this era was political and,
in some respects, catholic. Spain was treated badly and did not receive the
attention that it deserved. It remained a territory of mystery, where totally
irreconcilable Christian and Islamic values had been fostered side by side for
many centuries, yet was treated as a means of crossing between the more
enlightened parts of the world. Therefore the Mudejars were overlooked. No
other field of study (except perhaps the Crusades) has attracted so much belated
dominance by native historians. It is only since the 1970s that Spanish historians
have begun to dominate the field.
Angel Galan Sanchez’s “A Vision of “Spanish Decline:” Anglo-Saxon
historiography of the Mudejars and Moriscos (18th to 20th centuries)” looks at this
phenomenon, cataloguing this input by drawing upon English and Spanish
sources and by examining the common motives for the type of analysis made of
Spain’s Mudejar population. Galan Sanchez talks about the use of social
141
sciences, allowing historians to bridge gaps in the data and provide them with
novel perspectives. Yet the different types of Mudejar communities (who had
differing experiences and contexts, such as those in the already Christian Aragon
against the newly conquered of Valencia) have yet to be reflected in the many
works now available on the topic, one of the remaining stumbling blocks in fully
accessing the varied nuances of this field.
The one hundred years up to 1960 had seen only one serious book on the
Mudejars in any language and that was Francisco Fernandez y Gonzalez’s
“Estado social y politico de los mudejares de Castilla.” Whilst there were some
published articles, these were still few and far between. Francisco Macho y
Ortega ( Documentos relativos a la condicion social y juridical de los mudejares
aragoneses in 1922), Felipe Mateu y Llopis ( El Sumari de la succession dels
inclits Reys de Valencia and Notas sobre la patologia del libro y del documento
en Espana in 1942), Miguel Gual Camarena (Estudio de la territovialidad de los
fueros de Valencia in 1949), Francisco Roca Traver (Un siglo de vida Mudejar en
la Valencia Medieval: 1238 – 1338 in 1952) and Leopoldo Torres Balbas
(Estructura de las cuidadas hispanomusulmanes: la medina, los arrabales y los
barrios in 1953, Algunos aspectos del mudejarismo urbano medieval in 1954,
Extension y demografia de las cuidades hispanomusulmanes in 1955 and
Estudios de arqueologia e historia urbana in 1959) made their contributions but it
was during the 1960s that more specific works were written – such as Jose M.
Lacarra’s book on the Mudejars of Aragon in 1960 and Miguel Angel Ladero
Quaesada’s study of the Isabeline Mudejars in 1969. By the end of the 1960s,
you could speak of a basic but rapidly maturing field. At this stage, historians
were still preoccupied with social history.
The twenty-five years since the 1960s marked a change in the substitution
of political for social analysis in Spanish historiography. The French School of
Annales had a strong approach towards Spanish history, with increasingly
enlightened and abundant scholarship altering the understanding and
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appreciation for the period. The 1970s was the decade of the textbook, with
Dufourcq and Gautier-Dalché writing bibliographical works on the topic as well as
penning works on Spain’s socio-economic history. There were also books by
Joana Maria Palou, Techumbres mudejares en Mallorca in 1974, Vicente
Gonzalez Hernandez, Torres mudejares de Zaragoza y su provincial: dibujos in
1975, Eliseo Vidal Beltran, Valencia a fines del siglo XIV: mudejares, berberiscos
y granadinos in 1977, and the seminal work by Maria Luisa Ledesma Rubio, Los
mudejares en Aragon in 1979. This marked a distinct change in emphasis with a
greater acknowledgement of economic history and archaeology. The Mudejars to
this point had been seen as subjugated communities and victims.
France produced the early works of Pierre Guichard, including a study of
the Mudejar fief of Crevillente. Spanish output also increased during the 1970s,
the study of the Mudejars also becoming an institutionalised field, with a
government sponsored centre for Mudejar and Morisco studies at Teruel in
southern Aragon. The International Symposium of Mudejar studies convened
there from 1975. Whilst their discussions remained unpublished until the early
1980s, a review of 1977, outlining the basic arguments of Lacarra, Ladero
Quesada and Torres Fontes was published. At the time, the 1970s seemed to
represent the zenith of achievement, with a growing acknowledgement of
minorities and associated cultural issues yet the 1980s and 1990s were to
provide even more. In the artificial decade from 1984 to 1994, many more works
were published. An ongoing bibliography was maintained with eastern Spain its
focal point.
Mikel de Epalza was a key figure in gathering together an exhaustive
collection of books on the field into one bibliography: his 1983 publication had
over two thousand entries. In 1984, he founded the annual journal Sharq al-
Andalus: estudios arabes, a series featuring articles on the Mudejars as well as
other related topics. The appendix to this series continued to update the
bibliography from 1983 and by 1992 had reached over five thousand entries. It
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could be argued that he has made a great contribution to Mudejar studies, as his
original overview of Mudejar bibliography became very difficult by the later
1980s/ early 1990s, with the increasing amount of scholarship. It came at exactly
the right time to capture a snapshot of the historiography as studies of the
Mudejars entered a new phase. The 1980s saw an attempt to devolve studies to
the autonomous regions and hence bibliographies in more recent times have
tended to concentrate on regional or topical themes, such as Maria Teresa Ferrer
i Mallol’s 1992 publications on the Mudejars of Aragon. Those attempting to
catalogue the field in the early years of the current century would find it an almost
impossible task.
Japanese scholars joined the debate – Akio Ozaki was just one author,
alongside Mercedes Garcia Arenal, to examine the Muedjars of Navarre. Maria
Carmen Barcelo Torres followed with a book on the surviving Arabic
documentation for Valencia. 1987 saw Pierre Guichard’s works collected into one
volume. His strength was the examination of fortifications and aspects of rural
society. Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol published two books in the late 1980s on
fourteenth-century Aragonese Mudejars: a book on Aragon in 1987 and a study
of the society at Orihuela in 1988. A study of Muslims and Christians in Valencia
would follow. The latter collection of documents provides an historian with new
ideas and concepts for future study, covering as it does every aspect of life for
the Muslim under the Christians. Maria Blanca Basanez Villaluenga was another
to study every aspect of a Mudejar community, that of Aragon’s Huesca, in 1989.
As the 1990s approached, there were several studies of Mudejars in
Castille, a new development in itself, including a volume by J. C. de Miguel
Rodriguez (1988) as well as two works by Serafin de Tapia Sanchez (1989 and
1991). Francisco Franco Sanchez and Maria Sol Cabello collaborated on a study
of Muhammad al-Shafra (an important thirteenth century physician from
Valencia) in 1990. Manuel Gonzalez Jimenez studied Andalucia’s Mudejars in
1991. Josefa Mutgé made a thorough study of the documentary history of
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Catalonia’s main aljama at Lérida. Pierre Guichard wrote a history of Islamic and
Mudejar Valencia in two volumes in 1993 and Pere Balaña i Abadia’s “Els
musulmans a Catalunya (713-1153)” was a study of the impact of Muslims and
Mudejars in Catalonia from language to genetics. Carmen Diaz de Rabago
Hernandez wrote articles examining Mudejar access to Christian justice; looking
at the long-lived aljama of Chivert and paying homage to Maria Luisa Ledesma
Rubio, an expert in Aragonese medieval history. The latter included important
Mudejar articles and a bibliography of her own contributions.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the amount of work emanating from
Spain had greatly increased. The decade marked another turning point, as the
process of political devolution in Spain accelerated and meant an increase in the
interest surrounding regional and local topics whilst adopting a nationalist
perspective, including Aragon. The greatest volume of articles continued to come
from the publications of the Symposium of Teruel. These continued to be
predominantly by Spanish historians, with art as well as history receiving heavy
coverage. The inclusion of commentaries on art topics highlights its glaring
omission from general consideration. By its fourth volume, the historical content
was much stronger with the fifty items included being socio-economic in their
approach, covering topics such as Muslim occupations and activities in the cities
and in the country, the effect of the new administration upon them, monetary
matters and the slave trade. Aragon, Granada and Valencia received the most
attention. For an historian starting in the field, the 1984 volume contains an
analysis by Manuel Ruzafa Garcia of the available bibliography for Mudejars in
Valencia. As time moves on, however, the sizeable number of articles scattered
across an increasing number of volumes, some unknown, will potentially make
the task of tracking relevant material in any area that much harder.
The new decade also saw the blossoming of other journal and conference
series. The Congreso internacional: Encuentro de las tres culturas was an
ongoing collaboration from the 1980s by historians from Tel Aviv and Toledo,
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whose 1985 meeting provided seventeen papers on Jewish, Mudejar/Arabic and
mixed topics. Another conference series (The Intercultural Debate in the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries) brought together the writings of
contemporary intellectuals such as Arnau de Vilanova, Ramon Llull and other
Jewish and Islamic scribes. Innovative journals that include studies or papers on
Mudejars are: Afers (1988-9); Revista d’historia medieval (begun 1990); Estudios
castellonencs (begun 1983); Miscelanea medieval murciana (begun 1973);
Anales (from Alicante and begun 1982) and Miscellania de textos medievales
(from Barcelona and begun 1972) as well as Anuario de estudios medievales (a
well-known publication which concentrates on all areas of medieval history, not
just Spain), Bolleti de la Societat arqueologia lulliana Saitabi and Melanges de la
Casa de Velazquez. The latter is a French foundation in Madrid with an
archeological spin, examining castles, settlements and aljamas. Brill’s Medieval
Encounters is part of a new set of journals from the United States dedicating
itself to a cross-cultural examination of the Jewish, Christian and Muslim cultures,
beginning in 1995. Al-Masaq: studia arabo-islamica mediterranea began in 1988,
based at the University of Leeds, and with a special interest in Mudejars and
Moriscos.
Linked into any study of the Mudejars, however, must be an examination
of the aljamas in a Christian context or framework, and the new directions in
agricultural history, feudalism, law and changes in attitudes have some
application to studies in this field. An understanding of Islam in the context of
Medieval Spain has also undergone a transformation, with Dominique Urvoy,
Rachel Arié and Mikel de Epalza key names in the field. Miguel Barcelo is
important for Majorca while Pierre Guichard and André Bazzana provide
important insights on castles. Olivia Remie Constable’s work on trade in Muslim
Spain from 900-1500 consolidates work done by Charles Dufourcq in the 1960s.
Such studies highlight the individual nature of Mudejarism – a transformed
Muslim society, not quite a full part of Islam elsewhere. Study of the Jews in
Spain, particularly in Aragon, has expanded with a growing number of books,
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catalogues and monographs. Enrique Cantera Montenegro has integrated five
hundred items from the older and ongoing bibliographies into an essay booklet. A
new journal series – Calls – and a series under Yom Tov Assis (also the author
of a book on Jews in the Aragonese realms) along with books by David Romano
and Jaume Riera provide a good profile of the movement and life of Jews in
Catalan lands. Comparative studies also aid our understanding of the period. The
1990 symposium Indigenous Christian Communities in Islamic lands, Eight to
Eighteenth Centuries is one such example.
Despite this shift in emphasis, the pattern of surviving documentation still
tends to drive a Spanish historian, however, with Valencia having by far the
largest accumulation. The major change in Mudejar studies and the content of
most works since Francisco Fernandez y Gonzalez a century before has been an
increasing understanding of the different contexts of the many Mudejar
communities and the varied level of acculturation experienced – for example,
between Aragon and Valencia. The Balearics are a singular case. Conferences
such as those at Teruel still try and give each region an equal amount of time but
the huge deficiency in material available for other realms makes this virtually
impossible. It is also tempting to view Mudejar settlements as a collective
phenomenon, thanks to the surrender charters, yet the very difference in the
details provides for a unique experience in each community. Sometimes, the
accumulation of additional information helps shed new light on the topic, such as
the recovery of the Al-Azraq treaty of 1245. Manuel Vicent Febrer i Romaguera’s
work of 1991 collected together all the surrender constitutions granted to Mudejar
aljamas. Maria Jesus Viguera has highlighted the importance of internal
documentation from Aragon produced by the Mudejars themselves.
The archaeological approach by men such as André Bazzana and Pierre
Guichard is one of many novel ways in which to approach this subject. Leví-
Provençal and other historians have observed that Al-Andalus sprouted castles
and fortifications as a form of interior defence. Was this indicative of the rivalry
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inherent in the Muslim lands even before Reconquest? The Christian conquest,
they argue, reorganised the castle system along more European lines. Steadily,
year on year, Spanish historians with an interest in Mudejar history have been
recovering relevant documents from the archive. The concentration is very often
on the Mudejars themselves as a result of the documents which appear to favour
them in their focus, rather than on the true tri-cultural experience of Christians,
Muslims and Jews. Alien cultures often take on characteristics of their adopted
land and many Europeans of the time saw Muslim and Jewish aspects to
Spanish culture. Barcelo Torres has given a great deal of attention to the role of
language, whilst Ana Labarta and Federico Corriente have also done work in this
area. The Mudejar book of the Sunna and Shari’a gives an insight into life in
Catalan lands around the turn of the fifteenth century. Economic factors and art
have taken their place as fully fledged fields of study, with the capacity for being
combined with existing fields and interests.
The main question arising from this apparent explosion of interest is: what
prompted such a radical re-appraisal of Mudejar history and such a keen
interest? The relative abundance of later years came about through major
historiographical developments – namely a greater interest in cultural history,
religious history and the minorities themselves being given a greater voice in the
texts and commentaries being produced. The main consequence of these
changes was to move the historical focus to multicultural and multilingual
regions, and thereby to the Mediterranean. These changes allowed historians to
approach a relatively uncharted topic from many new angles. Indeed, the area of
Muslim and Christian contact has become so well explored in recent decades
that any historian new to the topic might find himself bewildered by the vast
scope of the material now available to him, particularly when the study of the
Moriscos alone now constitutes a completely separate field of work. One
downside to the abundance of interest is that it encourages niche study, with
historians rarely venturing beyond their own field of expertise for fear of criticism
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and attack from elsewhere. This can often prevent an historian from continually
acquainting himself with developments in the field.
As part of an increasingly heightened interest in the field, various concepts
are adopted by historians, such as Menéndez Pidal, who argued a continuist
theory. The issue of continuity (whether there was a persistence of the underlying
structures inherent in the communities before the conquest) against discontinuity
(that the conquest totally disrupted patterns of local indigenous life) is an
argument that continues to rage amongst historians of Spanish history and
shows no sign of abating. Equally contentious is the issue of optimism versus
pessimism – whether the conquered minority’s life was tolerable or the subject of
persecution. A subsidiary issue which affects all areas of this field is the question
of what constitutes acceptable terminology when examining both the Christian
and the Muslim structures in place before and after conquest.
Historians have often simply dismissed the idea of discontinuity through
the extent of Islamic survivals (engineered by James I’s surrender treaties) but a
third argument – one that argues continuity of function in areas of religious life
but that it was also discontinuous in its new Christian context – grew throughout
the 1970s, a decade where Mudejar studies in particular really began to flourish.
This broke away from the scenario of one versus the other which had
preoccupied historians up to this point. Mudejarism was instead, it was argued,
something new created out of the old. From an era for which Arabic documents
are sparse, the surviving Mudejar documents from Spain may help to provide a
balanced appraisal of the Muslim’s life before and after the conquests.
Then there is the question of whether tolerance or intolerance was shown
towards the conquered. Many of the presumptions made are imposed upon the
material rather than necessarily being indicative of the minorities themselves.
The extreme polarities of the optimist (that continuing traditions indicated a
profitable future for those conquered) and the pessimist (that the conquest
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robbed the indigenous population of their societal structure) are balanced by
those historians who seek a middle view, namely that the experience of a
conquered minority differed from region to region and from decade to decade.
For example, the later thirteenth century was certainly more harmonious than the
period immediately post-conquest: James’ son and heir enjoyed a relatively
peaceful time thanks, mainly, to the efforts of his father.
James’ surrender agreements also draw differing views. For example,
Cagigas and Menéndez Pidal view them as vindictive and as signs of intolerance
whereas Michavila y Vila sees James as badly treating his charges, who
received more humane treatment at the hands of Pere after the rebellions of the
late 1270s. Indeed, if an historian chooses a particular side this can often reflect
attitudes and influences from his own time rather than those particular to the
period of study. Hence, an historian interested in economic history may examine
this to the exclusion of the social element; a social historian to the exclusion of
the religious; an attempt to analyse the worker class may lead to an unintentional
separation from the ruling and administrative elite, whereas in reality the two
were inexorably intertwined.
An Islamic bias might lead an historian to look at the retention of religion,
schools, diet and the existence of a relatively well-off elite into the next century
as his evidence. An emphasis would also rest on language and the fact that
Arabic continued to persist, as if in defiance of the new milieu. This is expressed
through Louis Cardaillac’s idea of the shield and sword of Islam. Modern
preconceptions impact here. The latter day concept of tolerance does not fit this
period of the middle - ages, as the Mudejar effected his own exclusion by clinging
to ancient rites and customs. Assimilation would have been a concept foreign to
both Christian and Muslim at this time. The status of the Valencian Mudejar, in
particular, is likely to be contested and debated by historians for many years to
come – was he oppressed, reasonably prosperous or living in his concept of a
nightmare? For example, Dolors Bramon argues that the Mudejars continued to
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have a sense of commonalty, as shown by their election of Al-Azraq as a revolt
leader in the 1240s.
By the 1980s, despite the burgeoning interest, some problems remained,
with few historians attempting to re-ignite the arguments begun by Americo
Castro and Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz (that some special ‘key’ for understanding
Spanish history existed), even though those such as Vicente Contarino had re-
argued a similar case. This decade and the one following it changed historians’
approach to a stale question. The argument that orthodox medieval Christianity’s
view of Islam created the very peculiarities that separated Spain from its
European cousins was countered and altered by Reyna Pastor de Togneri in
relation to Toledo. Castro and Sanchez’s arguments were dismissed and instead
it was argued that a de-structuring of the Muslim economy led to a replacement
typifying the social and economic attitudes of the aggressors. Whilst this
approach has problems of its own (it is very focused on the society’s elite class
and its economic structures), it represented a breaking of the shackles and
enabled the debate to broaden and begin to move on.
There remains the tendency to impose modern moralistic standards on
certain topics – for example, slavery, which would not have been viewed as
inhumane by thirteenth-century Spaniards. However, it is not particularly
surprising that historians are divided on the many contentious topics when James
I’s own autobiography, a key source, is so ambivalent towards his subjects.
Teruel’s resurgence in Mudejar studies has led to intensive courses being
provided on this minority. During 1995, twenty hours of instruction were made
available under the banner of six different topics. Other sets of seminars were
provided for an examination of art and ceramics. The series Sharq Al-Andalus
has changed its emphasis from estudios arabes to estudios mudejares y
moriscos. Whilst much remains in Spanish archives to be uncovered and
researched, even obscure collections have finding aids such as Maria Teresa
Ferrer i Mallol’s catalogue for fourteenth century Aragon.
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